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Listening and Normative Entanglement: A Pragmatic Foundation for 
Conversational Ethics 
Susan E Notess 
 
Abstract 
People care very much about being listened to. In everyday talk, we make 
moral-sounding judgements of people as listeners: praising a doctor who listens 
well even if she does not have a ready solution, or blaming a boss who does not 
listen even if the employee manages to get her situation addressed. In this sense, 
listening is a normative behaviour: that is, we ought to be good listeners. Whilst 
several disciplines have addressed the normative importance of interpersonal 
listening—particularly in sociology, psychology, media and culture studies—
analytic philosophy does not have a framework for dealing with listening as a 
normative interpersonal behaviour. Listening usually gets reduced mere speech-
parsing (in philosophy of language), or into a matter of belief and trust in the 
testimony of credible knowers (in social epistemology). My preliminary task is to 
analyse why this reductive view is taken for granted in the discipline;  to diagnose 
the problem behind the reduction and propose a more useful alternative approach. 
The central task of my work is to give an account of listening which 
captures its distinctively normative quality as an interpersonal way of relating to 
someone: one listens not because the speaker is an epistemic expert, but because 
the speaker is a person, worthy of recognition and care. I created a framework 
which accomplishes this by deploying the conceptual resources of conversation 
sociology and psycholinguistics, in counterpoint to the standing philosophical 
work on the ethics and politics of speech and silencing, to create a practical ethics 
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‘Careful the things you say; children will listen 
Careful you do it too; children will see and learn’ 
—Stephen Sondheim1 
We the people, in our ordinary talk, talk about listening in ways that show 
we place value on being listened to, such that we ordinarily make moral-sounding 
judgements about the listening behaviour of others. My opening claim is this: 
Listening is treated (by we the people, in our ordinary talk, not by philosophers) as a 
moral concept. When identifying what it means ‘to listen to someone’, we need to 
see how it is conceptually different from other concepts of speech-responsiveness 
(such as hearing, understanding, comprehending, grasping, believing, agreeing, 
being convinced, complying, obeying…). What is distinctive about listening? It 
helps to look at some of the remarkable distinctions people make, such as: ‘I don’t 
think I managed to convince her, but at least she listened to me this time.’ 
Distinctions like these can be found for all the other concepts above. Listening 
behaviour often tracks with one or more of those concepts but is evidently not 
clearly reducible to any one or any firm combination of them. 
What makes listening distinct from other concepts of speech-
responsiveness is that, whereas the others are perceptual, linguistic, and 
epistemic, listening is a particular kind of normatively loaded concept. What I 
mean by this is that listening is a concept we wheel out specifically for the purpose 
 
1 Stephen Sondheim and James Lapine, Into the Woods, 16th print (New York: Theatre Communications 
Group, 2010), 136. 
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of judging the normativity of a person’s mode of responsiveness—to praise good 
listening, to blame people who fail or refuse to listen. We have norms for 
conversation, norms of language use, norms of knowledge and belief, and moral 
norms around epistemic responsiveness. The burgeoning literatures on virtue 
epistemology, building on Miranda Fricker’s foundation in Epistemic Injustice,2 
highlight the norms that guide the way we treat people as knowers, and how 
failures to correctly respond to knowers (such as a prejudice-based credibility 
deficit) cause such knowers to be harmed in that very capacity. 
A recurring theme in this literature is that epistemic injustices look, in 
many cases, like a failure to listen to someone. In my initial investigations, I was 
often pointed to The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, a collected volume of 
essays edited by Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr.3 On the 
cover of this book is a photograph of an open hand; someone has scrawled the word 
‘LISTEN’ in capital letters across the palm. Yet a search of the entire book reveals 
fewer than 50 uses of verbs of listening across the 438 page volume. Most of these 
uses are one-off descriptors standing in as synonyms for cases in which someone 
was not believed by someone else. Three essays, however, refer repeatedly to 
listening as its own concept.4 A look at the contrasts between these essays is 
revealing. 
A Question for Virtue Epistemology? 
In ‘Allies behaving badly: gaslighting as epistemic injustice’, Rachel 
McKinnon highlights a recurring problem of allies not listening to those they claim 
to support.5 McKinnon uses the phrase ‘not listening’ to point to the phenomenon 
 
2 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
3 The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (New York: Routledge, 2017). 
4 Rachel McKinnon, ‘Allies Behaving Badly’, in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James 
Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 167–74, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043-16; José Medina, ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice’, in The 
Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile M. Pohlhaus (New York: 
Routledge, 2017), 41–52; Anastasia Philippa Scrutton, ‘Epistemic Injustice and Mental Illness’, in The 
Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, 1st ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2017), 347–55, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043-34. 
5 McKinnon, ‘Allies Behaving Badly’, 2017, 167–74. 
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which, on her analysis, builds up to a form of gaslighting. If not listening to 
someone is equivalent to gaslighting them, then we would certainly have grounds 
to consider the moral stakes of listening as a concept; however, gaslighting is a 
term used to pick out a specific kind of oppressive behaviour,6 and the mundane 
familiarity with which we negotiate about listening and being listened to on a day-
to-day basis does not seem to pick out something so starkly malicious. No, what 
McKinnon seems to be doing here is building a case to show how patterns in 
something mundane—like whether or not we listen to someone—can be used in 
bigger picture harms. This seems true, and it tells us something about gaslighting, 
but it does not really tell us anything about how to theorise what listening is or how 
to do it. The relationship between listening and bigger picture harms, including 
gaslighting, is dealt with in Chapter 2. 
In ‘Epistemic injustice and mental illness’, Anastasia Philippa Scrutton 
explores psychiatric diagnosis and treatment as a case study for epistemic 
injustice.7 Psychiatrists are medical experts and, in most cases, psychiatric 
patients are not. Only the patient—the experient—can tell the psychiatrist what 
their experience has been, but experients of psychiatric disorders are frequently 
not taken to be credible witnesses. For appropriate diagnosis and treatment to 
take place, doctors have to find out from the patients what is going on, and this, 
we tend to say, requires doctors to listen to the patients. However, the doctor is in 
a position of authority and expertise, and as such is in a position to gainsay 
patients, it would seem. The epistemic discrepancy creates a tension around the 
need for patients to feel sure that they have been listened to by their doctors. 
This tension highlights a problem for understanding ‘listening’ as a posture 
of epistemic attention and reaction. What we demand of healthcare professionals 
is that they listen to patients, but also bring their expertise to bear, even if that 
means not (necessarily) quite believing the patient’s take on what is going on or 
what must be done. A doctor needs to be able to correct a patient’s idea of what 
 
6 Kate Abramson, ‘Turning up the Lights on Gaslighting’, Philosophical Perspectives 28, no. 1 (1 December 2014): 
1–30, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12046. 
7 Scrutton, ‘Epistemic Injustice and Mental Illness’, 347–55. 
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sorts of treatment might be appropriate, for example, and the doctor should by no 
means be held hostage to a patient’s non-expert beliefs in the name of listening to 
the patient’s voice. Scrutton’s case studies reveal, however, that there is more at 
stake in these interactions besides a contest of credibility or expertise. One patient 
who complained of not being listened to mentioned that the doctor had not even 
heard what she had said, but had ‘scrutinised’ her like an object, and she felt 
‘mocked’.8 Similarly, in a case study on general healthcare and epistemic injustice, 
Kidd and Carel cite patients’ descriptions of not being listened to as ‘he just 
laughed off my genuine and serious concern… I never did get a proper reply to that 
question.’9 
The contrast between the doctor’s expertise and the patient’s lack thereof 
means that the doctor may not believe at face value everything the patient says—
we are used to that somewhat irritating but understandable truth—but what the 
patients are concerned about is feeling that they are laughed at, mocked, 
scrutinised as objects, and not given answers to their questions. The complaint 
about not being listened to seems to pick out a much broader worry about being 
responded to and cared for in a right way that need not necessarily always boil 
down to an epistemic worry about being believed. Instead, the concept of 
‘listening to someone’ has more to do with paying attention, taking them seriously, 
and responding appropriately. A theory of listening needs to capture what it is to 
pay attention to someone and to take them ‘seriously’. This is an ethics issue, but 
not one that can be addressed using only the tools of epistemology. 
The third essay which brings listening into focus is ‘Varieties of 
hermeneutical injustice’ by José Medina.10 Hermeneutical injustice refers to the 
familiar truth that some experiences are difficult to convey; our languages do not 
always have the expressive resources necessary to get certain kinds of stories 
 
8 Scrutton, 349. 
9 Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd, ‘Epistemic Injustice in Medicine and Healthcare’, in The Routledge Handbook 
of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 
2017), 338, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043-33. 
10 Medina, ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice’, 41–52. 
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across, particularly those that oppressed groups might wish to tell. Where such 
gaps exist, according to Miranda Fricker, when we lack words or ways for some 
groups’ voices to be justly heard and considered, we have cases of hermeneutical 
injustice.11 Medina considers a variety of ways that hermeneutical injustice can 
occur and can be resisted. He writes: 
For example, expanding the available vocabulary may meliorate some 
hermeneutical injustices, but it will not do when what is needed is more 
attunement or sensitivity to an expressive style. Hermeneutical courage and self-
trust on the side of those trying to articulate a new experience may be what 
is needed in some cases, but it will not help with cases in which what creates 
the problem is a resistance on the listener’s side, not the expressive limitations of 
the speaker. Improving ways of listening and giving uptake may meliorate 
hermeneutical injustices produced by interpersonal dynamics.12 
Whether due to systemic and structural injustice or a problem at the interpersonal 
level, a listener who resists or is not attuned to a speaker gets in the way of that 
speaker’s capacity to be heard and taken seriously. 
Following Fricker, Medina suggests that one form of resistance to this 
particular kind of injustice is to become a virtuous listener. In Fricker’s words, the 
virtuous listener develops: 
…an alertness or sensitivity to the possibility that the difficulty one’s 
interlocutor is having as she tries to render something communicatively 
intelligible is due not to its being a nonsense or her being a fool, but rather to 
some sort of gap in collective hermeneutical resources.13 
If a patient expresses their worries to a doctor, it seems we would expect the 
virtuous doctor to be alert and sensitive to the possibilities that the patient does 
not have the communicative resources to convey their experience as meaningfully 
as one would like; if the doctor is a virtuous listener then she will accordingly 
 
11 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 147–75. 
12 Medina, ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice’, 48 [emphasis mine]. 
13 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 169. 
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support the patient to find ways to express her experience rather than laughing 
off, mocking, or disregarding the patient’s take. 
The question is: just how does one do this? Medina suggests a brief list of 
features that characterise virtuous listening, such as: 
…knowing when to shut up, knowing when to suspend one’s own judgment 
about intelligibility, calling critical attention to one’s own limited expressive 
habits and interpretative expectations, listening for silences, checking with 
others who are differently situated, letting others set the tone and the 
dynamics of a communicative exchange, etc.14  
It is a good list of features, and a great start to understanding what praiseworthy 
listening might look like. What it shows us, however, is that much of the work of 
listening sits well outside the domain of epistemology. A listener has practical 
wisdom—knowing when to stop talking and being attentive to the silences of 
others. A listener pays attention to her own expressive habits as part of an 
interacting system. Whether a patient feels listened to by a doctor has much less 
to do with the precise mental contents believed by the doctor in the presumed 
privacy of his mind; rather, a patient feels listened to because of how the doctor 
responds to her. The behaviours and expressive habits of the doctor are what let 
the patient know that her voice has been heard and taken seriously. 
To build a theoretical account of what it means to listen to someone, virtue 
epistemology provides a good point of departure. The virtue ethical framework 
provides apt tools for exploring the close relationships between listening as a 
perceptual stance or ‘internal’ attitude, and an embodied mode of interacting with 
people. Virtue ethics is also a useful framework for describing an ethical good that 
we want there to be enough of, but which can also go too far. Virtue epistemology 
is good for helping us articulate why there is a problem of injustice that occurs 
when people’s voices are not rightly received or are even smothered, but there are 
also limitations to this approach. Virtue epistemology in particular is good for 
reminding us that we should not underestimate the degree to which we should 
 
14 Medina, ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice’, 48. 
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trust someone—they may have expertise of a kind we are ignoring; they may be 
more credible than we expect, or they may be grappling their way around a 
hermeneutic lacuna. But what about when we need to listen to someone who 
simply is not trustworthy, who does not have expertise or credibility? 
To listen to the voices of the most vulnerable subjects in our communities, 
and to hear out those who are so often subjected to prejudiced dismissal, we need 
to be virtuous in such a way that we nevertheless are attuned to, sensitive to, alert 
to, and supportive of the things people are trying to say. If we are virtuous 
listeners, then we will be well set up to respond rightly to those who are experts or 
otherwise trustworthy, but we will also be well set up to respond rightly to the 
frightened child who tells us tales of monsters under the bed. 
A brief aside: It should be noted that two concerns co-exist here. One is that 
we need to listen to children even when they are not in a position to offer 
epistemically credible testimony. The other is that we need to not propagate 
epistemic injustice against children by undermining them as knowers. Burroughs 
and Tollefsen argue the second point, claiming that, ‘We need to develop a 
relational conception of child testimonial agency that includes the adult and her 
ability to actively listen to the child.’15 The arguments of Burroughs and Tollefsen 
resonate with my project, but it is not clear that the concept of active listening as 
it stands in the literature on education will do the work we need it to do. For 
example, Burroughs and Tollefsen describe active listening as a skill of being open 
to the different ways that children prefer to communicate, which ‘contributes to 
the development of a potential speaker’s voice and creates the conditions for a child 
to speak and be heard.’16 This advice seems sound, but it does not account for what 
the underlying concept of listening is picking out, nor explain why it is so 
significant. I take it to be the case that ‘active listening’, like empathy (see note 32), 
is a concept often invoked to try to explain listening, but which itself would be 
 
15 Michael D. Burroughs and Deborah Tollefsen, ‘Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child’, 
Episteme 13, no. 3 (September 2016): 360, https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.64. 
16 Burroughs and Tollefsen, 371, 374. 
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much easier to understand if we had a robust theory of listening in place. 
Therefore, it does not serve an explanatory role in my project.  
Some Starting Assumptions 
If listening to people is a virtue to be cultivated, what sort of virtue is it? We 
begin here by setting out some of the commonly held assumptions which seem to 
be at play in guiding our everyday talk about listening. The claims which follow are 
general trends in how we talk about listening; each of these is given to ensure we 
have the right explananda in focus. The content of these claims will be interpreted, 
critiqued, and argued for over the course of the subsequent chapters. 
Listening is like honesty, in that it is a normatively loaded term. That is to 
say, when we wheel out the word ‘listening’, we do so in order to judge someone’s 
interpersonal responsiveness as praiseworthy or blameworthy. Consider a patient 
who receives information from a doctor about available cancer treatments. The 
patient tries as best he can to understand the information, and then relays it to his 
family. As it happens, some of the information he relays is false, due to his limited 
understanding. The patient does not have any intent to deceive. In such a case, 
does the patient count as being dishonest? Or is this an honest mistake? It depends 
on whether we decide the error was in some way blameworthy. To say that the 
patient has been honest just is to say that he has not been guilty of mishandling the 
truth. 
To say that a person is not listening just is to say that something has gone 
wrong in their handling of their interlocutor’s voice and claims. I make this 
assumption because it squares with how we the people talk about listening; it is an 
assumption that would not be wise to make if listening were about believing 
someone to be credible or trustworthy. But as listening to people involves a much 
broader array of responsive postures besides those subject to epistemological 
norms, there is not a problem with making this assumption. A person can listen 
and yet not be persuaded. A person can listen and yet not comply with the speaker’s 
wishes. People may disagree at times over what level of persuasion and 
compliance ought to manifest if a speaker is being rightly listened to, just as we 
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may disagree about the culpability of the confused cancer patient. But in both 
cases, honesty and listening are terms used to stamp approval or disapproval on 
someone’s behaviour. 
Listening is also like kindness. Suppose I try do a favour for a friend, but it 
turns out to cause her great inconvenience. I meant well, but the outcome of my 
actions created problems for her. Would my act be considered a kindness? Again, 
we might debate which features of the situation qualify it for a positive or negative 
moral judgement. Key to the debate would be the question of how feasible it is to 
separate my intentions from the impact of my actions. A villain in a story might 
tend carefully to her victim in order to keep him alive for a key future plot point. 
These actions on the surface may resemble kindness, but with such malicious 
intent, is it right to call them kindness? A bumbling friend may have the kindest of 
intentions but cause great destruction; is it right for his gestures to be called 
kindnesses? If we judge that on the whole his efforts were praiseworthy, then yes; 
if we judge them blameworthy, then no. 
The correspondence between motivations, intentions, and outcomes is 
likewise important for listening—and this is typical of how virtues work in virtue 
ethical frameworks. A fully virtuous person possesses an excellence of perception 
to assess what should be done; has the right sort of motivations and intentions in 
responding to the situation at hand, and has the excellence—the skills and 
practical wisdom—necessary to ensure that the desired results are brought 
about.17 A partially virtuous person may have kind intentions but have imperfect 
judgement about what would constitute a kindness in a given case,  or he may have 
limited skill in acting in such a way as to produce an outcome which is in fact a 
kindness. An exemplar of virtue, particularly an exemplar of virtuous listening, 
has this full trifecta: (1) right perceptions of what listening requires in a given case, 
(2) the intention to be rightly responsive to the speaker, and (3) the skill required 
to produce the result that they do in fact listen to the speaker. 
 
17 Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of 
Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 137. 
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It is a feature of virtue ethical theories that they deal well with the 
complexity of moral goods that seem to require an integration of motivation, 
perception, and skill in bringing about right outcomes. This integration can be 
helpful with respect to understanding epistemological goods. In theorising 
epistemic norms like sincerity and honesty it is sensible, for clarity’s sake, to 
assume that one’s internal mental states and external actions function separately. 
The problem in cases of insincerity or dishonesty stems from an agent having one 
thing going on in the head, whilst claiming something to the contrary. The 
disunity, or dis-integration of perceptions, intentions, and action gives rise to 
instances of epistemically vicious behaviour (e.g., lying, deception). The 
epistemologist may be content to preserve the theoretical usefulness of keeping 
mental states and interpersonal actions distinct, but I propose that this kind of 
disintegration of the internal and external, where it occurs in actuality, is both an 
achievement (rather than a default way for things to be) and a cause for concern.18 
For example, it seems farfetched to suppose that one can genuinely listen 
to someone internally and yet manage to entirely conceal this fact, or vice versa. I 
work instead from a more embodied approach to mental actions, assuming that 
by default, we reveal through our behaviour what sort of listening is going on 
‘inside’—an assumption which is supported by sociological, linguistic, and 
psychological analyses of how conversation works (see Chapters 5 and 6). To 
genuinely conceal or misdirect someone is an achievement. Not everyone would 
have the actor’s skill of portraying in their behaviour something contrary to their 
genuine responsiveness; only some can manage that pretence. So yes, I take it that 
behavioural and internal actions may sometimes diverge, but this is an 
accomplishment which is only meaningful as a deviation from the ordinary case, 
and which can be an early form of the disintegration which will be examined in the 
chapters ahead as both a cause and an effect, at various times, of vicious 
behaviour. Chapter 2 gives especially close attention to the disintegration which 
 
18 By ‘achievement’ I mean that it is not the default way for things to be, but rather is a state of affairs which 
must be brought about, or accomplished, as the result of some processes. I do not use ‘achievement’ in the 
evaluative sense, to label something wonderful that has been admirably brought about. 
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results from moral damage and from experiencing ongoing psychological 
oppression. 
Listening, in its most iconic form, takes place between two interlocutors 
involved in a personal, private conversation. The concept of listening is also vital 
for describing more complex contexts—how a teacher listens to her class 
(collective agent), how a jury (collective agent) listens to a witness, how institutions 
listen to their constituents (both collective agents)—but I am working here from 
the assumption that these other forms of listening are variations on the central 
theme of conversational listening; therefore, I focus almost exclusively on the 
dyadic theme here.19 We do find discussions of listening as a professional 
technique of the therapist or the educator, wherein the concept of listen is largely 
functioning as the explanans rather than explanandum.20 Listening also appears in 
discussions of deliberation and rational discourse, with a similar limitation.21 The 
value of listening is evident in these discourses, and the exhortation to listen can 
clearly be seen in the professional and ethical demands of the educator, the 
therapist, and the rational debater—and rightly so, in my view. But they do not 
 
19 For a look at collective listening in the context of politics and broadcast, see Kate Lacey, ed., Listening 
Publics: The Politics and Experience of Listening in the Media Age (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, 2013). There is 
also ongoing theoretical work on how group deliberation and group inquiry ought to proceed, such as Scott 
Aikin and Caleb Clanton’s work on group-deliberative virtues or Michael Hannon’s work on empathy and 
understanding in democracy. See Scott F. Aikin and J. Caleb Clanton, ‘Developing Group-Deliberative 
Virtues’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 27, no. 4 (November 2010): 409–24, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
5930.2010.00494.x; Michael Hannon, ‘Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy’, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 101, no. 3 (November 2020): 591–611, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12624. As with 
most of the epistemological literature discussed above, listening occasionally comes up, but it does not 
receive extensive treatment. 
20 Barbara Applebaum, ‘“Listening Silence” and Its Discursive Effects’, Educational Theory 66, no. 3 (2016): 
389–404, https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12172; Andrea R. English, ‘Humility, Listening and ‘Teaching in a 
Strong Sense’’, Logos & Episteme 7, no. 4 (2016): 529–54, https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20167446; 
Jennifer Radden and John Z. Sadler, The Virtuous Psychiatrist: Character Ethics in Psychiatric Practice, 
International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
21 Daniel H. Cohen, ‘Argumentative Virtues as Conduits for Reason’s Causal Efficacy: Why the Practice of 
Giving Reasons Requires That We Practice Hearing Reasons’, Topoi 38, no. 4 (December 2019): 711–18, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9364-x; Katharina Stevens, ‘The Virtuous Arguer: One Person, Four 
Roles’, Topoi 35, no. 2 (October 2016): 375–83, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9309-4; Alessandra Tanesini, 
‘Arrogance, Anger and Debate’, Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5, 
no. 2 (2018): 213–27, https://doi.org/10.5840/symposion20185217; Alessandra Tanesini, ‘Arrogance, 
Polarisation and Arguing to Win’, in Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. 
Alessandra Tanesini and Michael P Lynch (London: Routledge, 2020), 158–74. 
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provide an answer to the question of interest to us here, of how to understand what 
listening is in the first place, how it works, and why it matters so much. 
I also take listening to be a fundamental mode of human relating, a way of 
treating the people we are interacting with, whoever they may be or whatever our 
respective social roles. Even so, to have normative judgements of listening show 
up to best advantage, we will often consider scenarios in which one participant 
does have a professional role on the basis of which the person has explicit or 
increased duties to listen. The earlier chapters in particular reach for scenarios 
where professional roles mandate listening to a comparatively vulnerable person, 
as we get clear about what it is that we are talking about when we talk about people 
not listening to us. The later chapters shift to scenarios with less explicitly role-
based listening duties, in order to become clearer about how the ordinary 
infrastructure of conversational behaviour gives rise to the constitutive norms of 
listening behaviour, and further, to the moral norms of listening.  
What About Philosophy of Language? 
The other potential port of departure for a project like this would be 
philosophy of language. Literature on silencing in particular offers a way to look 
at problems and complications of communicative agency. One could theorise 
listening with respect to speech act theory, as a virtue of giving uptake rightly—a 
virtue exposited by Nancy Potter,22 and not far off from the sort of thing listening 
seems to be. One could theorise listening with respect to the project of 
understanding others, in the Wittgensteinian or Gricean senses, and this would 
also not be far off. Philosophy of language also plays host to much of our 
theoretical work on silencing; perhaps listening is the opposite of silencing? I take 
all of these connections to be relevant and productive, and they all make 
appearances in the thesis, in Chapters 2 and 4. 
However, I have not taken philosophy of language as my main port of 
departure for this project. There are two reasons for this. One is practical: I make 
 
22 Nancy Potter, ‘Giving Uptake’, Social Theory and Practice 26, no. 3 (2000): 479–508. 
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significant use of sociolinguistics and Conversation Analysis (a subdiscipline of 
sociology) in my arguments, and these empirical perspectives do not always mesh 
easily with the theoretically idealising tendencies of philosophies of language. This 
is not to say that they are in conflict; rather, they use very similar terminology in 
sometimes very different ways, and work with different baseline assumptions. I 
found that it was clearer to allocate one chapter (Chapter 2) to exploring the link 
between listening, uptake, and silencing. Through that chapter I draw useful 
concepts from philosophy of language into my framework, importing and, where 
necessary, reorienting them, so that I can use them in investigating how our 
linguistic and sociological behaviours get picked out by a judgement that someone 
is a virtuous listener. 
The other reason why I have not based my argument in philosophy of 
language is also the answer to a broader question about the reasons why this 
project is valuable for analytic philosophy. I was astonished to find that there did 
not seem to be any substantial philosophical literature exploring listening, given 
that listening is so important to us as people. Some Continental theorists explore 
themes around listening, such as linguistic perception which likens listening to 
reading and dwelling in language (Heidegger, Derrida);23 embodied 
responsiveness (Merleau-Ponty);24 hermeneutic interpretation (Gadamer);25 and 
broad phenomenological considerations of the encounters between a subject and 
‘the other’ (Sartre, Levinas).26 
These themes are given treatment in Gemma Corradi Fiumara’s book, The 
Other Side of Language. She notes the dearth of philosophical attention to listening 
 
23 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger, trans. David Farrell Krell, Routledge Classics (London: 
Routledge, 2011); Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press [u.a.], 1988). 
24 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Psychology Press, 2002). 
25 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982). 
26 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (London: Routledge, 2003); 
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Duquesne Studies. Philosophical Series 24 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969); Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, 
European Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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as such as the reason why she builds a Continental philosophy of listening out of 
the materials of Heidegger and Gadamer’s work. She writes: 
From one extreme to the other in the vast array of possible social interactions 
the stress inevitably falls on the irreplaceable value of the expressive capacity 
rather than on a propensity to listen. The ‘attentive willingness’ to listen is 
even perceived as an eminently ‘futile’ stance that need not even surface in 
our culture, in spite of the fact that it represents a vital and essential requisite 
for thought. ‘God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of 
everyone’s eyes’, is one of Wittgenstein’s remarks. Perhaps the problem of 
listening is also in front of our eyes and we simply fail to see it.27 
Fiumara suggests that philosophy’s historical lack of attention to listening has its 
roots not only in philosophy’s zeal for the visual,28 but also in a commitment to 
devitalised abstraction.29 The notion of listening, she says, ‘is so alien to us that 
generally we do not even consider it worthy of our philosophical attention’.30 This 
point is echoed by Jean-Luc Nancy, who asks, ‘Isn’t the philosopher someone who 
always hears (and who hears everything), but who cannot listen, or who, more 
precisely, neutralizes listening within himself, so that he can philosophize?’31 
These critiques apply in both Continental and Anglo-American Analytic 
traditions, but we will not dwell here on the claims that the activity of philosophy 
is in itself allergic to the particularity and vulnerability of listening. Instead, I work 
from the assumption that philosophical activity may have many different goals, 
some of which make it difficult to see the significance of listening.  Those goals 
and the theories they lead to have their own merits, but they do not serve the needs 
of my project. We will see why this is so in the course of the discussion that follows. 
 
27 Gemma Corradi Fiumara, The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of Listening, Revised (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 31. 
28 For a phenomenological critique and remediation of philosophy’s historical fixation on the visual to the 
exclusion of the sonic, see Adriana Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression 
(Stanford University Press, 2005); Peter Szendy, Listen: A History of Our Ears (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008). 
29 Fiumara, The Other Side of Language, 30. 
30 Fiumara, 39. 




In the analytic tradition, texts that seemed most likely to hold theoretical 
insights about listening consistently elide the concept over into a matter of 
believing people (epistemology again, as highlighted at the start of this chapter) 
or, occasionally, into philosophy of emotion under the banner of ‘empathy’.32 I 
attended many conferences over the course of this project, and at each I asked 
nearly everyone I met whether they had run into any philosophical work on 
listening as such. This exercise confirmed to me that there did not seem to be an 
existing body of work of the kind I was looking for. Either this is a genuine lacuna, 
or there is a reason for the gap—perhaps there is nothing distinctive about 
listening, I worried; perhaps my project is ill-advised. Two discoveries alleviated 
this worry. 
The Search for a Politics of Listening 
One discovery was an array of philosophy-adjacent discourses that do talk 
about the importance of theorisation about listening, including its ethical and 
political importance—most especially in the contexts of democratic discourse, the 
public sphere, and education. These discourses sound a refrain about the strange 
and problematic neglect of the subject matter. Susan Bickford notes Plato’s 
explicit recognition in the start of The Republic that without listening, there can be 
no persuasion. 
Yet neither Plato nor his successors give explicit theoretical attention to the 
role of listening, and to a large degree, this theoretical neglect of listening 
extends to contemporary democratic theory. This omission is particularly 
surprising given democratic theorists' emphasis on shared speech as a 
practice of citizenship.33 
Mondal follows the trajectory to its repetition in Mill: 
 
32 Empathy itself is a fraught concept in philosophy; there is such a wide array of definitions that defining 
listening in terms of empathy would seem to create more confusion, not less. I have therefore left empathy 
out of the thesis altogether; perhaps a better understanding of listening to people can help us understand 
how we could best think about empathy. 
33 Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy: Listening, Conflict, and Citizenship (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 2018), 1, https://www-degruyter-com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/view/title/551537. 
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Mill sunders the relationality of social communication on which his wider 
argument would appear to rest. The listener is no longer a part of a 
communicative transaction… but rather an isolated, abstracted, and 
disembodied receiver of an equally abstracted, discrete ‘message’…34 
Kate Lacey notes (2013): 
Listening has long been overlooked in studies of the media as well as in 
conceptualizations of the public sphere. …The curious neglect of listening in 
relation to media and the public sphere has a long and complex history, but 
it is crucially bound up with a cultural hierarchy of the senses that privileges 
the visual over the auditory… and a logocentric frame in which listening is 
encoded as passive in opposition to the acts of writing, reading, and speech.35 
Andrew Dobson says (2014): 
Although much prized in daily conversation, good listening has been almost 
completely ignored in political conversation, and particularly the form we 
know as democracy.36 
Leah Bassel echoes (2017): 
…listening has been relatively understudied in social and political life, in 
contrast to the focus on voice and speaking.37 
The sentiment still holds in 2018, as emphasised in a collection of essays engaging 
with the work of those cited above: 
There is a growing recognition that both scholarship and practice on the 
politics of difference and the ethics of intercommunal solidarities have 
privileged the concepts of ‘voice’, representation, and the liberal framework 
of ‘free speech’, while the practices and politics of ‘listening’ remain largely 
 
34 Anshuman A Mondal, ‘On Liberty on Listening: John Stuart Mill and the Limits of Liberal Responsiveness’, 
in Ethical Responsiveness and the Politics of Difference, ed. Tanja Dreher and Anshuman Mondal (Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018), 44. 
35 Lacey, Listening Publics, 3. 
36 Andrew Dobson, Listening for Democracy: Recognition, Representation, Reconciliation, First Edition (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2. 
37 Leah Bassel, The Politics of Listening: Possibilities and Challenges for Democratic Life (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2017), 4, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/durham/detail.action?docID=4833890. 
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neglected. The result is an overly individualistic focus on the politics of 
expression.38 
I take these repeating claims to be indicative of a growing sentiment, at least 
among those who theorise the public life and democratic discourse, that we need 
far more than a nod to the importance of understanding listening. Those writing 
about the politics of listening are taking a zoomed out, wide-angle view of how 
listening works in society, and in many ways, the things they say about listening 
are right in line with the spirit and aims of my project. However, I am looking for 
a zoomed in view that looks at what listening is in the first place, and how we 
should understand it as a concept. My aim is to explore listening in a way that can 
answer back to the discourses of ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of 
language. 
A Deeper Worry: The Declarative Fallacy 
Lorraine Code noted the lack of this kind of epistemologically usable 
conceptual account in 2006: 
Yet listening is surprisingly unthought, undertheorized in epistemological 
analyses… Although, phenomenologically, it is a familiar part of many 
ordinary lives and its absence is easily perceptible, it resists conceptual 
analysis.39 
The worry about whether this is a genuine lacuna has been answered, as there is a 
persistent felt need for a satisfactory theorisation of listening. But a different 
worry follows from this: If listening itself resists conceptual analysis, and if in 
fifteen years of felt need we have not seen the development of an account of the 
kind we seek, perhaps it can not be done. 
This worry was alleviated by the second discovery. I identified the reason 
why listening seems to resist conceptual analysis—or, more to the point, why 
analytic philosophy has resisted the theoretical weightiness of listening as 
 
38 Tanja Dreher and Anshuman Mondal, eds., Ethical Responsiveness and the Politics of Difference (Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 4. 
39 Lorraine Code, Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, Studies in Feminist Philosophy (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 234. 
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conceptually distinct from our favourite categories of understanding, believing, 
trusting, and above all, speech. That reason stems from what Nuel Belnap calls the 
‘Declarative Fallacy’,40 which refers to our discipline’s tendency to privilege 
declaratives as the most fundamental form of speech act. Even for the various 
pragmatist philosophies of language, declaratives are taken as archetypal, whilst 
imperatives and interrogatives are taken to be derivatives of the indicative mood. 
According to Kukla and Lance, the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy ‘has been 
thwarted by a pervasive assumption that the structure of declarative assertions is the 
privileged or sole dimension of language to which we should attend in order to 
illuminate key questions in metaphysics and epistemology’.41 Even Brandom, the 
giant of inferential pragmatics, claims that ‘Asserting is the fundamental speech 
act.’42 
If this were true, then the norms which govern how we respond to anyone 
else’s speech acts would be of two kinds: discourse functional norms 
(conventional, not moral norms), and epistemological (norms of belief and 
knowledge). If what someone says is true, then I should believe her, and if it is not 
true, then I should disbelieve her. But as Kukla and Lance argue, the performative 
structure of linguistic interaction involves a whole host of normative changes. By 
our speech acts we incur obligations and entitlements. In fact, they argue, all 
speech acts ‘strive to bring about certain normative changes: for example, 
assertions strive to impart beliefs and grant inference licenses, orders strive to 
impute responsibilities for action, and so forth… speech acts can be productively 
analysed in terms of the normative statuses that enable them and the normative 
changes they effect through their performative structure.’43 
 
40 Nuel Belnap, ‘Declaratives Are Not Enough’, Philosophical Studies 59, no. 1 (May 1990): 1–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368389. 
41 Rebecca Kukla and Mark Norris Lance, ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’: The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009), 11. 
42 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, Mass. ; 
London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 173. 
43 Kukla and Lance, ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’, 12–13. 
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Suppose I promise to see to it that p. According to the Declarative Fallacy, 
what this means for you is that you have an opportunity to give uptake or not 
(recognise my illocution as a promise), then to believe I will see to it that p or not, 
and to follow with whatever speech act you fancy. But also, according to Kukla and 
Lance’s view, I have now incurred an obligation to see to it that p, and you are now 
entitled to hold me accountable to this obligation. Speech acts are performative, 
normative events; each one brings about normative changes, generating 
obligations and entitlements. This view is much easier to square with the 
perspective of, for example, linguistic anthropologist Nick Enfield, who uses 
Conversation Analysis to show how our communicative practices are structured 
by constitutive norms which, in turn, generate entitlements and obligations44 (see 
Chapter 6). 
Even utterances which on the surface have the structure of a declarative, 
such as ‘It is cold in here’, function in ways which are not captured by norms of 
knowledge and belief. The statement is not meant to inform someone about the 
objective temperature; it would be bizarre if the statement were met with, ‘I 
believe you.’ The utterance is not apt for credibility evaluation, but it is apt for 
normative evaluation: is it a request, an accusation, or a complaint, seeking to put 
the hearer under obligation to pass over a blanket, on pains of being thought rude? 
Perhaps it is said out a window on a hot summer’s day, as an invitation by means 
of which the hearer incurs an entitlement to enter the speaker’s nicely cooled room 
and find relief from the beating sun—an entitlement which would not otherwise 
have been present. 
If we follow the Declarative Fallacy and take it to be the case that language 
is mainly about declaratives which assert information, and that responding to 
utterances is mainly about epistemic evaluation and credibility judgements, then 
we are bound to miss what is most relevant for our folk normative judgements 
about good listening. If these are our options, it is unclear how we can help the 
 
44 N. J. Enfield and Paul Kockelman, eds., Distributed Agency, Foundations of Human Interaction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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doctor with the paradox of needing to listen to non-expert patients as part of the 
process of providing healthcare. But if language is mainly about acting within and 
on the normative structure of social interaction, about negotiating the obligations 
and entitlements which structure our relations with others, then whole new 
vocabularies open up for exploring the obligations and entitlements involved in 
conversational behaviour, from the medical clinic, to the conference dinner, to the 
court room.  
Shifting Frames 
 At this juncture we stop to ask: if Belnap, Kukla, and Lance are right to call 
the standard commitment to the declarative form a fallacy, then why is this 
commitment par for the course in philosophy of language? Why, moreover, do the 
majority of theorists not seem to be aware of, much less concerned with, 
answering the charges of the Declarative Fallacy? Am I reaching for a niche view 
which suits me, but does not have traction in the wider literature? I claimed above 
that the epistemologist has reasons to prefer to think of internal states and 
external actions as non-integrated, because it is theoretically useful to do so. The 
epistemologist uses a frame for thinking about mental states and actions that 
enables her to focus on just those things she aims to theorise. The frame she uses 
is largely the same as the frame which allows the philosopher of language to 
maintain an intensified focus on the semantics and metaphysics of declaratives. 
Here I follow the tradition harking back to Mark Johnson, among others, of 
identifying frames as the metaphors and narrative templates which we use to 
structure our concepts and to make sense of our world.45 Some frames are explicit 
and give rise to rich clusters of metaphorical idioms, such as the frame which casts 
life as a journey, or the frame which casts knowing as seeing, as in, ‘I see what you 
mean.’ Other frames are more implicit in the way we build our concepts, without 
showing up in metaphorical language. One technique of the theorist is to identify 
frames at work, and to interrogate the suitability of those frames. 
 
45 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2017); 
Code, Ecological Thinking. 
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The frame tacitly at work in the way the epistemologist and the philosopher 
of language approach claims, propositions, and declaratives looks something like 
this: anything someone communicates or says is like a message, which has 
contents. The contents of the message are put in by the mind of the sender (i.e., 
speaker meaning) and received, decoded, and interpreted by the receiver, who 
must decide whether to believe the message, or otherwise. On Elise Springer’s 
view, this approach is a ‘mixed blessing. For speech act theory tends to distil 
communicative activity down to granular or ballistic moves.’46 Furthermore, she 
continues: 
[A]n illocutionary speech act, conceived as a unit of action, is implicitly 
figured as a projectile, perlocutionary effects as its impact. A ballistic action 
can “misfire,” as it were, but then it cannot be salvaged or redirected; at best 
we may try again or undertake damage control.47 
The message, which might be any kind of utterance but is probably a declarative 
on some level, encodes a proposition (semantics). The proposition can be 
evaluated for truthfulness and believability (epistemology), and the sending of the 
message can be evaluated for what it does in the discourse vis-à-vis its 
contribution to epistemic projects, its illocutionary force, and any embedded 
imperative or interrogative content (propositions about what questions are under 
discussion or about what one has obligations and entitlements to do). 
I call this frame the Message in a Bottle frame, and it is wonderfully useful 
when one aims to look at the truth value of claims without the clutter of attending 
to any features of intention, motivation, or social situatedness besides those made 
relevant by the discourse. It is useful for thinking about how testimony works as a 
way to transmit information out of one mind and into another, keeping focus on 
summation of knowledge and not on social features. Useful as this is, it is not 
 
46 Elise Springer, Communicating Moral Concern: An Ethics of Critical Responsiveness (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 2013), 97–98. 
47 Springer, 101. 
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unproblematic, as social epistemology serves to remind us. As Lorraine Code 
describes the classical approach to epistemology, it was based around: 
…projects of reducing objects of knowledge to putatively basic units, often in 
the form of “observational simples” abstracted from their surroundings, and 
of representing knowledge, then, in discrete, isolated propositions, 
commonly in the rubric “S-knows-that-p.” The formal propositional 
structure implies uniformity among knowing subjects and among objects of 
knowledge, once they are extracted from the messiness of situation and 
circumstance, whose specificities claim no epistemological significance. In 
present-day variations on such commitments, in order to avoid 
contamination by interests and affect, properly objective knowledge is 
disconnected from what people care about and want to know. 48 
Theoretically, we treat the message as if it were contained neatly in a bottle so that 
it is not encumbered by interference from wider features of the context. On this 
frame, a listener is viewed as the person uncorking the bottle and reading the 
message within. The listener’s tasks are to decode and interpret the contents of the 
message (what it says, or declares) and to decide what to do with them (to believe, 
or otherwise). It is difficult to see on this view why listening to people would 
consist in anything more than what is picked out by the epistemologist and the 
declarative-centric philosopher of language.49 
The view advanced by Kukla and Lance troubles this framing. With the 
declarative moved out of prominence and the focus instead on how obligations 
and entitlements are modified by each utterance in a discourse, two changes in 
the frame are needed. First, the nature of interpersonal obligations and 
entitlements is such that only a small subset of utterances change the normative 
context for everybody; most of the time, the normative changes occasioned by an 
 
48 Code, Ecological Thinking, 11. 
49 As Lani Watson notes, ‘curiosity’ is etymologically derived from the Latin term cūra, for ‘care’ or ‘concern’. 
The framing we use as philosophers is designed around what we care about, are concerned with, and want 
to know. It does not necessarily serve the cares and concerns of wider human concerns. Perhaps this means 
that what philosophers are curious about misses something key about what people care about. See Lani 
Watson, ‘Curiosity and Inquisitiveness’, in Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, ed. Heather Battaly 
(New York, London: Routledge, 2020), 155–66. 
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utterance will attach specifically to the speaker, to the listener, or to both. (For 
example, if I invite someone into my house, that invitation creates an entitlement 
for that person to enter my home, but this entitlement does not apply to anyone 
else.) Secondly, if utterances change the existing normative context, then 
interpretation requires that we have a grasp of the normative context—and this 
includes understanding facts about who the interlocutors are; the relationship 
which obtains between them; the social and cultural norms that apply, and the 
political dynamics present particularly where there is a power imbalance between 
interlocutors. 
To escape the clutches of the Declarative Fallacy, we need a frame which is 
built to be responsive to the full context of utterances and to highlight the way that 
to speak is to do something in and to the normative context. Now, an approach 
which centres what agents do when they do something is usually called ‘pragmatic’. 
Two pragmatic traditions are in easy reach here. Philosophy of Language includes 
the subdiscipline of formal Pragmatics, where there is indeed a focus on what 
utterances do, or accomplish, in the discourse depending on what they say and 
mean (as in the work of Austin, Grice, and Searle, for example), especially with 
respect to what we know and what is thought to be true or possibly true. Where 
pragmatics attends to the structure of conversation and group inquiry an explicit 
frame is used, known as the conversational scoreboard.50 The Scoreboard frame is a 
metaphor for the understanding shared between participants of what is taken to 
be known (i.e. ‘scored’ as something we know), what questions are under 
discussion (still represented on the scoreboard as being in flux or unresolved), and 
what possibilities are represented by those questions (yet to be eliminated from 
the scoreboard).51 
 
50 This frame originates in Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game”; inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations (John Wiley & Sons, 2010). The frame has been further developed in Robert 
Stalnaker, Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Robert Stalnaker, Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Craige Roberts, 
‘Information Structure in Discourse: Towards an Integrated Formal Theory of Pragmatics’, Semantics and 
Pragmatics 5 (19 December 2012), https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.6; Joshua Habgood-Coote, ‘Group Inquiry’, 
Erkenntnis, 13 March 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00232-5. 
51 A fuller discussion is found in Chapter 5. 
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This frame does a much better job of highlighting the way the conversation 
unfolds as a shared activity of modifying a shared epistemic context, but it still 
predisposes us to the Declarative Fallacy. Operations on the scoreboard are still 
focused on how utterances encode information, and other kinds of locution are 
figured on this view as involving complexly nested declarative claims about what 
should be done to the scoreboard, which questions need to be resolved, and so 
forth. Again, this frame serves a purpose in its own theoretical context, but it is 
neither helpful nor elegant as a way to cash out the changes in normative context. 
Furthermore, it incorporates a competitive dynamic into the way we approach 
conversational operations, where the aim is to eliminate from the scoreboard all 
possibilities that are determined not to be true and to settle questions for the 
record whenever possible. 
This frame produces troubling-sounding results when we try to explain 
why a doctor needs to listen to a confused, non-expert patient. If what the patient 
is claiming happens to be something which has been eliminated from the doctor’s 
consideration as an open possibility, then the patient’s viewpoint risks being 
‘eliminated’. Now, I would not be taken to be saying that the pragmatics views have 
no better ways of dealing with such cases. The point, rather, is that the frame 
modifications necessary to highlight why listening to vulnerable speakers is 
important, even when truth seems quite a distant possibility, yield obfuscatingly 
complex results which do not resonate with the intuitive interpersonal demand 
that we be rightly responsive to what people say, especially vulnerable people. Even 
so, we revisit formal pragmatics in Chapter 5 to identify where listening comes 
apart from the usual pragmatic operations. 
The other tradition in easy reach here is the American Pragmatist 
tradition, stemming from William James, C.S. Peirce, John Dewey, and Jane 
Addams.52 This tradition builds from the originating notion that the project of 
 
52 William James, Pragmatism, 1907; Charles S. Peirce, Nathan Houser, and Christian J. W. Kloesel, The 
Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, 2 vols (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); John 
Dewey, Larry A. Hickman, and Thomas M. Alexander, The Essential Dewey, 2 vols (Bloomington: Indiana 
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knowing the world cannot be separated from the role of agency within the world. 
Pursuit of true ideas is fundamentally bound up with what we can do with ideas, 
and what they can do for us. This approach appeals straightaway to the theorist of 
listening: what we know of someone, what we take them to mean by what they say, 
and what sorts of epistemic decisions we make about what they say are all heavily 
dependent on what we do: as interlocutors, as listeners, as judgers, and as 
members of a community. If we want to keep the normative implications of 
utterance in focus, as do Kukla and Lance, then it seems only natural to keep 
agency and interpersonal action as an inseparable component of what goes on in 
conversation. If we want to highlight the moral significance of the actions in 
conversation, and the moral significance of listening to people, then we certainly 
need to keep action at the centre of how we understand what goes on with 
linguistic communication. It seems an obvious banality to say that action needs to 
be in focus, but saying so is necessary because the Message in a Bottle frame and 
the Scoreboard frame are both designed to background action, keeping a close 
focus instead on the messages and their effects. 
I endorse the American Pragmatist impulse, and my aim is to give an 
account of listening which makes sense of what people are doing to each other 
when they listen to each other, so that we can understand how to locate the moral 
normativity of conversational behaviour within the broader normative structure 
of discourse (those obligations and entitlements again). More specifically, I deploy 
John Dewey’s approach to explaining human conduct through the lens of habit, 
and in turn explaining habit as a relation between agents, each other, and their 
environment. Here, in Dewey’s work, we find the language which suggests a frame 
which would be more appropriate for theorising conversational behaviour, and 
which is picked up by Code as a suitable frame for understanding epistemic 
behaviour. An ecosystem includes the sum of relations between agents, each other, 
 




and their environment. A key contribution of this thesis is the articulation and 
elaboration of the ecosystem frame for understanding conversational behaviour. 
On the basis of this frame, I put forward what I call the Discourse Ecology 
Model. In concert with the ecological attention to habit and social context given by 
Dewey and Card, I offer an explicit framing with which to critically reflect on 
conversational behaviours. This choice of frame not only enables, it predisposes us 
to a broad, pluralistic focus on the interactions between individual speakers, 
communities of speakers, social contexts, linguistic resources, and extenuating 
political and normative factors. To move from an abstract frame to a firm model, 
I trace some basic levels of well-attested patterns and mechanisms of language 
change and variation. By doing so, I am seeding the model with concrete accounts 
of how individual speakers’ and language communities’ habitual and innovative 
utterances affect each other’s behaviours and the discursive environment itself. 
The spread and institutionalisation of new words and word use patterns is 
one of the easiest kinds of shifts to track in the discursive ecology. Much as a 
radioactive agent put into the blood before a scan enables a radiologist to see how 
things are moving and spreading through a body’s systems, we can watch how 
lexicalisations move and spread through a discursive ecosystem in order to form 
useful expectations for how we might see changes in other discursive behaviours 
play out across the system—changes in who listens to whom, and how social, 
normative, and political contexts alter and are altered by conversational activity. 
Were we to try to trace such changes using conventional models of agency, we 
would be caught in a dichotomy between individual agents and collective agents, 
without a clear way to examine how the actions of individuals are structured by 
and alter the social environment itself. Springer notes that the reflective critical 
agent needs ‘an appreciation of the social fabric of action within which she acts—
an appreciation that requires taking stock of relationships, background 
expectations, and the ways in which her critical response would come across.’53 
 
53 Springer, Communicating Moral Concern, 9. 
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The Discourse Ecology Model forms the basis for understanding an agent’s 
relation to that social fabric. 
The problem this thesis aims to address is, in part, the predisposition of 
analytic philosophy to the ‘ballistic’ view of agency in discourse. Springer 
highlights this and addresses the changes needed for thinking about critical 
approaches to moral agency; Code highlights this in relation to epistemological 
subjects. Here, we examine the same problem in relation to communication and 
what we owe to each other as listeners. Take Springer’s description of the view to 
be resisted: 
Probably no philosopher imagines that the number of moral agents is exactly 
one, and that he or she is that one. Yet modern models of agency draw a 
bubble around each moral subject; when I act, the script is a monologue. 
Other persons may stand in the wings of the stage: they will be sufferers, 
beneficiaries, or accessories of my deed, and I distinguish their fates from 
my own. I may invoke them, represent them, or act on their behalf; to 
anticipate the ultimate effects of my action I must predict how others will act 
in the wake of my choice. But all such considerations liken other agents to 
the props and occasions for what I do—not as ongoing participants whose 
action may be unsettled, questioned, amplified, or challenged in this 
encounter between us.54 
To adequately grasp the moral stakes of conversational behaviour, we must 
achieve a theoretical un-bubbling of the subject, embedding him instead within 
the social fabric within which and on which he acts, so that he may see his way not 
only to amplify or challenge the voices of others, but to be questioned and 
unsettled by them in turn. What follows is an overview of how this is to be 
accomplished, chapter by chapter. 
Chapter Overviews 
As I said at the outset, one of the desiderata for my account is that it should 
make sense of the ‘folk’ normative intuitions around listening as a way people treat 
each other via their conversational behaviour, so that is where we begin. Chapter 
 
54 Springer, 12. 
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2 looks at what it is that seems to be hurtful, harmful, or problematic about 
listening gone wrong. The aim here is to centre the attention on why listening 
seems to be normatively significant, so attention is not given at this stage to 
fleshing out a technical idea of what listening is. 
We ride in on the wave of philosophers of language who talk about 
silencing and problems around uptake. Using their framework, we establish a 
working vocabulary for talking specifically about what happens when someone 
refuses to listen to someone else—not fails to listen, not disbelieves, but in some 
clear way refuses to grant the appropriate form of uptake for the speaker’s 
utterances. We see how refusals to listen can play out in cases of cumulative moral 
damage, such as gaslighting, depersonalisation, and fragmentation, in which 
cumulative moral damage can contribute to the dis-integration of a speaker’s 
communicative intentions and outcomes. Analysis of these sorts of cases allows us 
to see what kinds of harm might be at stake, so that we can begin sketching a 
broader idea of what grounds the moral significance of listening to people.55 
Chapter 3 moves to look at the positive side of the normativity of listening 
to people. Shifting from a lens of harm-based moral reasoning to virtue ethical 
 
55 One question that often comes up when one begins theorising the normativity at stake in ordinary human 
activity is this: what do we, or what should we say about neurodivergent people, who may not function in 
similar ways or may not share some the capabilities which play a role in the norms we hold dear? Are our 
moral theories ableist, if they do not account for what it means, say, for a neurodivergent person to listen, 
when that person has very different capabilities to those we take as standard? It is a good question, but 
ultimately, it is not mine to answer here. At stake are for more foundational questions about the relationship 
between human capacities and the moral norms we treasure. It is not obvious a priori which kinds of 
neurodivergence should lead us to broaden our normative attachments, and which kinds of 
neurodivergence might involve such different capacities that a different set of broader moral obligations 
obtain. I suspect possible responses fall into two groups. We could say that, wherever neurodivergence leads 
to cases of radical asymmetry in the power relations between people, there is correspondingly a radical 
asymmetry in the obligations and entitlements generated. This would mean that highly vulnerable people 
are entitled to far more labour, risk, and enchronic support from their interlocutors than usual, and that 
they have correspondingly reduced obligations to their interlocutors. Alternatively, we could say that moral 
norms which are specific to discursive context only apply to agents who participate in discursive activities. 
This dodges the question about what we owe to each other as conversationalists when strongly 
neurodivergent cases are at issue, but one might still wonder how cases of neurodivergence require us to 
alter our sense across the board of what people owe to each other. I take it to be the role of those who give 
attention specifically to philosophy of neurodiversity and to the meta-ethicists to sort out these deeper 
questions; whatever solutions they come up with can be applied here, with deference to their expertise. My 
thanks to Sara Uckelman for pressing me on this point. 
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reasoning, we look at how listening contributes to the flourishing of both speaker 
and listener, and in a non-technical sense, what the listener seems to be doing that 
is identified as listening. By ‘non-technical’, I mean that we are looking at how we 
can narrate the actions involved in listening as interpersonal acts, whilst keeping 
clear of the trappings of the Message in a Bottle and Scoreboard frames. Instead, 
to avoid slipping into the Declarative Fallacy by attaching to a speech act theory or 
semantics model at this stage, I use the persuasion literature from social 
psychology known as the Elaboration Likelihood Model as a basis for describing 
the interpersonal actions in view. I also use Miranda Fricker’s virtue ethical 
account of testimonial (in)justice56 as a template for talking about listening as 
doing justice to what someone is saying. The theme of justice in conversation is 
prevalent throughout the thesis, but it should be noted that in this chapter, the 
concept of listening justly should not be taken to be doing a huge amount of 
theoretical work. We could also talk about listening rightly, or listening well, but I 
have kept Fricker’s justice framing here to prefigure the socio-political 
significance of conversational behaviour on the Discourse Ecology Model. 
As mentioned previously, it is a feature of virtue ethical frameworks that 
they support a focus on the integration of intention and outcome. Chapter 3 also 
introduces a vocabulary articulated by Gilbert Ryle in a posthumously published 
paper about mental actions.57 Ryle looks at how complex kinds of action can be 
composed of myriad smaller, seemingly unrelated actions, or infra-doings. For 
example, there is nothing about what it means to wait for a train that has a 
necessary structural connection between doing a crossword puzzle, chatting with 
a stranger, pacing, or sitting half asleep. None of these four activities has any 
necessary structural relation to each other either, except that they are each 
deployed in service of an intention not to miss one’s train. In Ryle’s terms: infra-
doings are coordinated by a policy to accomplish a certain course of action. Chapter 3 
claims that a great many linguistic, para-linguistic, and non-linguistic behaviours 
 
56 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice. 




can serve as infra-doings, coordinated by a policy of responsiveness which, in the 
case of a virtuous conversationalist, leads to a course of action that can be 
described as listening rightly. 
The second half of the thesis is focused on identifying the infra-doings 
coordinated by praiseworthy and blameworthy policies of responsiveness. 
Chapter 4 adopts the normative posture of Chapters 2 and 3 but abandons the close 
focus on private conversations between individuals disjointed from social 
contexts. It seems fitting to introduce the Discourse Ecology Model with a case 
focused on how speakers and listeners function as part of a wider discursive 
environment, to ensure the wider social and political contexts are figured into the 
model from the outset, not worked in as an afterthought. This chapter introduces 
two fictional characters, Jimmy Green and Gina Blue. As Jimmy learns to listen to 
Gina, his listening becomes a habit, and we will see how this habit can change and 
spread through their discursive environment and, in a crude sense, lead to social 
change. 
With the model established and the socio-political contexts worked in at 
the ground level, we return in Chapter 5 to look at what conversational behaviours 
constitute listening. Recalling the Rylean terminology of Chapter 3, the aim here 
is to give a full account of the infra-doings—the precise conversational actions and 
behaviours—which are coordinated by a policy of responsiveness, whether the 
policy is one of listening, of refusal to listen, or simply of listening badly. This is 
the technical articulation of what it is a listener does that we call listening, so I call 
the account in the chapter a Pragmatics of Listening. The title here admittedly 
prods, as well as credits, the heritage my argument finds in both formal 
pragmatics and American pragmatism, even as I move aside from the usual 
declarative and metaphysical commitments of the former. To see, for instance, 
how Jimmy Green might go about listening to Gina within a given conversation, 




Useful analyses of patterned conversational behaviours are imported from 
a subfield of sociology known as Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis, 
or EMCA, and from empirical findings in Interactional Linguistics. EMCA 
involves recording and transcribing conversations in order to analyse how each 
infra-doing, each ‘turn’ in a conversation, gives rise to its structure and 
accomplishes the conversation itself. Existing analyses from EMCA have revealed 
basic patterns and templates (or, constitutive norms) for turn taking which we 
regularly and with great ease tend to follow, bend, or even purposefully break or 
‘breach’ conversational norms in order to accomplish our conversational aims. So 
EMCA gives us a way to look at structure across turns, or the inter-turn level of 
structure, to see how interlocutors’ behaviours function as infra-doings of the 
(shared) course of action (the conversation).58 
The findings I draw on from Interactional Linguistics look at how a speaker 
and listener interact with each other during the course of a longer, extended turn 
in a conversation, such as when one person tells the other a story.59 Throughout 
the turn, both interlocutors contribute various infra-doings to accomplish the 
extended turn. This literature gives us a way to look at the intra-turn structure of 
conversation, to see how interlocutors are constantly interacting and jointly 
acting, even when one is in the role of speaker and the other in the role of listener. 
Here also, we see examples of how interlocutors’ infra-doings can follow, bend, 
and even breach the constitutive norms of extended turn conversations. 
This same approach to analysis is then applied to patterns we find in formal 
pragmatics, about what people do with what is said in a conversation. We need 
not be particularly faithful here to standard emphases in pragmatics; rather, I 
borrow and modify the way they use the idea of a Common Ground to explore how 
utterances respond to and act upon the semantic and epistemological context of 
 
58 Elizabeth Stokoe, Talk: The Science of Conversation (London: Robinson, 2018); N. J. Enfield, How We Talk: The 
Inner Workings of Conversation, First edition (New York: Basic Books, 2017). 
59 Victor H. Yngve, ‘On Getting a Word in Edgewise.’, in Papers from the Sixth Regional Meeting of the Chicago 
Linguistic Society (Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 1970), 567–78; Janet B. Bavelas, Linda Coates, and 
Trudy Johnson, ‘Listeners as Co-Narrators’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 6 (December 
2000): 941–52, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.941. 
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an interaction. We are, of course, going to want to preserve the focus on the entire 
discursive ecosystem, not just the semantic and epistemological context, so I take 
a key example case from Stalnaker60 and work in a wider array of contextual 
information, using arguments from analogy to see what infra-doings comprise 
the things people do with what is said in a conversation. The dis-integration we 
embrace in discrete theoretical projects is not a disintegration we want to see 
replicated in ourselves, in our actions, or in our world. So, in using Stalnakerian 
ideas, my purpose is to reintegrate the semantic and metaphysical concerns of the 
common ground into the wider discourse ecosystem and see what people do with 
what is said, not as a matter of negotiating modal logics but as a matter of social 
interaction, of knowing and understanding each other. We see, once again, how 
interlocutors’ infra-doings can follow or breach the constitutive norms for what 
we do with what is said. 
However, the real value of Chapter 5 lies in the insights we pull from each 
of these three explorations of infra-doing templates and breaches. The idea behind 
Ethnomethodology (the ‘EM’ in EMCA), is that when we pay attention to breaches 
of constitutive norms and how people respond to such breaches, we get a sense not 
only of where the normative boundaries lie, but also of what matters to people 
about the norms. Put differently, we see what kinds of variations from the 
constitutive norms lead people to get upset and even outraged at the behaviour of 
another person who keeps breaking the norms, and this gives us clues as to what 
other kinds of normativity underpin the constitutive normativity of the 
conversational game.61 When inter-turn breaches lead to upset, we get a sense of 
the texture of social and moral normativity at play. Just as Chapter 2 examines 
where refusals to listen to someone can lead to harm such that we tend to consider 
 
60 Stalnaker, Context. 
61 Harold Garfinkel, ‘A Conception of, and Experiments with, “Trust” as a Condition of Stable Concerted 
Actions’, in Motivation and Social Interaction—Cognitive Determinants, ed. O. J. Harvey (New York: The Ronald 




such refusals morally blameworthy, Chapter 5 examines where breaches of 
conversational norms lead to judgements of blameworthiness. 
As a result, as we move through each of the three structural ‘registers’ given 
in Chapter 5, we see where breaches of constitutive norms lead to judgements of 
blameworthiness, and where they do not. From the discrepancies we get a sense 
of what an appropriate ‘policy of responsiveness’ entails. In each register, breaches 
seem to be judged as blameworthy when the breacher does not shoulder his 
rightful share of the labour and risk involved in the shared activity of conversation, 
and when the breacher does not allow his interlocutor her rightful share of access 
to modify the conversational Common Ground. The culmination of Chapter 5 is a 
simplified sketch of those constitutive conversational norms which are morally 
significant, and a listener’s role in those: a Pragmatics of Listening. 
Chapter 6 pulls together each piece of the thesis. Working with the picture 
sketched at the end of Chapter 5, we now focus exclusively on the changes enacted 
to the normative context—the obligations and entitlements which arise—through 
conversational behaviours of listeners. It is vital here to keep in focus the way that 
infra-doings of two distinct agents are not just coordinated by the respective 
agent’s policy of responsiveness but are also interconnected as elements of a joint 
activity. Linguistic anthropologist and EMCA practitioner Nick Enfield calls this 
grain of interconnectedness the enchronic structure, or relevance framework, of a 
conversation.62 I add a depiction of the Enchronic Frame into the pragmatic sketch 
from Chapter 5, and using these together, I explain what was going on in various 
of the cases explored over the preceding chapters. We look at how refusal to listen 
plays out and how moral damage is enacted through vicious policies of 
responsiveness like silencing and gaslighting. We see how Jimmy Green made the 
change in his conversational behaviour in virtue of which he began to listen to Gina 
 
62 N. J. Enfield, ‘Sources of Asymmetry in Human Interaction: Enchrony, Status, Knowledge and Agency’, in 
The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation, ed. Tanya Stivers, Lorenza Mondada, and Jakob Steensig 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 285–312; N. J. Enfield, Relationship Thinking: 
Agency, Enchrony, and Human Sociality, Foundations of Human Interaction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013); Enfield, How We Talk. 
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Blue, and we see how dyadic interactions of this kind can be depicted as part of a 
wider network of participants in a discursive ecosystem. Finally, we look at how 
we might depict one of the most non-standard kinds of listening: that of the 
Samaritans volunteer who listens to a distressed caller. This case study gives us an 
especially clear picture of how we can understand the value of listening using the 
model I have presented. 
I end with a concluding summary of what it means to listen to someone, 
how to do it, and why it is morally significant. I do not argue explicitly in the thesis 
against alternative arguments or dissenting theoretical viewpoints, because there 
are no sufficiently robust theoretical articulations of listening with which I can 
engage in such a way. Instead, I offer what follows as a positive account of how we 
might usefully be able to think about the value and meaning of what it is to listen 






Refusal to Listen: What’s the Worst 
that Could Happen? 
 
Anger can be an instrument of cartography. By determining where, with whom, 
about what and in what circumstances one can get angry and get uptake, one can map 
others’ concepts of who and what one is. 
—Marilyn Frye63 
When we speak of listening to someone—not just listening as an auditory 
perceptual task, but listening to someone—we have in view the interpersonal sense 
of the term ‘listening’, which points to a social behaviour involving a person 
responding in certain kinds of ways to the communicative acts of another person. 
There are claims and distinctions we tend to make in ordinary talk which suggest 
that listening to people has normative value. Most obviously, there is the blame-
tinged bid for better responsiveness: ‘You are not listening to me!’ Mild praise is 
implied when I say, ‘My boss could not grant my request, but at least he listened to 
me.’ Listening shows up as a residual good that can be claimed when other goods 
sought do not materialise: ‘I am seeing a new specialist at the hospital today. 
Clearly no one knows what is wrong with me or what to do about it; I guess all I 
can hope for is that she listens to me, unlike the last specialist, and doesn’t dismiss 
me.’ 
These kinds of claims suggest that there is a ‘folk conception of listening’, 
as I call it, according to which interpersonal listening is a value-laden term. When 
 
63 Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, The Crossing Press Feminist Series 
(Trumansburg, N.Y: Crossing Press, 1983), 93–94. 
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we label someone’s behaviour in a conversational exchange as ‘listening’, we are 
saying that they are in some way rightly responsive to the speaker. When we label 
someone as ‘not listening’, we are making a critique which implies they are not 
being rightly responsive. Certainly, in many cases, listening will overlap or 
coincide with other forms of responsiveness typically picked out by virtue 
epistemologists and others, looking at justice as a function of believing or trusting 
a person as a source of knowledge. However, there are also certainly cases in which 
the norms of listening come apart from the norms of belief—in brief, anytime one 
is being addressed by someone who is not a source of knowledge in the relevant 
sphere; anytime one’s interlocutor is forming communicative acts which are not 
testimonial or otherwise epistemic in nature; or anytime one’s interlocutor is 
speaking from a position of vulnerability, such as a speaker addressing someone 
with power over their life due to their particular social roles with respect to each 
other, or due to broader structures of oppression. 
This difference from belief norms can be seen especially clearly in the 
norms according to which parents and caregivers ought to listen to children (that 
is, to be rightly responsive to them), even when children say things that cannot be 
regarded as credible knowledge claims, such as, ‘There are monsters under my 
bed.’ Although listening frequently co-occurs with, and even helps to structure, 
various modes of responsiveness, we are most vividly concerned with listening 
when responsiveness cannot be reduced to a form of belief,64 trust,65 or response to 
 
64 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice; Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice; 
Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). Despite its 
centrality to philosophies of language, information exchange is only part of what we are doing in speaking to 
one another. Hagi Kenaan notes, ‘One can say that, when the propositional sets the grounds for our speech, 
information becomes the essence of language… a language indifferent to whom one speaks of, to whom one 
listens. Information is a form of intelligibility that excludes us as individuals. If, in speaking to me, 
information is all you wish to hear in my language, then I am not relevant to you as the individual I am’—see 
Hagi Kenaan, The Present Personal: Philosophy and the Hidden Face of Language (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 47, https://doi.org/10.7312/kena13350. In being concerned with listening, we are concerned 
with a side of speaking that is too interpersonal to be reduced to collecting believable information. 
65 Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson, eds., The Philosophy of Trust (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017); especially Karen Jones, ‘“But I Was Counting On You!”’, in The Philosophy of Trust, ed. Paul 
Faulkner and Thomas Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 90–108; Katherine Hawley, How To 
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authority.66 Rather, listening stands as something closer to, and yet more 
ontogenetically specific than, a form of care67 or a beholdenness to second-
personal address.68 Rightly, I take it, Kukla and Lance claim that ‘We speak by 
calling to others to recognize and take up the force of our words for them. 
Whatever else speech does… it does it by seeking to forge such a relationship of 
mutual recognition between speaker and target audience through vocative call.’69 
The concept of listening picks up the moment the call is acknowledged and 
determines whether we respond to the call as something requiring epistemic 
responsiveness from us, or some other kind of responsiveness. 
The theory of listening given here, therefore, should not be about believing 
or trusting people, but rather about the morality of listening to people qua people, 
particularly when those people are vulnerable, are non-experts, or are not in a 
position to rely on being trusted for securing appropriate recognition from the 
listener. I grant that in many cases listening overlaps with believing and trusting, 
 
Be Trustworthy (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). Cf. Alessandra Tanesini, ‘The Gift of 
Testimony’, Episteme, 4 May 2020, 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.52. 
66 Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, ‘What Is It to Believe Someone?’, in Rationality and Religious Belief, 
ed. C. F. Delaney (University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A 
Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). In my 
view, it seems critically important that we be able to talk about the morality of listening in ways that do not 
reduce to epistemic considerations, so that we can get clear about what we owe to the more vulnerable 
speakers who address us. What is less clear to me is whether we should therefore seek to move the goalposts 
of epistemology to include these matters alongside the already urgent issues of testimonial injustice, or 
whether we should seek to build up a new body of related literature focusing on what we owe to 
interlocutors that does not depend on epistemic terminology and criteria. For now, I lean towards the latter, 
but this is mainly because I do not want to minimise the importance of the specifically epistemic harm done 
to vulnerable people through testimonial injustice. 
67 Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
68 Richard Moran, The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018); Jeremy Wanderer, ‘Addressing Testimonial Injustice: Being Ignored and Being Rejected’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 62, no. 246 (2012): 148–69. 
69 ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’, 165. Cf. Darwall’s notion of accountability to second-personal address, which implicitly 
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respect as an offense against the dignity of the person; see Stephen L. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: 
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50 
 
but there will also be cases where, prior to the epistemic norms getting involved, 
and after questions of credibility and trust have been settled, one still has 
reasons—moral reasons—to be rightly responsive to an interlocutor. My aim in 
this chapter is to explore why right responsiveness to people might be governed by 
moral, rather than merely conventional, normativity. 
In an era of ever-increasing social awareness of the way language has 
power to hurt and to heal, to liberate and to bind, we feel ever more keenly the need 
for clearly articulated norms of public discourse, supported by a clearly articulated 
idea of conversational ethics,70 and of the specific harm done to someone in her 
capacity as a speaker when an interlocutor refuses to listen.  Note that this is not 
about when someone makes a genuine effort to listen but fails for some reason. 
This is about when the ‘listener’ is refusing to listen, in that they are not interested 
in being ‘rightly responsive’ to the speaker. The refuser actively resists the 
speaker’s communication going through. 
The title question, ‘What’s the worst that could happen?’ can be taken two 
ways. One implies that ‘the worst that could happen’ is something negligible and 
should not deter one from a given course of action. The other way asks, say, if we 
were planning a risky venture, about the benefits and risks involved. If things go 
wrong, what’s the worst that could happen? We need to know, because without an 
accurate assessment of the risks at stake we could cause quite a lot of damage. To 
inform our conversational ethics, given that we know language is powerful and 
political and as such can be a risky venture, we need to know what sort of damage 
is done when the way people treat each other in conversation goes wrong. 
 
70 For virtue-centric takes on listening, see Nancy Potter’s account of the virtue which she calls ‘giving uptake 
rightly’; in Potter, ‘Giving Uptake’. Cf. Joseph Beatty, ‘Good Listening’, Educational Theory 49, no. 3 (1 
September 1999): 281–98, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1999.00281.x; Sophie Haroutunian‐Gordon and 
Megan J. Laverty, ‘Listening: An Exploration of Philosophical Traditions’, Educational Theory 61, no. 2 (1 April 
2011): 117–24, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2011.00394.x; Suzanne Rice, ‘Toward an Aristotelian 
Conception of Good Listening’, Educational Theory 61, no. 2 (1 April 2011): 141–53, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-
5446.2011.00396.x; Leonard J. Waks, ‘John Dewey on Listening and Friendship in School and Society’, 




It should be noted that not all conversational interactions manifestly 
demand conscious or effortful listening behaviour. In simple, low-stakes cases, 
the ‘work’ of listening happens so automatically that its presence is not noticed, 
much as we tend not to notice the communicative labour that we do as speakers 
except when conversations become particularly difficult or delicate.71 To ‘listen’ 
adequately in such cases just is to straightforwardly grasp and react to the 
utterance.72 Such cases do not help us understand where the morality of listening 
comes in, so we proceed in this paper from the cases that do clearly seem morally 
relevant. For analogy, consider two people bumping into each other as they pour 
out of a crowded metro onto a platform. An ordinary elbow bump in such cases is 
usually part of the mundane collateral of living in a shared world, but when the 
elbow bump becomes forceful, deliberate, or targeted to a specific person, or when 
the elbow bumps someone who is in a state of vulnerability for one reason or 
another, then the ordinary bump becomes an affront, warranting apology, or 
becomes a harmfully violent action. The greater the force or damage involved, the 
more likely it is that the incident will register not as an accident but as a deliberate 
moral harm, or a culpable negligence in addressing accidental harms.73 
 
71 Rachel A. McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’ (New York, The City University 
of New York, 2015), 61. 
72 As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, even simple cases like this have a complex structure. 
73 I am undecided whether the cumulative harms of refusal to listen would constitute a kind of 
microaggression or an analogue of the same. Either way, I am cautious about appropriating the concept of 
microaggression for use in considering refusal to listen, which does not necessarily trace socio-political 
injustices in quite the same way as microaggressions do. See Saba Fatima, ‘On the Edge of Knowing: 
Microaggression and Epistemic Uncertainty as a Woman of Color’, in Surviving Sexism in Academia: Feminist 
Strategies for Leadership, ed. Kirsti Cole and Holly Hassel (New York ; London: Routledge, 2017), 147–57; 
Christina Friedlaender, ‘On Microaggressions: Cumulative Harm and Individual Responsibility’, Hypatia 33, 
no. 1 (2018): 5–21, https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12390; Emily McTernan, ‘Microaggressions, Equality, and 
Social Practices’, Journal of Political Philosophy 26, no. 3 (2018): 261–81, https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12150; 
Regina Rini, ‘How to Take Offense: Responding to Microaggression’, Journal of the American Philosophical 
Association 4, no. 3 (2018): 332–51, https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.23; Mark Tschaepe, ‘Addressing 
Microaggressions and Epistemic Injustice: Flourishing from the Work of Audre Lorde’, Essays in the 
Philosophy of Humanism 24, no. 1 (5 August 2016): 87–101, https://doi.org/10.1558/eph.31404. 
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Likewise, the potential for a listener to fail to understand or to listen to a 
speaker is part of the mundane collateral of human interaction. Ordinarily, such 
failures simply call for some form of correction or repair, but when they become 
forceful, deliberate, or targeted to a specific person, or when they land on someone 
in a particularly vulnerable position, the miscommunication becomes an affront, 
causing harm and warranting apology. Therefore, I assume that the morality of 
listening shades off into mundane automaticity and accidents at one end of a 
spectrum, and at the other end points to the most dramatic ways people can be 
harmed through targeted, hostile silencing. We can also stipulate for present 
purposes that, just as one might be justified in violently shoving an attacker on a 
metro station platform in self-defence, there will be certain cases in which a 
speech act would be perceived as damaging, and a listener in such cases might be 
justified in making (non-culpable) use of a refusal to listen as a self-defence 
strategy against overtly malicious or abusive speech. 
With these stipulations in place, we can turn our attention to cases in 
which deliberately hostile refusal to listen elicits blame. I argue that such refusal 
to listen causes moral damage, where ‘moral damage’ refers to an individual being 
damaged in respect to some of those features in virtue of which she is considered 
a part of the moral community, specifically her autonomy, agency, and capacity to 
communicate. I argue that the moral damage is constitutive, and I should say 
something about the way I use this term. I am specifically following a terminology 
set by Bernard Williams in his book Moral Luck, where he describes a difference in 
scope between incidental bad luck and constitutive bad luck. ‘Incidental’ bad luck 
refers to a particular set of events gone awry, and the ‘constitutive’ bad luck refers 
to features of how an agent’s character is constructed, or constituted.74 This 
distinction is discussed in further detail in Section 3 of this chapter. 
Thus, when I say that moral damage is constitutive, I do not mean that it 
is constitutive as opposed to causal, per se. I mean that the moral damage is 
 
74 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Reissue edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). 
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altering the constitution of the moral agent in respect to her agency and autonomy 
as a speaker. In other words, the damage that is done in refusing to listen to 
someone is not just a bit of hurt feelings; rather, the damage has effects that alter 
and stay with a person and can accumulate over time. In the interest of keeping a 
focus on the way listener behaviour impacts the agency of speakers, a number of 
inclusions and exclusions apply. 
First, we do not need to be concerned here with the mechanics of how 
listeners get at speakers’ meaning—we will assume that, in much the same way 
one can intuitively tell when she is being listened to and when she is not, listening 
is something people intuitively know how to do to at least a basic extent, in virtue 
of being competent discourse participants.75 For that reason, I will proceed with a 
broadly Austinian framework for understanding speech as action76 rather than a 
Gricean framework.77 I find Grice’s terminology more useful for exploring how 
listeners actually get at a speaker’s meaning, and Austin’s terminology more useful 
for exploring how speakers succeed or fail in accomplishing their aims. In this 
choice I am following much of the literature on silencing as illocutionary 
disablement.78 This is the focus of Section 1, in which I use Austin’s terminology to 
 
75 I am conscious that this assumption skates right past some of the most interesting considerations around 
listening as a skilful, subtle art. We return to these considerations in Chapters 5 and 6. 
76 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (William James Lectures) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
77 Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1993). 
78 Wesley Buckwalter, ‘Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 15 May 2018, 
1–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1459754; Kristie Dotson, ‘Tracking Epistemic Violence, 
Tracking Practices of Silencing’, Hypatia 26, no. 2 (May 2011): 236–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-
2001.2011.01177.x; Jennifer Hornsby, ‘Disempowered Speech’, Philosophical Topics 23, no. 2 (1995): 127–47; 
Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, ‘Free Speech and Illocution’, Legal Theory 4, no. 1 (March 1998): 21–37, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325200000902; Rae Langton, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 22, no. 4 (1993): 293–330; Andrew Peet, ‘Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation’, 
Synthese 194, no. 9 (September 2017): 3421–43, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0942-7. Cf. Gricean 
accounts in Ishani Maitra, ‘Silence and Responsibility’, Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 189–208, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00025.x; Ishani Maitra, ‘Silencing Speech’, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 39, no. 2 (January 2009): 309–38, https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0050; Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate 
McGowan, ‘On Silencing, Rape, and Responsibility’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 1 (March 2010): 
167–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400902941331; Elmar Unnsteinsson, ‘Silencing without Convention’, 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100, no. 2 (2018): 573–98, https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12260. 
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build out a simplified account of the tasks of a listener in the successful 
accomplishment of speech acts. We can then identify which of these tasks the 
refusing listener is refusing to complete, in order to be clear about the point at 
which the speaker’s agency encounters interference. 
Second, with regard to the literature on silencing: I take refusal to listen to 
someone to be another kind of silencing, similar to and yet distinct from the kinds 
of silencing most prominently discussed. In particular, whereas prominent 
accounts of silencing focus on cases of systemic silencing due to structural 
injustice, we are looking at a form of silencing that occurs between individuals in 
conversation. This kind of silencing can still have impact that is systemic in scope; 
yet the mechanism of silencing through refusal to listen operates at the level of 
individual behaviour, for which individual listeners can take responsibility.79 This 
is the focus in Section 2, in which I draw on the silencing literature to establish my 
claim that refusal to listen to someone is another kind of silencing. 
In Section 3, the case is made for how silencing phenomena should be 
understood as being damaging to speakers. For this, we look at Williams’s 
concepts of moral damage, both incidental and constitutive as mentioned above, 
and at Bartky’s account of psychological oppression.80 The aim here is not to say 
anything novel about moral damage or psychological oppression in themselves; 
the aim is simply to give an initial, theoretically intelligible characterisation of the 
damage done by refusing to listen to someone. 
With these ideas in play, we can venture an answer to the question of the 
worst that could happen. In Section 4, Abramson’s account of gaslighting as 
existential silencing provides a way to understand limit cases of cumulative moral 
damage.81 By analogy, we can suggest what a limit case of damage caused by 
 
79 It is an interesting question whether the same mechanism of silencing through refusal to listen could also 
be enacted by groups of agents. As with most forms of communicative action, I take it that the agents of this 
phenomenon can be group agents; however, this issue is beyond the scope of this piece. 
80 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression, Thinking Gender 
(New York: Routledge, 1990). 
81 Abramson, ‘Turning up the Lights’. 
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blameworthy listening behaviour might look like—on the understanding that it is 
unlikely we would see such limit cases where the moral damage is caused entirely 
by one kind of harm. The worst that could happen when we refuse to listen to 
someone therefore needs to be understood within the broader context of how 
agency is constituted, shaped, and eroded over the course of a life. Nevertheless, 
this broader context makes it clear what are the harms and stakes of listening 
behaviour that give the concept its moral weight. 
1. Uptake and Illocutionary Disablement 
The part of Speech Act Theory which the silencing literature deploys is the 
criteria for the felicitous (successful) completion of a speech act. The locutionary 
act (just the string of words uttered) needs to be perceived. The illocutionary act 
(what the person is saying by uttering those words, such as suggesting, 
demanding, joking, denying, or apologising) needs to be recognised by the 
audience. The perlocutionary act (what is accomplished as a result of the 
utterance, such as persuasion or securing compliance) depends on how the 
audience decides to respond. 
The criterion of interest to us is the second: audience uptake of 
illocutionary acts. Austin says, ‘Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary 
act will not have been happily, successfully performed… I cannot be said to have 
warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes it in a certain sense.’82 If 
one attempts to execute the illocutionary act of warning people, but those being 
warned take the speaker to be performing an entertaining pantomime, the 
speaker will have of course succeeded in his locutionary act, having uttered 
whatever string of words he chose to use for his effort, but he will have failed to 
execute the act of ‘warning’. The same is not true of perlocutionary acts: I might 
warn fellow hikers that there is a rattlesnake on the path around the curve; they, 
taking themselves to have been so warned, secure the uptake by which my 
illocutionary act of warning is felicitous. They may nevertheless decide for 
 
82 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 115. 
56 
 
themselves whether they will respond to this warning by turning back or by 
carrying cautiously onward. 
This distinction—between the requirement of uptake for illocutionary 
success, and the unrequired perlocutionary effects which may follow from a 
speech act—is important for separating the role of uptake from the epistemic 
values that are frequently at issue in the way we respond to a person’s speech. The 
perceived credibility of the speaker affects how likely we are to allow ourselves to 
be persuaded by her words,83 but her credibility does not have any particular 
bearing on the matter of uptake. For example, suppose I am walking toward the 
basement of my house. My niece, immersed in imaginative play, says, ‘Look out 
for the bears in the basement! They are very hungry because their tea is late today.’ 
Now, I would correctly take myself to have been warned about a situation that my 
niece considers dangerous, which means that her illocutionary act secures uptake 
and is felicitous. However, this does not mean that the content of her warning is 
true (since it happens that there are no bears in the basement) nor that the 
perlocutionary effect she had in mind will be achieved (namely, frightening me out 
of going down to the basement). 
Simple scenarios such as the above remind us that the way an audience 
listens to or refuses to listen to a speech act is not a function of epistemic 
evaluation alone, nor of writing a blank cheque to fulfil all the perlocutionary aims 
of a speaker. What, then, should we take to be the basic tasks of listening? For 
present purposes, let us say that one listens when she meets the speaker’s speech 
act with an attentive responsiveness to the utterance, utilising her own attentional 
resources to perform three basic tasks that are analogues of the three facets of the 
speech act: 
L1 (Locutionary): performing a baseline level of language processing to 
comprehend the utterance, and filling in gaps that may occur in the linguistic 
signal due to noise interference or errors in diction 
 
 
83 see Fricker, Epistemic Injustice. 
57 
 
L2 (Illocutionary): gauging what illocutionary act is being attempted and 
giving uptake accordingly 
 
L3 (Perlocutionary): drawing inferences as necessary for interpreting the 
speaker’s full meaning, so as to assess what implications and perlocutionary 
aims are and to select appropriate responses to these aims 
These three tasks of the listener support, respectively, (L1) comprehending the 
locution, (L2) grasping the illocution, and (L3) interpreting and formulating a 
response to the communication in its perlocutionary fullness. Where the listener 
undertakes these tasks with attentiveness and responsiveness to the speaker’s 
aims, she avoids throwing infelicities into the path of the speaker, allowing the 
speaker to successfully achieve the intended speech act. 
When something goes wrong with listening behaviour, this could in 
principle have to do with any aspect of a speech act. We are not interested in issues 
of perception of language here, so we will assume that the locutionary act goes 
through unproblematically (L1)—the listener hears and grasps the utterance. 
Whether the speaker achieves what she hopes to perlocutionarily is not entirely up 
to her; listeners are not obligated to be persuaded by every utterance thrown at 
them nor be amused by every joke told to them (L3). Of course, complaints of 
‘You’re not listening to me!’ may come up when a listener is particularly resistant 
to the speaker’s perlocutionary aims, but it is not necessarily the case that a listener 
is out of bounds for this, just as I am not out of bounds in not being frightened by 
my niece’s warning. 
However, a competent language user should in most cases be able to get 
across to audiences her illocutionary aims and an ordinarily cooperative audience 
should thus provide uptake (L2).84 It is only if the illocutionary act is felicitous that 
 
84 This claim works for the sense of illocutionary acts typically used in the literature on silencing. One may be 
concerned that on some interpretations, Austin is taken to identify as ‘illocutionary’ only those speech acts 
which are more specifically tied to institutional actions, such as marrying someone, voting, or pardoning. 
Of course, these kinds of illocutionary acts are restricted as to who can perform them successfully, but we 
are following the interpretation common throughout silencing literatures, on which Austin identifies all 
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she has a chance of succeeding in her perlocutionary aims. For these reasons, we 
are dealing primarily with what happens when a person refuses to provide 
illocutionary uptake. Refusal to listen can be enacted in a variety of ways, 
including through perlocutionary frustration (a problem at L3), but for clarity this 
paper will treat illocutionary disablement as the paradigm case (a problem at L2): 
a somewhat artificial idealisation, to be sure. Yet, as Potter notes, ‘…giving uptake 
to another person involves not twisting, distorting, minimizing, or mocking her 
words, feelings, and perceptions—even when we disagree, or are frightened, or 
don’t understand.’85 In many cases, a refusal to listen implies a broad resistance to 
acknowledging the speaker as saying what he takes himself to be saying—a 
resistance86 which would typically be read as an affront, and for which the listener 
would be judged culpable. 
Consider the following scenarios exemplifying a refusal to listen. The 
scenarios depict a range of variation in social factors, such as the distribution of 
power between the participants. In some cases, the refusal to listen should 
intuitively seem culpable; in others, the refusal should seem exceptional and 
justified: 
1. OFFICERS: A woman answers a knock at the door; two uniformed 
military officers are there to inform her that her child has been tragically 
killed by a fluke engine failure at the Air Force Academy. In her grief, she 
refuses to listen to them. 
 
speech acts as being in some way an illocutionary act. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting 
this divergence. 
85 Potter, ‘Giving Uptake’, 482. 
86 Resistance is not quite the same as ignoring, but like ignoring, is ‘a complex attitude’, as Kukla and Lance 
note: ‘The paradigmatic failure of a hail is when its normative upshot is not taken up and hence not 
acknowledged. But refusing to take up a normative demand requires recognizing that the demand has been 
made. To refuse a hail is already to recognize and acknowledge it as a hail in refusing it.’ See ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’, 
147. One might ignore someone, refusing to take up the demand to recognise her hail, by, for example, 
pretending not to have seen or heard the hail. One might refuse to listen to someone by ignoring some 
salient feature of the content of what she is communicating in order to resist acknowledging her meaning. 
Ignoring certain illocutionary possibilities is a way to avoid acknowledging the speaker’s communicative 
aim, when one already tacitly recognises, to a greater or lesser extent, what those aims might be. 
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2. FASCIST: A corrupt leader of a nation with an increasingly dictatorial 
regime gives a public speech, warning people away from seditious 
insubordination. In the crowd is a comedian who refuses to listen to the 
dictator’s warning. He laughs aloud at the implied fragility of the regime 
and makes wisecracks; he makes loud fart noises to get the crowd around 
him laughing. As the laughter spreads, the speech fails to find uptake as 
a warning, having been turned into a joke. 
3. HANGRY JOE: Hangry Joe knows that when his blood sugar is low, he 
turns into a bit of an irrational monster, saying harsh and unfair things 
to anyone who happens across his path but which he as a person 
absolutely does not mean or believe. His friends have seen the internet 
memes about hangry people, and through humour the group have 
negotiated a kind of tacit, standing consent from Joe that anything he 
might say while hangry will not be listened to or treated as Joe himself 
saying something. Joe is relieved by this tacit agreement. 
4. ELEANOR: Eleanor is a professor of philosophy at a world-leading 
university. When she meets new people in social settings, they ask what 
she does. Although she tells them in plain, audible English what she does, 
they somehow consistently ‘hear’ her as saying that she is a philosophy 
student. They ask what she hopes to do with her degree or why she doesn’t 
put her studies to good use. Annoyingly, Eleanor’s male colleagues do not 
tend to have this experience, leading Eleanor to feel that it is because of 
her gender that people find it so difficult to provide uptake to her 
straightforward claims about her profession.87 When queried, such 
interlocutors do not say, ‘She claims she is a philosophy professor, but I 
don’t believe her,’ as they would if this were a matter of credibility, instead 
of a matter of uptake in the first place. 
5. ELIZABETH: Mr Collins is a sleezy, uninspiring man with a job and an 
inheritance. He makes what he therefore considers to be a charitable 
offer of marriage to his cousin Elizabeth. She rejects his offer because 
she does not wish to marry him, inheritance notwithstanding. He finds 
himself unable to conceive that she is not agreeable to, let alone flattered 
by his offer, therefore construing her ‘rejection’ as a coy little game. She 
maintains her stance, until her father does give uptake to her 
 
87 This is a real-life example given to me in personal communication [name has been changed]. 
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illocutionary acts of rejection, making evident their meaning and 
supporting their force to Mr Collins. The slighted suitor departs, 
outraged.88 
In the above scenarios, we can easily enough track the reasons why each person 
resists giving uptake to the illocution being attempted. In some cases, we find the 
resistance non-culpable, as in OFFICERS and FASCIST. We might excuse 
HANGRY JOE, but only so long as neither he nor his friends seem to be abusing 
the arrangement. In ELEANOR and ELIZABETH, however, we would be inclined 
to attribute the reasons for resisting the illocution to prejudices about gender in 
academia and to the fragile ego of an insensitive man, respectively. 
In none of these cases does the respondent fail to grasp the locution (L1). In 
ELIZABETH, we might want to say that there is a problem at L3, but only once the 
respondent has been compelled to reckon with what the illocution was and 
maintains a reaction of, ‘Surely not!’ Due to the power dynamics in FASCIST, we 
might excuse or even approve whatever ‘damage’ may be caused to the leader and 
his regime. I take the first three cases to be ‘exceptions which prove the rule’ that 
refusal to give uptake is a blameworthy violation of ordinary discursive norms.  
2. What non-reciprocity does to speakers 
As I said from the outset, the choice to use Austinian terminology follows 
precedent from the literature on silencing. A speaker’s dependence on the 
audience’s cooperation for the successful completion of a speech act is a structural 
feature of Speech Act Theory, although it is not explicitly in focus through much 
of Austin’s lectures. Jennifer Hornsby underlines this need for ‘reciprocity’—a 
term which makes particularly good sense within the turn-taking structure of 
conversations. Reciprocity suggests fair play, turn taking, or doing one’s bit. 
Hornsby is specific about tying reciprocity to the illocutionary act, as there 
is something particularly dysfunctional about a conversation participant who 
 
88 This example comes from Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, ed. Vivien Jones and Tony Tanner, Reprint 
edition (London: Penguin Classics, 2008), 102 ff. 
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refuses to take a speaker’s words for what they are and for how they are meant to 
be taken. She writes: 
I give the name ‘‘reciprocity’’ to the condition that provides for the particular 
way in which successful illocutionary acts can be performed. When there is 
reciprocity among people, they recognize one another’s speech as it is meant 
to be taken: An audience who participates reciprocally does not merely 
understand the speaker’s words but also, in taking the words as they are 
meant to be taken, satisfies a condition for the speaker’s having done the 
communicative thing she intended.89 
Again, it is not necessary for the audience to believe the speaker, be persuaded by 
her, laugh at the joke, grant the request, and so on (although these functions can 
also be assumed to be governed by a broad principle of fair play). There’s 
something particularly obstinate about a listener who refuses to take the speaker 
to be saying what she is saying, given that a listener can grant uptake whilst 
remaining unmoved by the perlocutionary act. To refuse to acknowledge the 
illocution for what it is would be akin to pretending the speech act had not been 
made at all (as in OFFICERS), as if the speaker had not spoken (HANGRY JOE), or 
even treating the speaker as if she had said something she has not said (ELEANOR, 
ELIZABETH). 
Pretence is a useful notion to consider here. One way to understand 
‘uptake’ is as something that is not a conscious choice, but merely an effect of a 
competent listener having heard someone’s speech, all things being equal. In that 
case, it would not make sense to talk about someone withholding uptake as a 
matter of refusal.90 Alternatively, we could understand ‘uptake’ as something 
which, even if it registers in the listener’s awareness, only has its function in the 
discourse when the listener in some way signals her recognition of the illocution. 
We do not need to commit exclusively to either interpretation of uptake: 
failure to listen might happen when there is an error in the first kind of uptake, but 
 
89 Hornsby, ‘Disempowered Speech’, 134. 
90 Potter, ‘Giving Uptake’, 481; see also Alessandra Tanesini, ‘Silencing and Assertion’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Assertion, ed. Sanford Goldberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 748–69.  
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refusal to listen is an error of the second kind of uptake, implying that what the 
listener is signalling to the speaker is disingenuous. The listener has consciously 
or subconsciously recognised the illocution but pretends as if she has not, or gives 
uptake to the utterance as a different illocution altogether—a closely related form 
of discursive injustice91 or hermeneutical resistance.92 
Refusal would, in such a case, be seen as a bad-faith lapse of reciprocity, 
causing illocutionary disablement by forcing the speech act to fail. The speaker’s 
illocutionary intention is reduced to silence (or, in the case of FASCIST, to a 
laughingstock), and the words rattle around, their meaning emptied or twisted by 
the hostile listener. This distinction in interpretations of uptake recalls the 
gradient I suggested at the outset: inconsequential failures to listen requiring 
simple repairs, but the more deliberate and targeted those instances become, the 
more they shade over into morally problematic instances of refusal. If uptake is 
not instantly secured, it is often fine—we have repair manoeuvres for this. But 
when the repair manoeuvres repeatedly fail, when it becomes increasingly clear 
that the situation is not one of simple errors in uptake but of a deliberate, bad-
faith withholding of reciprocity from this particular person or for this particular speech 
act, the result is an increasingly blameworthy affront to the autonomy of the 
speaker. 
Refusing to listen to someone is a bad-faith reaction that works a bit 
differently to the classic kind of silencing that anchors the literature. Hornsby and 
Langton focus more specifically on structural, society-wide patterns which result 
in silencing.93 Of particular interest is the way that a broadly accepted set of beliefs, 
such as those propagated by the pornography industry, can make it impossible for 
a speaker to perform certain types of speech acts—notably, for a woman to enact 
 
91 see Rebecca Kukla, ‘Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice’, Hypatia 29, no. 2 (2014): 
445–48, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01316.x. 
92 Medina, ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice’, 48. 
93 Hornsby, ‘Disempowered Speech’; Hornsby and Langton, ‘Free Speech and Illocution’; Langton, ‘Speech 
Acts and Unspeakable Acts’; Catherine A. MacKinnon, ‘Francis Biddle’s Sister’, in Feminism Unmodified: 
Discourses on Life and Law, 9. printing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), 177–79. 
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refusal as an illocutionary act when she says ‘no’ to sexual advances. Because this 
type of speech act is not, as it were, included in the man’s catalogue of illocutionary 
acts she could possibly be making, he reaches for other interpretations, such as 
that she is being coy.94 Thus, he does not give uptake for her refusal, rendering her 
illocutionarily disabled in that respect.  
We have already noted that failure to listen can occur when extenuating 
circumstances contribute to the lack of reciprocity between audience and speaker, 
such as when conversations get interrupted, obstructed by noise, or fall prey to 
ordinary misunderstandings. We can add here that socially systemic silencing 
could interfere in the way Hornsby and Langton claim. The deliberate refusal on 
the part of an individual, however, implies something more purposeful and 
specific: the audience, in completing the three tasks of listening, simply takes one 
or more illocutionary (or perlocutionary) options off the table. 
For example, suppose Jane has invited her brother, Hangry Joe, to her 
birthday party. Joe dislikes loud, crowded parties, and he does not get on with 
Jane’s friends, who like to tease and torment him. He makes his excuses, offering 
to buy Jane dinner at another time as a quieter alternative form of celebration. 
Jane, however, relentlessly punctures every excuse he offers, trying to remove the 
implied obstacles to his attendance. He does not bend, and so she says, ‘Oh come 
on, you’re just hangry’ and hands him a packet of crisps. Joe is not currently 
hungry, and so is not hangry. He resents the implication that his disinterest in the 
party is irrational, a mere by-product of the disagreeableness brought on by low 
blood sugar. 
Now Jane must be at least somewhat aware that the ‘declining to attend her 
party’ option exists in the library of illocutionary possibilities. Not wanting it to be 
the case that Joe is purposefully declining her invitation, however, she offers 
 
94 There are clear similarities between what Hornsby and Langton have in view and what Mr Collins does in 
ELIZABETH. Whether they ought to be taken to be the same kind of refusal to listen depends on how one 
understands culpability of individuals in the context of systemic injustice—an issue which extends beyond 
the arguments at hand. 
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uptake for any speech act but the one which he is making (again, much like Mr 
Collins does in ELIZABETH, albeit with a different power dynamic). She forces his 
speech acts to fail, unless he changes over to a speech act which suits Jane’s 
interests.95 Such a thing could occur in many different modes: a listener may play 
dumb about an illocutionary possibility, or commit herself to a set of assumptions 
rendering the undesired speech act senseless or incoherent, or launch a narrative 
about the presumed motivations or capacities of the speaker. 
I need not catalogue all such possibilities here. What is common to these 
variations is that the listener removes an illocutionary possibility from the scope 
of her consideration in task L2 of listening. She forces the speaker’s actions to fail, 
making the speaker unfree to perform that act. So, when I argue that to refuse to 
listen to someone is blameworthy because to do so harms the speaker in her 
capacity as a speaker, I am referring to the way that an audience’s selective refusal 
to listen to someone causes that person’s agency to be unduly curtailed, inhibiting 
or circumscribing her freedom of communicative action. In this way, she sustains 
damage to one of the core capacities by which we identify her as a participant of 
the moral community, for which reason the harms caused by refusal to listen to 
someone should be understood as a kind of moral damage. To that concept we now 
turn.  
3. Dynamics of Moral Damage 
In the first two sections, I argued that refusal to listen to someone has a 
direct impact on them as a speaker, altering the communicative possibilities that 
are available to them and forcing certain communicative actions to misfire—that 
is, to be infelicitous. In what follows, my task is to argue that this direct impact on 
the speaker constitutes a form of ‘moral damage’. I articulate this claim first with 
reference to accounts of moral damage from Williams, Tessman, and Bartky, in 
 
95 I chose the genders of the people in this example so as to reverse the usual dynamic, highlighting the 
particular thrust of this kind of resistance which is sometimes obscured by familiarity when the genders are 
reversed: see Kate Manne’s discussion of silencing framed by the notions of smothering (literally and 
communicatively) and making someone eat her words in classic cases of misogyny; Kate Manne, Down Girl: 
The Logic of Misogyny (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–6. 
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order to get clear about how targeted illocutionary disablement can constitutively 
alter a person’s autonomy. 
The idea that silencing is a morally significant issue turns on the premise 
that, inasmuch as our autonomy includes our sense of agency as speakers, so an 
assault on our capacity as speech act makers would be experienced as an assault 
against our autonomy and personhood. As Kukla and Lance frame it, one’s 
standing as a person with normative commitments and entitlements in a 
community entails that one is recognizable as able to hail and be hailed.96 Where 
one person’s treatment of another person undermines that person’s autonomy, 
standing, and moral agency in some way, we are worried that the treatment is 
causing ‘moral damage’. My use of the term follows Tessman’s usage in Burdened 
Virtues, in which Tessman examines ‘the formation of the oppressed self as a 
morally damaged being’, in the sense that the oppressed person experiences 
constitutive moral bad luck.97 The idea is that through the adverse circumstances 
of oppression, one’s selfhood comes to be constituted, or structured, in a way that 
compromises one’s ability to act with that autonomy held to be so vital for moral 
agency. 
Tessman’s claims are grounded in Bernard Williams’s concept of moral 
luck. Williams writes, ‘One’s history as an agent is a web in which anything that is 
the product of the will is surrounded and held up and partly formed by things that 
are not.’98 As a case in point, as I argued above, a speech act is the product of the 
speaker’s will, but it is also held up and partly formed by the reciprocity of the 
audience, without which the speech act fails to be what it was intended to be by 
the speaker. For Williams, one experiences bad moral luck when one’s ability to 
act is caught in a web in which some of the external circumstances surrounding 
the act cause harmful or morally suspect results, even though the agent might not 
have done anything wrongful or negligent.99 Two kinds of moral luck are relevant 
 
96 ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’, 141. 
97 Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12. 
98 Williams, Moral Luck, 29. 
99 Note here how intentions and outcomes are dis-integrated in this picture of bad moral luck. 
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here: incidental (which arises in discrete events) and constitutive (which contributes 
to one’s overall situation as a moral agent). 
An example of incidental bad moral luck would be an occasion on which a 
child runs in front of a moving car and is killed; the driver is likely to feel regret for 
her actions’ outcomes, despite that there was nothing she could possibly have done 
to avoid them. An example of good constitutive moral luck would be Plato’s class 
of sages, who are lucky to have been born as ideal moral agents.100 Tessman’s claim 
is that oppression can so systematically affect a person’s life that, rather than view 
the harms they incur as being a series of bad luck incidents, we do better to view the 
incidents as a system of oppression which so alters that person’s capacities and the 
formation of their character over time as to be constitutive of the curtailed shape of 
their moral agency.101 That is, the oppressed person is the victim of bad 
constitutive moral luck: the grim corollary of the platonic sage.102 What Tessman 
adds to Williams’ account of bad moral luck is the premise that deliberate or 
systemic harms can cause similar kinds of damage, bridging the dynamics of bad 
luck and oppression. 
Failure to listen at a critical juncture could be an accident, but persistent 
refusal to listen to someone circumscribes her autonomy in ways that resemble 
Bartky’s account of psychological oppression. Bartky argues that it is: 
…dehumanizing and depersonalizing; it attacks the person in her 
personhood. I mean by this that the nature of psychological oppression is 
such that the oppressor and the oppressed alike come to doubt that the 
oppressed have the capacity to do the sorts of things that only persons can 
do, to be what persons, in the fullest sense of the term, can be.103 
 
100 Williams, Moral Luck, 20. 
101 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 13–14. 
102 To clarify, bad moral luck does not amount to culpability, because the emphasis in the concept of moral 
luck is on features of a situation which are outside the agent’s control. The aim of Tessman’s account is not 
to cast blame on the oppressed, but to highlight the necessity of healing in the course of the moral 
development of the oppressed self. 
103 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, 29. 
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Bartky goes on to give an example of this effect, in which female stereotypes 
promote an understanding of women as less than autonomous. When such 
stereotypes are believed, people are led to question whether women picked out by 
the stereotype can pose the kind of autonomous figure that is typically held to 
mark out persons from non-persons. This can affect anyone who is confronted by 
the stereotype, leading not just observers but also the stereotyped women to 
question their own autonomy.104 We can apply the same pattern to the case of 
speech-autonomy: if by refusing to listen to someone I create conditions under 
which her speech actions are forced to fail due to my withholding of reciprocity, I 
force her speech into infelicity, thereby undermining her capacity to speak 
autonomously to me.  
This form of sabotage casts doubts in the mind of the refusing listener and 
in the mind of the speaker about her capacity to utter felicitous speech acts, 
potentially leading both to doubt her capacity to be an autonomous agent in 
speech, to experience not only her utterances but her subjectivity as infelicitous. 
In Medina’s terms, we can distinguish between infelicitous utterances and infelicitous 
subjects, which are incidental and constitutive infelicities, respectively.105 If a 
speaker makes utterances which are in some way expressions of herself as a 
human subject, or are exercises of her autonomous agency, and those utterances 
are persistently rendered infelicitous, then speaker, listener, and bystander would 
all have the clear impression that some relevant aspect of the speaker is not 
welcome in the discursive environment. An element of her subjectivity is made 
summarily infelicitous, and this is a step to undermining her subjectivity itself, 
either by pushing her out of the discursive community altogether, or by forcing 
the infelicitous part of her to be dis-integrated from the rest of her subjectivity. 
Some might say it is too strong to claim, as Bartky does, that such harms 
amount to dehumanisation and depersonalisation. It is alarming to think that one 
 
104 Bartky, 24. 
105 José Medina, ‘How to Undo Things with Words: Infelicitous Practices and Infelicitous Agents’, Essays in 
Philosophy 8, no. 1 (January 2007). 
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individual incident of such harm can really have the oppressive power to alienate 
someone else from their very humanity and personhood. Such simple acts as 
stereotyping and refusing to listen to someone, acts which we might at times 
unwittingly and unintentionally commit, seem minor when viewed as separate 
incidents, a single drop of water on a mountain’s face. Nevertheless, they do 
contribute to these drastic effects of psychological oppression when viewed 
systematically. The matter can be clarified by taking dehumanisation and 
depersonalisation to be cumulative results of extended, ongoing oppressive 
situations. The longer and more systematically one is oppressed, the more the 
mountain is eroded, or weathered. The more one’s subjectivity becomes dis-
integrated through repeated silencing, the more the results accrue in the direction 
of dehumanisation and depersonalisation. 
As with moral luck, so with silencing: an individual may sustain incidental 
moral damage through incidental silencing when a single speech act encounters 
refusal of reciprocity. But where someone’s speech is met with refusal of 
reciprocity across whole categories of speech acts or even across all their attempts 
at making claims in discourse with certain interlocutors—more on this below—
the situation is one of constitutive moral damage. 
To illuminate the progression of cumulative psychological oppression, 
Bartky draws attention to this dis-integration, which she describes as: 
…fragmentation within their own persons, a kind of inner impoverishment; 
parts of their being have fallen under the control of another. This 
fragmentation is the consequence of a form of social organization which has 
given to some persons the power to prohibit other persons from the full 
exercise of capacities the exercise of which is thought necessary to a fully 
human existence.106 
We would not tend to say that refusing to listen to someone is the same thing as 
prohibiting them from using their human capacity to be a speaker, although 
perhaps in some cases an especially hostile refusal might amount to the same 
 
106 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, 34. 
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thing. What we can more readily say, however, is that in any action which is 
interdependent, where actors depend on reciprocity and cooperation for success, 
there is a possibility that non-cooperating parties can block actors from exercising 
their human capacities successfully. 
When a hostile respondent refuses to cooperate fairly in the speaker’s 
action through reciprocity, the speaker’s ordinary human capacity to speak 
autonomously—to speak for herself—becomes fragmented, with the speech-actor 
part of her being having been alienated by the person who forces her repeatedly 
into illocutionary failure despite the validity of her speech acts. As the repeated 
damage of silencing accumulates, she becomes increasingly fragmented and dis-
integrated in her own character as an agent of speech; this is a case of constitutive 
moral damage. 
4. Abramson on Existential Silencing 
If moral damage is cumulative, and dis-integration and fragmentation are 
intermediary stages, then our attention should turn next to what maximal states 
of this kind of damage from refusals to listen would look like. I argue that they 
should be understood as a particular form of gaslighting—a phenomenon that 
entered psychoanalytic and popular discourse under that name following its 
portrayal in the 1944 film Gaslight, in which a man psychologically manipulates and 
persuades his wife that she is going crazy in order to steal her family heirlooms.107 
The concept has grown to refer to an array of phenomena whereby a person is 
psychologically undermined by being made to distrust her own perceptions, being 
told that what she’s experienced cannot have happened and that she must be 
imagining things or making things up. 
The usual case where gaslighting is discussed has to do with accusations of 
sexual harassment, but the same dynamic is also at play in the Disney film The Lion 
King, after Scar (the jealous uncle) murders his brother, King Mufasa, in front of 
 
107 John Van Druten et al., Gaslight (Burbank, Calif.: Warner Home Video, 2004). 
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Mufasa’s young son, Simba.108 Scar takes advantage of Simba’s naivete, grief, and 
confusion to tell him that he, Simba, was responsible for Mufasa’s death, that the 
lion pride would never forgive him, and that he must run away and never return. 
Later in the film, when an adult Simba is found and called back to take his place as 
the Lion King, he does not feel he can be king after having killed his father. Key to 
the plot’s resolution is the need for Simba to work out that he had not, in fact, killed 
his father, that he had not been responsible. His perspective on the situation had 
been skewed by the lies Scar told in order to psychologically manipulate the young 
cub, to prevent Simba from taking his own lived experience seriously and telling 
the true version of the story, which would reveal Scar’s guilt. 
This strategy of sabotaging a person’s trust in her own sanity was given its 
first philosophical account by Kate Abramson in “Turning Up the Lights on 
Gaslighting”.109 Classic cases involve two parties, which Abramson calls the 
Gaslighter (Scar) and the Target (Simba). The Target is typically a person from 
whom the Gaslighter fears questioning, critique, or disagreement—and this is 
often the case if the Target is the victim of some wrong(s) perpetrated by the 
Gaslighter, in virtue of which the Target has reason to make the accusations which 
the Gaslighter seeks to avoid. Abramson describes the phenomenon thus: 
The central desire or aim of the gaslighter, to put it sharply, is to destroy even 
the possibility of disagreement—to have his sense of the world not merely 
confirmed, but placed beyond dispute. And the only sure way to accomplish 
this is for there to be no source of possible disagreement—no independent, 
separate, deliberative perspective from which disagreement might arise. So 
he gaslights: he aims to destroy the possibility of disagreement by so radically 
undermining another person that she has nowhere left to stand from which 
 
108 Allers, Robert et al., The Lion King (London: Mercury, 1995). 
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https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1610051; Cynthia A. Stark, ‘Gaslighting, Misogyny, and Psychological 
Oppression’, The Monist 102, no. 2 (1 April 2019): 221–35, https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onz007. 
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to disagree, no standpoint from which her words might constitute genuine 
disagreement.110 
In other words, gaslighting refers to the kind of damage that Scar causes to Simba, 
disabling him from discovering or exposing Scar’s regicide by convincing Simba 
to believe himself to be guilty. This is the same general kind of damage that a co-
worker experiences when claims of sexual harassment in the workplace are met 
with dismissals in the form of telling the claimant that she is delusional, crazy, or 
maliciously motivated. Similarly, by claiming to the Target that she is ‘crazy’ to 
say, think, or desire what she says, thinks, or desires (call this the Crazy Claim), 
the Gaslighter assaults her standpoint as a speaking, thinking, desiring being.111  
Now the programmes of gaslighting that occur in Gaslight and The Lion King 
are deliberate and intense. A specific individual victim is purposefully gaslit by a 
particular agent or group of agents as part of a course of action to sabotage the 
Target’s capacity act in some particular way. However, gaslighting need not be 
perpetrated by a single actor with a single aim; it can also be accomplished by the 
slow drip, cumulative autonomy erosion that occurs when a person sees a certain 
kind of illocution silenced time and again, by various actors, against various 
speakers, as Karen Adkins argues in ‘Gaslighting by Crowd’.112 If women’s accounts 
of sexual harassment by a prominent member of a department are consistently 
met with the claim that the claimant is crazy, gaslighting is accomplished—not by 
anyone in particular, perhaps, and perhaps not on purpose, just as on a crowded 
metro station platform a person with reduced mobility may be harmed in the 
jostle, even though he is not bumped by anyone in particular nor particularly on 
purpose. 
 
110 ‘Turning up the Lights’, 10. 
111 Andrew Spear further argues that gaslighting destroys the victim’s epistemological standpoint through 
exploiting and manipulating the reasoning processes of the victim—an apt parallel for the joint harms that 
occur when someone both refuses to listen to someone and refuses to acknowledge her credibility. See 
Spear, ‘Epistemic Dimensions of Gaslighting’. 




Nevertheless, when such incidents are not properly redressed, the 
perpetrator comes to be culpable. If a woman makes a claim about sexual 
harassment in the department and the initial reaction is the Crazy Claim, she 
might challenge the respondent. ‘I know it’s hard to hear, but it really did happen, 
and I need you to take this seriously!’ Suppose the situation is then rectified, and 
she is believed and properly supported by her department in seeking safety and 
justice. We would not, in such case, say that she had been comprehensively gaslit 
by the bumbling initial responder. Indeed, if she is anticipating the Crazy Claim 
and is prepared to defend herself against it, she might not be so summarily 
silenced. It is when the Crazy Claim is made repeatedly, by one person or many, 
against one claimant or many, that the damage accrues. 
Suppose again that the Target calls out the respondent, but that the 
situation is not then rectified. The Crazy Claim is reasserted, and then gossip 
spreads about the claimant. The Crazy Claim then might be followed up by 
whatever manipulations are necessary, not only to persuade the Target and 
everyone else in the department that she is crazy, but to make it the case that she 
actually stops trusting the veracity of her own experience. In extreme cases, such 
as in the film Gaslight, the Target is in fact driven mad—that is, she ceases to have 
‘standing as a deliberator and moral agent’113 such that she can make claims that 
would pose a disagreement, critique, or challenge to the Gaslighter. 
Abramson stresses the moral darkness of this manipulative behaviour, 
which is striking in the context of a Kantian account: ‘The problem with contempt, 
according to Kantians, is that it involves regarding a person as though she were 
outside the moral community. Gaslighting attempts to make it the case that a person 
is in fact no longer properly regarded as a full member of the moral community, 
because she doesn’t in fact have that independent standing.’114 Gaslighting affects 
both the Target and the community around her, ensuring that no one remains to 
treat the Target as if she still has an intact moral and deliberative standpoint. 
 
113 ‘Turning up the Lights’, 8. 
114 Abramson, 16. 
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The mechanisms of gaslighting are diverse, but at the core of the 
phenomenon is the destruction of the Target’s ability to make claims, which seems 
straightaway to bear some resemblance to silencing. In silencing, whatever 
challenges a speaker might try to make to someone will, of course, not be taken by 
the silencer to actually be challenges, because the silencer refuses to grant uptake 
of the utterance qua challenge (refusal of L2). Instead, the utterance may be 
construed as some other kind of speech act (i.e., ‘Perhaps she is hysterical, or lying 
to get attention’), thereby forcing the speaker’s intended illocutionary act to fail. 
Similarly, by withholding uptake of the Target’s locutions as claims 
constituting actual challenges, the Gaslighter forces the Target’s illocutionary 
aims to fail. But gaslighting goes further. Abramson elaborates: 
…it’s not only at this level that gaslighting is ‘silencing’ in Langton’s sense. 
Insofar as the target of gaslighting is regarded as crazy, it’s not merely 
particular utterances that will fail to have what would otherwise be their 
illocutionary force, but anything she says. And insofar as gaslighting is 
actually successful, it undermines the target’s ability to take her own words, 
thoughts, reactions or views as having the force they otherwise would… 
Successful gaslighting, in this way, involves what might be aptly thought of 
as a kind of existential silencing.115 
The concept of existential silencing is valuable for understanding how the stronger 
forms of moral damage are accomplished by the accrual of the comparatively 
‘minor’ harms of individual incidents. What begins as fragmentation and dis-
integration has a cumulative effect of dehumanising and depersonalising 
someone. 
For Bartky, it is the damage to a person’s autonomy which damages their 
status as a moral agent, resulting in psychological oppression.116 With silencing, 
the damage to a person’s capacity for autonomous speech damages their overall 
status as moral agents. And under Abramson’s description, gaslighting can be 
seen as encompassing both of these kinds of moral damage to a comprehensive 
 
115 Abramson, 17–18, italics mine. 
116 see also Stark, ‘Gaslighting, Misogyny, and Psychological Oppression’. 
74 
 
extent: silencing mounts from the incidental, to the constitutive, and then to the 
outright existential bad luck of having one’s standing as a member of the moral 
community undermined or even destroyed. 
If we want to understand what is the worst that could happen when 
refusing to listen to someone, we must understand that to inflict moral damage 
against a person, even in its mildest forms, can be a step along the way to 
destroying that person existentially.117 This does not mean that every failure to 
listen or every elbow bump on the metro station platform is a comparably 
granular, morally damaging assault on the personhood of the vulnerable person. 
A raindrop on the side of a mountain does not constitute a flood; nevertheless, just 
as a concentrated onslaught of raindrops can cause a flash flood dangerous 
enough to scrape out a canyon, so can incidents on the rising scale of hostile 
refusal to listen to someone cause illocutionary disablement which, potentially, 
can contribute to the constitutive fragmentation and dis-integration of someone’s 
autonomy as a speaker and participant in the community of moral discourse. 
These metaphors of cumulative damage could lead to a question about 
whether the minor scope of a single incident can excuse a refusal to listen to 
someone. One might argue that because she is—only today, in this particular 
case—refusing to listen to the person rather than full-on gaslighting them, that 
her actions are not all that harmful and do not warrant the judgement of moral 
blameworthiness associated with forms of moral damage. I think this objection 
flows out of a problematic view of the isolability of incidents—what Springer 
refers to as ‘an implicit atomism about action’ and an ‘assimilation of speech 
activity to discrete speech acts’, which we ought to resist.118 
 
117 About the difference in scope between incidents and gaslighting as a whole, Abramson writes: ‘A single 
instance of one person saying to another, “that’s crazy” may not appear—may not be—an instance of 
someone trying to destroy another’s standing to make claims. But when that form of interaction is iterated 
over and over again, when counterevidence to “that’s crazy” is dismissed, when nothing is treated as salient 
evidence for the possibility of disrupting the initial accusation, appearances shift.’ See Abramson, ‘Turning 
up the Lights’, 11. 
118 Springer, Communicating Moral Concern, 101. 
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The refuser of reciprocity could choose to limit their moral calculus to 
include only their own one-off refusal to listen to someone, and so come up with 
an account by which they are not causing any discernible moral damage. However, 
such limitations appear disingenuous when we consider that the listener has no 
control over (and may have no knowledge of) the extent to which the speaker has 
been subject to constant, consistent refusal from other listeners. She may be under 
a substantial amount of psychological oppression already and may even have 
sustained severe moral damage from gaslighting. The listener may be, wittingly 
or unwittingly, part of a system in which the speaker is systematically silenced. If 
that were so, then suddenly the listener’s ‘isolated incident’ appears less isolable. 
Caring About the Droplet 
It is tempting to try to justify a refusal to listen by presenting it as a small 
droplet, an isolated instance, which does not cause great amounts of harm. This 
justification fails because it depends on ignoring the possibility that a speaker has 
already endured substantial harms in order to justify the bad listener for colluding 
with, or adding to, the moral damage which the speaker has already sustained. 
When we adequately account for the context and history of moral damage 
suffered, we hold as blameworthy those who, out of hostility, refuse to make 
repairs when accidents are brought to light, in addition to those who perpetrate 
wilfully hostile programmes of comprehensive refusal to listen to someone, such 
as the extreme gaslighter. 
The account given here does not serve to tell us exactly how a practical 
morality of listening should work, but it does show us where the moral 
significance of listening comes from. We praise listeners whom we take to offer 
normal reciprocity, recognising our utterances for what they are and allowing us 
to participate in discourse with integrity. We blame listeners whom we take to be 
withholding reciprocity, refusing to recognise our utterances for what they are, 
and disallowing us to participate in discourse as our whole, unfragmented selves. 
This chapter has responded to the question of why listening matters to us 
in the way that it does. Particularly, if it is a moral issue, what kinds of stakes and 
76 
 
goods ground our judgements of listeners as praiseworthy or blameworthy? We 
shall see the themes of silencing, fragmentation, and gaslighting recur in Chapter 
4 and following, as we begin building the more technical account of praiseworthy 
and blameworthy listening behaviours, and the way they affect us and our 
communities. But first, we need to get a clearer look at what kinds of actions and 
action structures we need to be evaluating to make sense of how listening actually 
works, beyond the simple matter of not flouting the expected reciprocity by 






Listening to People: Using Social 
Psychology to Spotlight an 
Overlooked Virtue119 
 
And the strength needed to listen to something unheard of might actually fail, 
precisely because things may be unhearable when listening has only been trained to 
pay, effortlessly, the minimum price established by dominant logics. 
—Gemma Corradi Fiumara120 
 
We shift now from talking about the harms at stake when listening goes 
wrong, to talking about listening as a positive practice, something which is a good 
that we intuitively look for in our conversations which contributes to the 
flourishing of both speaker and listener. The refrain I typically hear when I talk to 
professional listeners – therapists, doctors, teachers, and consultants – about 
what it means to be a good listener is that they wish they had a better vocabulary 
for talking about how to do listening well, so that they can more reflectively 
practice the skills of the listener and improve their practice. It is difficult to strive 
to be a good listener, let alone to recognise what it feels like when one is succeeding 
 
119 This chapter develops work that was previously published as Susan E Notess, “Listening to People: Using 
Social Psychology to Spotlight an Overlooked Virtue,” Philosophy 94, no. 04 (October 2019): 621–43, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819118000529. It is included here with permission. 
120 Fiumara, The Other Side of Language, 91. 
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at being a good listener, if one does not first have a clear grasp of what the tasks of 
listening are. 
The aim of the present chapter is to give a preliminary articulation of what 
those tasks are, focusing in a loosely phenomenological way on how we tend to talk 
about what does or does not count as listening, and what it is like to listen or not 
listen in these ways. For this purpose, we need a way to talk about how a listener’s 
motivation or intention is related to their perceptions of speakers and to their 
particular responsive actions that virtue theoretic accounts call for, and which is 
necessitated by the complex varieties of particular behaviours which may 
characterise listening (or not), from one situation to the next. We also need a way 
to narrate what the listener is doing, such that we keep motivation and intentions 
in focus.  
 I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I give a brief overview of the rather 
limited literature available covering the issue of listening, and in particular, 
listening as a virtue, to show why these accounts are inadequate. In Section 2, I 
offer some alternative resources for articulating the ethical structure of the 
experience of listening to someone: Gilbert Ryle’s notions of courses of action as 
policies of infra-doings, and Linda Zagzebski’s account of intellectual virtues. In 
Section 3 I discuss the variation in levels of salience that we perceive in different 
voices, and the salience-based heuristics which lend efficiency to our responses to 
others, but which also can breed unjust unresponsiveness towards others. Social 
psychology of persuasion and attitude change furnishes us with vocabulary for 
talking about such efficiencies and the alternative, other-centring mode of 
responding to messages, so that we can look at how the listening agent engages 
with their own perceptual and motivational tendencies. 
In Section 4, using the language of salience and persuasion, I argue that to 
listen to someone (justly) is to establish a relation to that person under which the 
speaker’s messages are not debarred from higher-effort, content-based modes of 
processing but are centred by the listener. To refuse to listen to someone is to 
obstruct the transmission of their communicative meanings by employing 
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salience-based efficiency measures in such a way as to block their message from 
more central routes of processing. (5) I discuss the refinement of skilful listening 
behaviour and what it looks like, in theory, for someone to be a fully virtuous 
listener. 
 A note before I proceed: the question inevitably arises about what to call a 
person who does not rightly respond to a speaker, being perhaps a 
poor/unvirtuous listener, or not a listener at all. To preserve the clarity of the roles 
in the communicative exchange, I refer to the non-speaking, respondent 
participant of the dialogue as a ‘listener’ regardless of whether in a given scenario 
the person actually does listen. The result is that I may at time refer to a listener 
who is not listening: I embrace the jarring dissonance between the person’s 
conversational role and their behaviour as a natural critique of the ethical failure 
nascent in a person’s failure to fulfil their role as a listener. 
1. Overview of Virtue-Based Accounts of Listening 
There are a few theoretical accounts of listening available. Educational 
theorist Suzanne Rice121 argues that good listening is a wholesale intensification of 
attention and narrowing of focus to auditory stimuli, such that one who listens 
well must both intensify and narrow the field of her attention in order to closely 
engage with a single speaker, to the exclusion of other stimuli. However, what 
constitutes a good practice of listening varies in different situations, sometimes 
even requiring simultaneous alertness to a broad array of stimuli. 
Since a broad form of listening would be the opposite of the wholesale 
attention-intensification and narrowing Rice prescribes as the iconic meaning of 
good listening, she concludes that listening cannot be a singular virtue. For 
example, at many times during a typical day it would be unvirtuous of a classroom 
teacher to intensely and narrowly listen to one student, instead of monitoring and 
attending to the class as a whole via a more diffuse form of attention. Rice 
therefore posits that there are multiple irreconcilable tasks referred to under 
 
121 Rice, ‘Toward an Aristotelian Conception of Good Listening’. 
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‘listening virtuously’, which, being so varied and applying to such differing 
circumstances, do not bear further theorisation together under the notion of 
listening being a virtue as such.122 
 Philosopher Joseph Beatty,123 like Rice, argues that listening is related to 
many other elements of virtuousness, but his solution is to cast good listening as 
both a virtue and a meta-virtue similar to phronesis,124 because good listening is a 
route to the refinement of virtues in general. Beatty’s conception of listening is the 
taking of a particularly detached, neutral position from which to respond to 
others, which not only results in right communicative responsiveness (listening as 
a virtue) but in the increased pursuit and acquisition of virtues in general 
(listening as a meta-virtue). 
 Haroutunian-Gordon and Laverty125 offer an overview of accounts of 
listening through the history of philosophy, few as they are, emphasizing again 
the pragmatic role of the listener in soliciting the speaker’s meaning as a route to 
increased social or epistemic understanding, rather than emphasizing the moral 
aspects of such solicitous activity. Interestingly, in Haroutunian-Gordon and 
Laverty’s collection, Leonard Waks126 represents John Dewey as holding listening 
to be primarily a democratic virtue, in that active listening is an effort to see all 
voices duly included in discourse – a view which shares resonances with that 
offered below. This higher-altitude view of listening merits further exploration as 
 
122 I am not convinced that the variety of listening-related tasks required of the virtuous person makes 
listening a poor candidate for inclusion in an arsenal of virtues. On the contrary, it seems that one 
particularly useful strength of virtue ethics is its ability to cope with virtues whose manifestations can take a 
wide variety of forms. To be courageous can take the form of all kinds of unrelated activities, from charging 
into battle, to initiating a conversation, to undergoing surgery to donate a kidney. More on this strategy of 
categorisation in Section 2. 
123 Beatty, ‘Good Listening’. 
124 In describing listening as a meta-virtue, Beatty writes that it is ‘a “virtue of virtue” in that it is a 
fundamental avenue of understanding one’s own and the other’s character and occasioning its 
transformation’ (Beatty, 281.).  
125 Haroutunian‐Gordon and Laverty, ‘Listening’. 
126 Waks, ‘John Dewey on Listening and Friendship in School and Society’. 
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relates to the view I offer below, but in the present work, I leave aside the political 
register of listening in favour of a more focused look at how the process of listening 
itself actually works. 
 The account I argue for here sits between Rice’s scepticism and Beatty’s 
enthusiasm for classing listening as such as a virtue. Like both of them, I am 
focused on the moral meaning of listening rather than on listening as a purely 
empirical tool, although, again like both Rice and Beatty, I follow the Aristotelian 
tradition of positing an intimate relation between moral and intellectual virtues, 
as a result of which the empirical curiosity for truth driving the accounts of 
Fiumara and those in Haroutunian-Gordon and Laverty’s view would be a relevant 
reason for striving to develop the intellectual virtue(s) related to listening. 
Inspiring my account is Miranda Fricker’s theory of the virtue of Epistemic 
Justice,127 in which she highlights the dually moral and intellectual (epistemic) 
nature of justice in the testimonial context. For this reason, I follow Fricker in 
taking as my point of departure Zagzebski’s work on intellectual virtues,128 since 
Zagzebski’s definition of a virtue in general is designed to accommodate both 
moral and intellectual virtues in a manner that is derived from, and yet more 
unified than, Aristotle’s founding account of the two kinds of virtue – moral and 
intellectual virtue – in the Nicomachean Ethics.129 I say more about Zagzebski’s 
account in Section 2. 
 Since I have selected as my explanandum here, as in the previous chapters, 
not just auditory stimuli but conversational exchanges in general, including sign 
language and written exchanges, I diverge straightaway from Rice’s view that 
listening is simplistically a narrowing intensification of auditory attention. As I 
have already emphasized, an adequate theory of listening must account for its 
predominantly interpersonal rather than sensory function. Those who employ the 
capacity of listening in a virtuous manner would be virtuous listeners; to specify 
 
127 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice. 
128 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind. 
129 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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such an attribution, what we need is a way to identify the specific interpersonal 
value of the excellence that a virtuous listener possesses. By aligning this 
interpersonal excellence with the family of virtues having to do with justice, we 
can account for what it means to listen virtuously across a broad array of 
situational requirements, keeping in focus the particular social meaning of 
listening to someone rather than foregrounding the diversity of perceptual and 
linguistic systems and operations that can be involved in listening. To act justly 
has as many different manifestations as there are different situations requiring 
justice. To listen justly likewise has far more manifestations than simply 
amplifying and focusing attention to auditory stimuli in the selective way that 
raised Rice’s concerns. 
 Beatty prioritises the interpersonal element rather than the perceptual 
element of listening with his winner-take-all theory of listening – construing 
listening as a virtue and a meta-virtue, rather than focusing on the perceptual 
definitions of the verb ‘to listen’ – in which perceptual systems simply serve the 
social enterprise of listening, which is optimised under conditions of detachment. 
Making detachment central to an account of listening strikes me as a counter-
intuitive choice, considering how much emphasis Beatty places on the 
interpersonal rather than perceptual nature of listening. Indeed, it seems 
straightforward that good listening involves resisting the distorting effects of 
strong prejudices and unwarranted biases, but I am sceptical whether detachment 
is the best strategy to employ against such distortions. Instead, a satisfactory 
account of listening should explain how becoming a virtuous listener involves 
training oneself to respond justly to the speech of others through attentive 
engagement with what they are saying, rather than detachment. 
To facilitate such a view, I cast the excellence by which one listens 
virtuously as an excellence of justice; that is, to be virtuous as a listener involves 
seeking to establish and maintain just relationships with interlocutors. This claim 
fits naturally into the ecological frame discussed in the first chapter, whereas the 
Message in a Bottle framework would have difficulty incorporating it. Moreover, 
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the need for understanding listening has having to do with establishing and 
maintaining just relationships with interlocutors is made evident in the discussion 
in Chapter 2 of how social and political discrepancies contribute to the moral harm 
that can be brought about by vicious failures of listening. Contra Beatty, the virtue 
of listening justly should arguably be seconded to the meta-virtue of justice130 and, 
like Fricker’s virtue of epistemic justice, function as a hybrid moral and intellectual 
virtue. This picture serves as our ‘working understanding’ of listening for the 
remainder of this chapter.  
2. Listening as a Policy of Infra-doings 
The specific activities that can be associated with listening are a diverse 
array, including but not limited to perceptual, linguistic, relational, and cognitive 
faculties. Further, a good listener may take various steps to reassure a speaker of 
her attention, such as by closing a door to remove distractions; bending down to 
eye level when attending to a speaking child; verbally committing to leaving a 
conversation unresolved, or promising the speaker that she will continue listening 
and trying to understand his point of view. So, it is important to specify what 
activities are themselves to be taken as constitutive of listening, and which 
activities are subordinate functions, contingently incorporated into the process of 
listening according to the requirements of particular scenarios. 
If listening is taken to be constituted by something as specific as ‘closing a 
door’ or ‘bending down to eye level’ – both tasks which in some instance support 
listening but may at times be irrelevant or even obstructive to listening – then we 
run the risk of being like Gilbert Ryle’s boy at the zoo,131 who is on a quest to take a 
photograph of a mammal. With dismay the boy passes by signs for bears, foxes, 
lions, and monkeys but never finds an enclosure marked as containing ‘mammals’. 
To avoid such a category mistake and correctly identify the activity of listening, we 
 
130 Aristotle, Book V. 
131 Ryle, ‘Courses of Action or the Uncatchableness of Mental Acts’, 333–34. 
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need to identify listening with the broader category of action that controls the 
array of more specific subordinate actions such as those listed above. 
 To address activities that are best assessed at the broader category level, 
Ryle provides the idea of a course of action,132 which functions much as a policy that 
controls a potentially enormous array of subordinate activities. He gives the 
example of seven people waiting on a station platform for a train. There is no one 
discrete action that is, precisely, ‘waiting’. One person does a crossword puzzle; 
one smokes a pipe, and one chats to another. Of these various meantime activities, 
Ryle says, 
For to wait for a train is (nearly enough) intentionally-not-to-move-far-from-
where-the-wanted-train-is-due-to-come-in-at-any-moment-before-it-
comes-in… Between the seven or seventy such infra-things that the seven 
train awaiting travellers were witnessed in the act of doing there need have 
been no visible, audible or introspective similarities. The significant, though 
unphotographable and unintrospectable similarity was their common Supra-
policy, namely, their all alike resolutely not doing any of the various things 
that would remove them far from the train’s arrival platform.133 
Ryle’s notion of a course of action is well suited to describe many of the complex 
undertakings that fill our lives. Listening to someone, much like waiting for a 
train, is not a singular action but a course of action, a policy which coordinates the 
myriad choices and activities sprinkled throughout an extended period of time 
towards the accomplishment of a given purpose. To listen to someone is, to mimic 
Ryle’s style of description, intentionally-to-establish-a-relationship-of-adequate-
responsiveness-to-someone-so-as-not-to-close-oneself-to-her-communicative-
attempts. To achieve this end, a person does not merely engage in the mundane 
activities supporting the perceptual processing of the speaker’s linguistic signal. A 
listener also engages in the cognitive work of attending to the level of effort that 
she gives to processing the speaker’s message, ensuring that the effort level is 
sufficient to duly facilitate the speaker’s communicative prospects. The mundane 
 
132 Ryle, 335. 
133 Ryle, 340. 
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perceptual activities and cognitive attentional work that go into listening are infra-
doings, coordinated by a policy and aimed at accomplishing a certain course of 
action. The infra-doings of listening are explored in their various forms 
throughout this Chapter and those that follow, with Chapter 5 especially 
examining the conversational infra-doings most intimately related to the course 
of action of listening to someone.  
 A key element to notice at this juncture is the way that listening involves 
establishing relationships such that a person will deal adequately with another 
person’s speech, according to the requirements of a given scenario. To deal 
inadequately with a person’s speech is to close oneself off prematurely to her 
communicative attempt, to assume on the basis of surface features of the scenario 
that what the person is saying can be dismissed without any further attention. On 
such a view, to not listen to someone is something more than merely mishearing 
or not hearing her; as Chapter 2 makes clear, problems of perception or auditory 
processing can be repaired easily enough, but problems of listening arise when the 
listener is not willing to let a speaker’s claims go through. To not listen to someone 
is to close oneself to that person’s communicative endeavour prematurely, 
withholding uptake in bad faith, and silencing the speaker with respect to the 
particular communicative act being attempted. 
 The difference between what these concepts pick out can be seen in how 
we would describe a situation in which a lifeguard orders swimmers out of a pool, 
and one swimmer fails to respond to the lifeguard’s instructions. If the swimmer 
was underwater at the time of the instruction and simply did not hear the 
lifeguard, we would not say that the swimmer ‘did not listen’ to the lifeguard, but 
that he ‘did not hear’ the lifeguard. If the swimmer were a foreign tourist who does 
not know the language the lifeguard used, we say he ‘did not understand’ the 
lifeguard. But if the swimmer heard the lifeguard, understood the language and 
the meaning of all the words used, and yet refused to display an appropriate form 
of responsiveness to the instruction, we have an example of someone who did not 
listen, because the swimmer has made a judgement about what the speech of the 
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lifeguard means for him and requires of him, and the judgement he makes is 
conspicuously inappropriate to the situation. 
 When we talk about whether a person is listening, we are talking about the 
judgements that the person is making about their level of responsiveness to what 
a speaker is saying, where the level of responsiveness refers to three main 
components, beginning with (1) the judgement the listener makes about the 
possible importance of what the speaker says. This judgement in turn informs the 
listener’s policy with regard to (2) the level of effort the person is willing to put 
towards processing the speaker’s message. Furthermore, when a person judges a 
speaker’s speech as something important in some way – be it important to her as 
a source of information, or perhaps important because it is important to the 
speaker – she in effect establishes for herself a policy of responsiveness to the 
speaker that involves (3) a decision about her openness to persuasion, such as a 
decision not to dismiss out of hand what the speaker says. The further measures 
she takes to understand and determine her replies will vary according to the 
particulars of the situation. 
 Alternatively, when a person establishes a policy of non-responsiveness to 
a speaker, the person is judging the speaker’s speech as unimportant, whether 
because the listener simply does not care about what the speaker has to say, or 
because she is committed to a belief that what the speaker says is unreliable or sure 
to be wrong. Such a non-responsiveness policy is what we pick out when we accuse 
people of not just failing, but refusing to listen to us. Whatever stance a listener 
takes towards a speaker can be viewed as a policy of responsiveness towards the 
speaker. Whether the policy is supportive or obstructive, the policy can be cashed 
out in terms of the same three factors given above. As such, whether we consider 
a person to be listening to someone turns on what sort of policy of responsiveness 
the listener establishes towards the speaker, based on (1) judgements she makes 
about the possible content or importance of the person’s speech, (2) the level of 
effort she contributes to processing the person’s message, and (3) the decision she 
makes about her openness to persuasion by the speaker. 
87 
 
 Taken together, these elements of a policy of responsiveness form the basis 
for construing listening as an inherently moral concept—like honesty or kindness, 
wheeled out specifically for making normative judgements, as discussed in 
Chapter 1—since taking up a policy of responsiveness involves taking a stance on 
the importance of a person’s speech and the level of processing effort due her.134 
We would ordinarily say that when a person hears and processes bits of language, 
she listens just in case she meets the other person’s speech with a policy of 
responsiveness that involves adequately and rightly taking into consideration 
what the person has said. To suggest that someone has listened carefully but 
towards sinister ends is to suggest the person is doing something other than 
‘listening well’. Although they have perhaps skilfully and adeptly navigated the 
implicatures, they cannot be said to have adequately and rightly handled the other 
person’s speech, as any manipulative sitcom antagonist shows: she understands a 
speaker’s meaning and responds skilfully, but she is not ‘a good listener’. Thus, we 
can say that to possess the excellence of listening to people is to possess both the 
right motivation to bring about the ends of the speaker’s success and the skill in 
bringing about that success. 
By these features we can categorise listening as a virtue. But in order to be 
clear about what it is that lends listening its moral structure, I refer to the virtue 
as ‘listening justly’. It is then easy enough to say that someone who listens unjustly 
has failed to get listening right because of a problem in the motivational 
component of the virtue of listening, even though all the subordinate skills of 
 
134 Compare, for example, what Lovibond writes about the concept or Bildung of a virtue providing “a stable 
point of view with which we can identify for the purpose of talking about the ‘demands’ of, say, courage, and 
of the courageous person as ‘responding’ to these; and when we do talk in this ethically loaded way (as 
opposed to saying simply that A faced the danger while B ran away), we demonstrate our investment in the 
forces that direct Bildung and that designate certain behaviour-patterns as the ones flowing from a ‘clear 
perception’ of the ethical” (Sabina Lovibond, Essays on Ethics and Feminism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 79–80.). To describe something as ‘courageous’ rather than describing bare actions just is to take a 
stance on the ethical quality of certain actions; likewise, to describe someone as listening well rather than 
employing any other of a litany of more barely descriptive verbs (like hearing, paying attention, 
understanding, believing…) is to take a stance on the ethical rightness of the way in which those other verbal 
activities were deployed. 
88 
 
listening are present in terms of the capacities for hearing, paying attention, 
understanding the language, and drawing implicatures. This is typical of, and, as 
I have said, is a feature of theorising an excellence as a virtue: to be an excellent 
listener, one should have the right sort of motivations (to respond justly to 
speakers), the right perception of the situations at hand (attending to how one is 
perceiving the voice of the other), and the skill to bring about the right kind of 
outcomes (being adequately and rightly responsive). I call this the Trifecta of 
excellences: motivation, perception, and producing outcomes. A virtuous listener 
has integrated all three excellences. 
 I derive the notion of a virtue as a Trifecta of excellences from Zagzebski’s 
definition of a virtue, which is as follows: 
A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of 
a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired 
end and reliable success in bringing about that end. What I mean by a 
motivation is a disposition to have a motive; a motive is an action guiding 
emotion with a certain end, either internal or external.135 
At the core of this definition are two familiar components: motivation towards an 
end, and reliable success in bringing about that end. To have reliable success in 
bringing about an end involves, at least at the beginning, having a skill or set of 
skills. When the deployment of those skills has become a consistent habit, on 
account of the person’s having a disposition towards using those skills in the right 
times and in the right ways, towards the right people, this person is said to possess 
the relevant virtue. 
 Listening is an intriguing case because, like talking, it is a basic human 
capacity essential for communication, and as such, all interpersonal exchanges are 
characterised by how, rather than whether or how much, the participants deploy 
these two communicative capacities. Thus, to listen virtuously follows a different 
pattern than generosity, for example. To be generous is to give one’s resources to 
 
135 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 137. 
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others for their benefit, potentially at loss to oneself. A person is viewed as more 
or less generous according to whether, and how much, the person gives to others. 
Listening virtuously follows a pattern more like that of Aristotle’s speech 
related virtues of truthfulness and ready wit,136 in that whenever one speaks, it is 
not the mere presence of speaking-behaviour that is virtuous, but the quality of 
that speech as truthful or untruthful, as lacking or possessing wit, which for 
Aristotle forms the basis for judging the virtuousness of the speaker with respect 
to truthfulness and ready wit, respectively. Someone who has ready wit speaks at 
the right times and in the right ways, just like someone who listens virtuously 
listens to the right extent,137 not short-changing speakers with curtailed attention 
or a refusal to engage in processing the content of what the speaker is saying, but 
establishing a relationship to the speaker in which one does not foreclose the 
speaker’s communicative possibilities by giving inadequate attention to what she 
says. To get a clearer picture of what this right relationship to a speaker looks like 
when one does not foreclose her possibilities, let us look at what the listener is 
doing. 
3. The Hidden Tasks of Listening: Salience-Response and 
Elaboration 
To be sure, a listener deploys a variety of skilful infra-doings, which 
ordinarily are highly automated, like parsing an auditory linguistic signal; 
opening and reading a text message; identifying what sort of speech act is 
occurring (is it a request or a suggestion?), and drawing the relevant implicatures 
needed to understand the meaning and import of what has been said. These infra-
doings may become conspicuous or more-than-usually intentional when the 
communicative process is obstructed by noise, linguistic error or inability on the 
 
136 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV. 
137 Aristotle does mention listening briefly in his description of the virtue of ready wit, saying “there is such a 
thing as saying – and again listening to – what one should and as one should” (Aristotle, 102-03.). He was 
right to note that there is such a thing as rightness in what one listens to and how, but his mere bracketed 
mention suggests that there is rather little to be said about listening rightly, compared to the important 
matter of speaking rightly. Needless to say, I disagree. 
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part of the speaker, or when there is difficulty understanding. These infra-doings 
support hearing, reading, and understanding, which are as well infra-doings of 
the listening course of action. To describe the policy that is itself picked out by the 
verb ‘listening’, we require the concept of responsiveness described in the 
preceding section, where policies of responsiveness include both spontaneous, 
unthought reactions to a person’s speech and thoughtful judgements about how 
one will respond to a speaker. We are more responsive to some people than to 
others, depending on a variety of factors, which leads to imbalances in the 
communicative potential of different speakers.  
 Such communicative imbalances can be understood, I propose, in terms of 
the power of the voices138 involved in an exchange, especially the power of the 
voices to persuade or to gainsay each other. This power takes two forms. One is 
salience – that is, the immediate perceptual affective force of a voice. Voices of 
those whom we are inclined to trust are highly salient. Salience can increase on the 
basis of perceived prestige and gravitas, and the favourability, accessibility, or 
intelligibility of what is being said. Salience can rise or fall on the basis of age, 
gender, race, accent, diction, dress, and skill in using conventions of politeness, 
spelling, and social ritual. These lists are far from comprehensive. The other form 
which vocal power takes derives from the listener’s engagement with the content 
of what the speaker is saying. Someone who makes compelling arguments, using 
strong rhetoric and citing reliable sources and statistics, has more power to 
persuade me than someone who provides me with few such details for 
consideration. A person’s vocal power can increase according to her rhetorical 
 
138 I am not referring to the volume of the literal voice of a person, as in the sound produced by the larynx. 
Rather, I am using ‘voice’ in the same way we talk about having a voice in a conversation, which we often use 
to refer to spoken participation in person, or to representation of a person or set of people’s views in a 
broader social discourse. For present purposes, in referring to a person’s ‘voice’ I am referring to their 
capacity to communicate their concerns and their power to persuade. As such, the power of my ‘voice’ is 
relevant to my listening activity, even when my interlocutor is the one speaking. To clarify, think of the 
listener’s voice as pointing to what the listener would say about the matter if she were speaking, and the 
power of her voice as pointing to the strength of her beliefs about the matter.  
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abilities even if she lacks certain salience-building features, as in the case of a dry, 
boring expert whose views are sought out and trusted despite a lack of charisma. 
 To clarify the difference between salience and content as features 
moderating vocal power, we will be helped by importing and repurposing some 
terminology from empirical studies in social psychology, concerned with 
persuasion and attitude change in contexts including, but not limited to, 
messaging in commercial advertising and political campaigning. Whilst empirical 
studies of attitude change have been popular from the early decades of social 
psychology research in the 1920s,139 it was not until the beginning of the 1980s that 
theories of attitude change found their feet, when two theories emerged: Petty and 
Cacioppo’s theory which has become known as the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM),140 and Chaiken’s theory, known as the Heuristic-Systematic Model 
(HSM).141 Both models succeeded in coping with the above-mentioned complexity 
by positing two main processes of attitude change, rather than one. In this 
respect, these two theories ‘have more in common than they have points of 
divergence,’142 and have together formed the foundation for much of the literature 
in persuasion studies since. 
 Whilst either of these theories would suit my purposes, I focus primarily 
on ELM, which proposes that the processes giving rise to attitude change fall on a 
continuum: 
…defined by how motivated and able people are to assess the central merits 
of a person, issue, or position... The more motivated and able people are to 
 
139 Paul A. M. van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanski, and E. Tory Higgins, Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology 
(Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012), 224, 246. 
140 Petty, Richard E. and Wegener, ‘Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables’, in The 
Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey (McGraw-Hill, 
1997), 326–28. 
141 Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, 246–66. 
142 Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, 226. 
92 
 
assess the central merits of the attitude object, the more likely they are to 
effortfully scrutinize all available object-relevant information.143 
The term elaboration refers to the cognitive activity involved in effortful scrutiny. 
Where people are highly motivated and able to consider the content and context 
of a message, they engage in a high level of elaboration on the message. This 
process of attitude change is referred to as the central route of persuasion. When 
people are less motivated to engage in effortful elaboration, attitude change can 
result from less effortful processes, investing less in scrutinizing the message and 
responding more to salience cues and, as Chaiken rightly emphasizes, heuristics. 
Attitude change arrived at through low elaboration processes occurs through the 
peripheral route. 
A myriad of motivational and situational factors influences whether a 
message is processed more via the central route or the peripheral route – that is, 
whether a person engages in a high degree of elaboration and reflective scrutiny 
of content, or depends on efficiency measures like heuristics and salience cues to 
make judgements about the message.144 Furthermore, according to each of the 
major contemporary models of attitude change including single as well as dual 
process models, “attitudes based on high amounts of thought are proposed to be 
more persistent over time, resistant to attack, and predictive of behavior than 
attitudes formed or changed with little thought.”145 
 As I have said above, we naturally find certain voices more salient to us 
than others. Suppose Sally’s voice holds little salience for Joe on matters of driving 
and navigation, because Sally does not know how to drive. If Sally presents Joe 
with a message he is disinclined to accept – perhaps she is telling him that he has 
taken a wrong turn at the last roundabout – his tendency will be to dismiss what 
she is saying on the basis of little elaboration. The assumption he makes, correctly 
 
143 Petty, Richard E. and Wegener, ‘Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables’, 326. 
144 Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, 231. 
145 Jamie Barden and Richard E. Petty, ‘The Mere Perception of Elaboration Creates Attitude Certainty: 
Exploring the Thoughtfulness Heuristic’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no. 3 (September 
2008): 489, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012559. 
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or not, is that because he perceives her to be an unreliable source and her message 
is unappealing, he can safely dismiss it without devoting a high degree of time and 
effortful activity elaborating on her message, ‘reassuring’ her confidently that he 
is on the correct road. 
 Joe is unlikely to listen to Sally unless she makes a specific bid for him to do 
so. When she indignantly cries, “You’re not listening to me! I saw the sign for the 
turn we were meant to take. Do you really recognise this road?” she is asking Joe 
to abandon his heuristics on the basis of which he has been screening her message, 
and to instead engage with the actual content of her message. Perhaps if Joe does 
so, he will find that she has a valid point that is worth taking seriously, despite his 
initial assumptions and confidence in his navigational abilities over hers. Because 
the salience of her voice is low, and her message is averse to his self-concept as a 
superior navigator, he is not likely to be persuaded by her unless he makes a 
concession of elaboration in processing her message. This is something he might 
be unlikely to do, based on his peripheral judgements about Sally, unless she 
makes a point of asking him to engage more fairly with her message itself. 
 Alternatively, suppose a stranger whose voice has no particular salience to 
Joe offers him a message that he has no particular reason to contest. As Joe 
approaches his car in a car park, a stranger in a high-visibility jacket tells him that 
a certain bridge is flooded and that he should take an alternative route. It is likely 
that Joe will respond agreeably to the message via the peripheral, low-elaboration 
route. Although the stranger’s voice has no personal salience for Joe, the non-
adverse message is accompanied with the salience-booster of a high-visibility 
jacket. Joe is likely to be persuaded by the testimony without elaboration.146 
 What this language gives us is a way to conceptualise the activity 
constitutive of listening as a function of the listener’s responsiveness to the 
 
146 I am sidestepping the considerable literature about epistemology of testimony, since the issue of whether 
a person listens to someone arises right where normal responsiveness to testimony ends. For one fairly 




speaker. The listener may by default take the speaker’s voice to be authoritative, 
and so centres the speaker’s message by reflex. The listener may alternatively hold 
the speaker’s voice to be important to him, and so centres the speaker’s message 
by choice, in accordance with his policy of responsiveness towards that person. 
When this is so, the listener may even need to invest some work on the speaker’s 
behalf, filling in the gaps in the spoken message or conscientiously resisting 
prejudice, in order to ensure that he captures the most viable interpretation of 
what the speaker is saying and centres it, in the dialogue and in his own view, in 
order to ensure that the speaker has the best possible chance of persuading him. 
As a paradigm case, consider a parent listening to a small child: the child’s diction 
may be very unclear, her grammar lacking, and she doesn’t know many words yet. 
Nevertheless, because her voice is deeply important to the parent, he or she will 
invest great amounts of effort in decoding the child’s syllables and drawing 
inferences as necessary in order to discover what the child is trying to say. 
On the other hand, a listener who fails or refuses to do this is he who 
instead employs against the speaker a policy of non-responsiveness. The speaker’s 
voice is not taken to be important; the speaker’s message will be processed with 
minimal effort from the listener on the speaker’s behalf, and if the message is not 
amenable enough to the speaker to persuade him from the periphery, then it ‘does 
not deserve’ to be centred. On such a policy, rather than giving the speaker the best 
possible chance to succeed, the listener sets a metaphorical bouncer at the door of 
his more central processing route. Here it is not just a particular illocutionary aim 
that gets taken off the table in bad faith by the hostile listener, as in Chapter 2; 
rather, whatever it is that the speaker is saying will not be granted uptake—whether 
the listener has on some level grasped it or not. If a speaker’s voice and message 
are not perceived to be amenable on the basis of salience cues and heuristic 
processing, they are not even admitted for due consideration, let alone offered the 
support of the listener investing his own elaborative effort in ensuring the most 
viable interpretation of the speaker’s message gets through. 
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4. A Relation of Managed Openness  
Thus far I have argued that listening is a virtue referring to a course of 
action, in that the tasks of listening include a wide variety of infra-doings 
subordinate to a policy of establishing a certain kind of relation to a speaker. That 
relation should be one of sufficient openness as to allow the listener to adequately 
and rightly respond to the speaker’s message, which requires that the listener 
actively avoid closing herself off to the speaker’s message. In ELM terms, the 
relation of openness established by a virtuous listener can be described as a 
commitment to not letting the salience-based efficiencies of peripheral route 
processing block a message from being processed by a more central route when 
required or requested. The core task of listening then is not the processing of 
speakers’ claims, but the establishing and maintaining of such adequately open 
and responsive relations to the speakers themselves. 
In the section that follows, I argue that the responsiveness of the listener 
does not entail that the listener always processes a person’s speech through central 
routing; such a policy would be inefficient and unnecessary. Instead, the 
responsive listener makes use of both peripheral and central processing routes, 
but manages the routing of messages through those routes according to a policy 
by which the results of peripheral route processing cannot block or preclude a 
message from being centred in the listener’s attention when called for. 
 The moral significance of managing how one routes messages emerges 
when we view the routing as an opportunity for equalising the power difference 
between our voices and those of others. By dedicating our elaboration efforts to 
the communicative attempts of those we might otherwise find questionable, we 
give them a fairer chance to be heard and to persuade. Likewise, if a message’s 
content seems garbled, but I recognise the speaker as someone who is probably 
reliable despite being unskilled in our language, then I could use these salience 
cues to motivate a highly engaged, gap-filling level of elaboration to ensure I 
adequately process the message. As our perceptions and heuristics are developed 
over time and become refined and made more reliable, our activity of listening 
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serves to interrogate the assumptions we are primed to make about the voices of 
others. 
A fully virtuous listener would be one who habitually avoids the pitfall of 
dismissing others’ claims on the basis of peripheral route processing where 
greater elaboration was required. On the way to developing such acuity, we err on 
the side of central processing, double-checking our judgements made via 
peripheral route processing by following them up with central route processing. 
When someone makes a direct appeal – ‘You’re not listening to me!’ – we abandon 
our peripheral route options until we are confident we have done justice to the 
speaker in our consideration of their message.  
 By extension, when listening to small children or language learners whose 
voices’ power is diminished due to limited language ability, we broaden the set of 
elaboration-related infra-doings involved in listening. The centring of the 
messages of linguistically limited voices using a high degree of elaboration from 
the listener may not correspond so much to a shift from salience-based reaction to 
reasoned response; rather, the shift towards effortful activity on the listener’s part 
may correspond more to the listener committing a high degree of effort to piecing 
together the other person’s message through patient close attention, guesswork, 
filling in the gaps, and devoting as much labour as necessary to the inferential 
labour of sussing out the speaker’s meaning. In this claim I am extending the 
notions of elaboration and central route processing from their original meaning 
in social psychology, to include a broader set of activities that may be seconded to 
the course of action of listening to someone. At issue is the listener’s investment 
of effortfulness in centring the speaker’s message, as a factor of how much 
importance the listener places on the speaker and of the listener’s willingness to 
respond duly to the speaker’s communication. The following imagined scenario 
between Sally and her dentist illuminates the dynamics at play: 
 As a general rule, Sally does not expect her voice to hold a high level of 
salience when, to make chat, she tells her dentist that her mouth feels fine and 
seems healthy. Contrariwise, the diagnostic claims that the dentist makes as a 
97 
 
result of his examination of Sally’s mouth hold a high degree of salience for Sally, 
who will likely believe whatever the dentist tells her on account of the dentist’s 
professional expertise and having just performed a detailed exam. The white coat 
eliminates Sally’s need to elaborate on the dentist’s claims before believing them. 
Now, suppose Sally feels terrible pain on one side of her mouth. She tells 
this to the dentist, who nevertheless persistently replies that everything looks 
perfectly fine: Sally is wrong to think she has a dental problem. Unconvinced, Sally 
makes a bid for the dentist to listen to her account, describing in detail what the 
pain feels like and where it is located. How the dentist responds to Sally’s claims 
will reveal her policy of responsiveness towards her patient. In a normal 
encounter, because the dentist cares for his patient’s wellbeing, the dentist would 
then centre Sally’s claims in his attention. Using Sally’s descriptions as clues to 
what problems he may be looking for, the dentist investigates until he is able to 
offer reasonably satisfactory diagnosis and treatment for Sally’s pain. But suppose 
this dentist is a particularly unvirtuous, callous listener. He might persist in telling 
Sally that her mouth is perfectly fine despite the severe pain, perhaps even 
suggesting that Sally is imagining her pain, being overly dramatic, or lying. 
Because the callous dentist is unwilling to centre Sally’s claims and clings 
exclusively to his heuristics, viewing patients as non-experts and unreliable 
diagnosticians of dental health, he dismisses Sally’s claims without adequate 
elaboration and ultimately fails to provide the required dental care. 
 The foregoing example allows us to locate the specific wrong done to a 
speaker when one refuses to listen to her. The callous dentist’s commitment to 
judging Sally’s message on the basis of peripheral salience cues has the effect of 
blocking the message from her more central routes of processing. Contrary to the 
classic picture of listening as passive reception of speech, my account presents 
listening as involving active tasks of managing how one processes and responds to 
others on the basis of one’s willingness to centre, elaborate on, and respond to the 
other person’s speech. These tasks, together with a variety of other infra-doings, 
comprise the activity by which a listener establishes and maintains relationships 
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of greater or lower degrees of openness towards speakers, based on the listener’s 
policy of responsiveness. 
The openness of the relationship a listener maintains towards a speaker is 
of moral importance: to avoid wronging her in her capacity as a speaker, the 
listener must avoid blocking her voice from being centred on the basis of 
peripheral judgements about her importance or her message. To block someone 
in such a way is, simply, to refuse to listen to her. This view allows us to make sense 
of familiar comments like, “My boss sadly did not agree to my request, but at least 
she listened to me!” Such a comment usually indicates that the listener has given 
adequate consideration to the content of the speaker’s claims and evidenced a 
sufficient degree of elaboration to assure the speaker that her claims were being 
taken seriously, even though the final result from the listener was not one of 
agreement. The boss is praised for listening because of how she managed her 
openness to the speaker’s claims under a fair policy of responsiveness. 
 An advantage of identifying listening with this managed openness is that 
it allows us to avoid two pitfalls, namely, identifying listening with simply being 
persuaded, and identifying listening with processing all messages through 
maximally central routes. One who has mastered virtuous listening still has the 
option of processing some messages by peripheral routes, and still had the option 
to maintain her view rather than be persuaded by every message that comes her 
way. To explain how these options can remain open to a virtuous listener, let us 
now consider what the excellence looks like in one who is fully in possession of the 
virtue of listening justly. 
5. Mastering the Virtue of Listening Justly 
Naturally, the learning process for acquiring the virtue in question 
requires trial, error, and practice. Practising involves doubting and double 
checking one’s instincts about which communicative encounters can be processed 
via peripheral routes. The notion of heuristics is particularly useful on this point. 
Heuristics arise on the basis of patterns which we can (presumably) expect to 
remain fairly stable. As a person accrues experience in interacting with different 
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kinds of people, the plurality of those experiences lends increasing nuance to the 
patterns the person trusts enough to deploy as a heuristic. By erring on the side of 
caution, double-checking peripheral judgements, and interrogating one’s own 
listening practices, one’s heuristics become attuned to note which situations call 
for higher levels of elaboration. Once a person becomes so well practised that she 
can consistently make right judgements about how much elaboration is required 
in a given situation to ensure that speakers are done justice, her efficiency 
measures do not mislead her from adequately listening to people. 
 The instinct-refining learning process establishes within the fully virtuous 
listener a stance of openness towards others which is just. The exemplary listener 
is rightly open, responsive, and attentive to others. Where those others have 
reduced communicative capacity or voices with low salience, the listener engages 
the speaker’s communiques with increasingly high levels of elaboration, until 
justice is had. Rather than posing the ideal listener as someone who is maximally 
detached, I pose the ideal listener as someone who is maximally engaged, devoting 
higher levels of her own cognitive resources to the processing of speakers’ 
messages in order to achieve justice. 
While it is true that increased elaboration aims at rectifying a speaker’s 
reduced communicative capacity by focusing the listener on the content of the 
speaker’s message, this does not entail that the listener becomes more detached, 
pace Beatty,147 but that the listener becomes increasingly invested in the people to 
whom she listens and in supporting them in their capacity as speakers. As such, I 
argue that the ends the listener has in view are to be sufficiently engaged in the 
communicative exchange to do justice to the speaker, rather than construing the 
ends as having to do with perfect understanding of or acquiescence to the 
speaker’s message. Although these two might seem likely candidates for the ends 
of listening, they give rise to three problems. 
 
147 Beatty, ‘Good Listening’, 285–90. 
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 First, taking an achievement – full understanding or acquiescence – as the 
ends of listening is problematic, since maintaining just policies of responsiveness 
is a dynamic and ongoing process. This virtue is not held to a bounded criterion, 
such as ‘fully grasping the speaker’s meaning’, nor, as I have said, can we take 
listening to entail agreement, belief, or compliance with a speaker’s desired result. 
We can in some cases see where people are satisfied with a person’s response in a 
communicative exchange, even though the results of the exchange are not what 
they wished. While people are more likely to accept someone’s non-agreeing or 
non-cooperating responses to us if we first feel that they have genuinely listened 
to us, there is no guarantee that successful listening will make for a satisfied 
speaker. 
 Second, problems arise if we postulate that the end or aim of listening is to 
grasp a full and complete understanding the speaker, since it is doubtful whether 
such a result is even possible, let alone in all cases desirable. Certainly, being 
understood would be an imagined ideal result to which many speakers aspire, but 
it is doubtful whether such an ideal is truly possible to achieve: how fully can one 
understand someone else’s experience? It is further doubtful that, even if a listener 
should happen to succeed in perfectly imagining the speaker’s experience, that the 
listener would be able to know that she had been so successful. Indeed, it often 
seems that when a listener claims to have fully understood exactly what the 
speaker feels, she curtails the speaker’s communicative efforts and can block the 
progress of the exchange, while a listener who acknowledges straightforwardly 
that she does not entirely understand the speaker’s experience has motivation to 
centre the speaker’s voice in an ongoing dialogue.  
 A third problem is that speakers may not always be able, in terms of their 
communicative abilities, to successfully convey what they want to say. As a matter 
of language processing, we might assume that one can only be successful as a 
listener in proportion to the linguistic and rhetorical success of the speaker, but 
this cannot be right. Not only would this assumption make the requirement for 
listening from those in authority dependent on the vulnerable communicative 
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skills of those under them, which would be worrisome, the assumption also 
contradicts the very premise of the work involved in listening. The parent assists 
the child in communicating; the doctor helps the patient to identify the correct 
descriptions for his experience, and the native speaker patiently uses her 
imagination to make sense of a language learner’s unusual idiom, so that 
communication can occur despite language mistakes. 
 Therefore, in light of these three problems, the end of listening should not 
be pinned on an achievement construed as perfective, like having grasped or 
understood the other’s meaning. Instead, listening more closely follows the 
unbounded structure of relational virtues like friendship, which is fulfilled not 
when the relationship with a friend is ended, but when it is established. Listening 
is in this way dissimilar to the more episodic manifestation of virtues like 
generosity in its most iconic form, the ends of which are fulfilled when the need 
for generosity has been met and the donation event has ceased. By identifying the 
ends of just listening as the establishing and maintaining of relationships of 
managed openness to the claims of others, we may be able to make sense of 
situations in which a listener never manages to understand quite what a speaker 
is saying, or does not manage to agree to what the speaker is saying, but 
nevertheless invests a great deal of effortful activity in centring the speaker’s 
claims, refusing to block that speaker’s access to the listener’s central processing 
route or to consign that speaker’s voice to the periphery of one’s considerations. 
Conclusion 
What I have done in this chapter is to illuminate listening as an active 
practice, the mastery of which calls for excellence across the Trifecta of 
motivation, perception, and securing good outcomes. Listening is difficult to pin 
to a singular activity due to the wide array of behaviours which can be involved in 
listening, but as we have seen, this is because listening is an activity at the policy 
level, coordinating a diversity of subordinate Infra-doings in support of a policy of 
responsiveness towards a speaker. A policy of responsiveness involves making 
decisions about how important a speaker’s words are, and on that basis, how much 
102 
 
effort we are willing to invest in centring and processing their messages. From 
this, it follows that how we listen to people is a key part of how we treat others, and 
so is important to our character. In this chapter we have been concerned with 
listening as a policy of responsiveness; in the chapters that follow we delve more 
into the infra-doings coordinated thereby. 
A good listener is judicious in managing how she routes speakers’ 
messages through peripheral (heuristic- and salience-based, low effort 
processing) or more central (content- and context-based, high effort processing) 
routes. If one chooses to treat a person in the manner of refusing to listen to her 
speech, blocking the speaker’s message from having access to sufficiently central 
processing routes, one commits an injustice against the speaker. It remains for an 
account to be given about exactly how this injustice plays out through specific 
conversational behaviours and against the backdrop of the wider sociohistorical 
and political context of injustices writ large. The latter is the subject of Chapter 4, 
in which the motivational piece of the Trifecta is in central focus as we see how a 
shift in motivation leads to the cultivation of new habits of perception and action, 






Listening in Public Discourse 
 
“[Ecological thinking] infiltrates the interstices of the social order, where it expands to 
undermine its intransigent structures, as the ice of the Canadian winter expands to 
produce upheavals in the pavements and roads, working within/against these 
seemingly solid structures to disrupt their smooth surfaces.” 
—Lorraine Code148 
 
“[I]t is the privileged and powerful who bear the responsibility for transforming 
hierarchies of attention which determine who and what can be heard.” 
—Tanja Dreher & Poppy de Souza149  
Given the scope of agency damage and depersonalisation that can occur 
when a person refuses to listen to someone, we should be concerned about the 
scope of damage that occurs when society as a whole refuses to listen to certain 
voices, or when whole sets of voices are silenced out of public discourse. The 
argument I give in Chapter 2 concerns the harm which can be caused in one-to-
one interactions, and how that harm can scale outward when such interactions are 
repeated and persistent. One unjust listener can contribute to the silencing of a 
person or group through individual vice; but what most of the silencing literature 
cited at the start of Chapter 2 is focused on is systemic patterns of injustice, not 
enacted through the malicious choices of solitary agents, but woven through the 
fabric of society. When one group of people is not able to participate in public 
 
148 Code, Ecological Thinking, 198. 
149 Tanja Dreher and Poppy de Souza, ‘Locating Listening’, in Ethical Responsiveness and the Politics of Difference, 
ed. Tanja Dreher and Anshuman Mondal (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 22. 
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discourse, whether through systemically patterned choices or through the 
institutionalisation of structural injustices, justice is not possible. 
It is undoubtedly the case that systemic level silencing is a feature of 
society, and not an easy one to rectify. A theory of listening, if it is to be helpful, 
should address what can be expected of the individual listener by way of virtuous 
listening when systemic injustice prevails. Further, the theory should articulate 
what the individual listener can do to avoid silencing people under such conditions 
or even to push back against the conditions themselves, and whether the 
individual listener’s pursuit of virtue can have any salutary effect on the state of 
public discourse.150 That is the purpose of this chapter, and to address these 
questions we need a principled way of thinking about how individual 
conversational behaviours and shared patterns of conversational behaviour—the 
social context of discourse, including its resources and injustices—relate to, 
respond to, and alter each other. I offer the Discourse Ecology Model here to 
facilitate and give structure to this way of thinking. 
We need more than just a lens, however, to see what we are aiming to see. 
We also need to know where to point that lens if we are to see what it is meant to 
show us. To see the ecosystem dynamics at work, a simplified, fictionalised 
narrative context is given. Imagine a society that consists of two social groups; we 
will call them the green people and the blue people.151 Historically, the greens have 
 
150 There is a way to ask this question which looks at what the disempowered can do to unsettle such systems 
from within their disempowered role, and this would include some creative approaches to listening past and 
listening to undermine oppressors. Accounts of this kind of resistance can be found, to name just two, in 
James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992); Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New rev. ed, Penguin Books (London: Penguin Books, 1996). I 
am interested here in what kinds of responsibility can be taken up by a listener in a position of comparative 
socio-political dominance—how Jimmy can push back against systemic injustices, not how Gina might fight 
these herself. 
151 The use of colour identifiers here serves to simplify reference in the example whilst abstracting away from 
the types of injustice the example could illustrate. I recognise that the use of colour terms suggests that this 
is a distinction of race, and indeed I had race relations in mind as I formulated some parts of the example—
but I also consider the example to be potentially applicable to a myriad of differences, including gender, 
class, religion, sexual orientation, linguistic variation, and so on. 
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oppressed the blues, and though officially the two groups are now on equal 
footing, legacies of injustice remain, and the blues are still marginalised. Jimmy 
Green is the superintendent of a public school district, and he dreams of running 
for mayor one day. This week, he has a scheduled meeting with Gina Blue, the 
spokesperson for a network of blue parents advocating for better support for blue 
students in the school district. 
In previous years, Jimmy has not had a great relationship with Gina and 
her group; Gina’s persistence as a concerned and often critical voice did not make 
her one of Jimmy’s favourite people. When meeting with Gina, Jimmy has a bad 
habit of slipping over into what Rachel McKinney calls conversational 
uncooperativity.152 Lately, however, as Jimmy seeks to grow personally and to 
improve his standing in the community to support his future hopes, he has come 
to realise that if he wants to stand a chance at getting votes from the families in his 
area, he will need to have a substantiated reputation as ‘someone who listens’ to 
the blues. Unless people feel that he has genuinely earned such a reputation, he is 
unlikely to get much of the blue vote, and even less likely to influence the wider 
green community to take steps to rectify their legacies of injustice. If he wants to 
achieve his dream, something has to change, starting now, in his relationship with 
the blues. 
He plans to begin by listening—really listening—to Gina at the meeting this 
week. How does he go about changing his listening habits? According to Chapter 
3, Jimmy needs to change his policy of responsiveness to Gina so that his 
perception of her changes, in order that he not block her voice from having a 
chance to persuade him via his central route processing. According to Medina’s 
claims discussed in Chapter 1, Jimmy needs to become alert and sensitized to the 
‘silenced’ voices of the blues, and find a way listen to them in the face of society-
wide patterns. 
 
152 McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’, 69. 
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Exactly how he would make these changes is the question at hand. A 
somewhat more concrete explanation in the terms from Chapter 2 would say 
Jimmy has to notice when he—whether by personal choice, systemic habitus, or 
both—withholds uptake in bad faith. He needs to notice that when Gina says 
something that he does not want to hear, by habit he takes the relevant interpretive 
option off the table. Once he learns to catch himself doing so, he is faced with the 
task of resisting this habit; he will need courage and humility—particularly at 
first—as he starts giving uptake to whatever it is Gina has to say. We will keep our 
focus in this chapter on the way Jimmy’s motivations and intentions are at play, 
and in light of these, see what he should certainly avoid doing if he indeed intends 
to be a good listener. If Jimmy is a well-integrated virtuous subject, then the 
switch in motivation may be sufficient to start him on the path to change,153 but if 
he wants a linguistically and conversationally concrete account of the infra-doings 
which one uses to accomplish listening, he would find those in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Let us suppose the motivation-led change in behaviour will be possible for 
Jimmy to accomplish—not all at once, but beginning this week; this course of 
change will continue with much practice, correction, and more practice in the 
months ahead. For purposes of illustration, I am stipulating that Gina is an 
exceptionally adept communicator, not difficult to understand. Gina is thoughtful 
and well-informed, great at her job, and a credible witness. Compared to Jimmy, 
she has considerable expertise regarding issues of welfare in the blue community. 
Jimmy is, in general, also thoughtful and well-informed, great at his job, and 
genuinely concerned about the welfare of his students. He is not one of those 
administrators known for caring more about district prestige and test scores than 
for the needs of his students. Jimmy is passionate about education and as a 
member of a different (non-intersecting) marginalised community, he knows 
what it is like to be marginalized and silenced. Perhaps this is why he can be so 
touchy about Gina’s claims that he has not sufficiently addressed the needs of blue 
students and families in the district. 
 
153 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 137. 
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In Section 1, we have an overview of the listening habits Jimmy wants to 
move away from. Since at this point we are focusing on Jimmy’s motivation for 
change, we want to get a sense of what the Old Jimmy might look like, and for 
ample contrast, other ways that vices of poor listening can show up. Joining the 
patterns from Chapter 2 (silencing, gaslighting, and refusing to listen) are 
problematic patterns which I call ‘epistemic whack-a-mole’,154 playing the 
Inquisitor (as opposed to the inquisitive Critic), and excommunication. 
Section 2 follows Jimmy’s motivational shift to the new posture of seeking 
to listen. We get a sense of the contextual features he is up against in his socio-
political environment. For a comparison case of what to do, we look at a situation 
where Jimmy does listen well, to serve as a rough template for him to follow in 
seeking to change his behaviour. 
In Section 3 the Discourse Ecology Model is introduced. I explicate the 
ecosystem frame we will be using and seed it with some concrete examples of 
linguistic change, so that we can see how the dynamics of individual and social 
habit play out in the context of the discursive environment. We have stipulated 
that Jimmy will be successful in slowly changing his habits until he becomes 
someone who really listens to the blues. Our aim is to see how Jimmy’s personal 
habit change has an effect on the wider ecosystem—how it spreads and, in theory, 
could become institutionalised as a new standard habitus of his community. 
Section 4 looks at how Jimmy’s own behavioural change can produce a local 
motivational complex (consisting of a ‘prompt’ for others attention to shift and a 
‘drive’ for them to alter their behaviour). Section 5 looks at how the change 
introduced by Jimmy at the local level can spread to the point where the change 
becomes institutionalised as a collective social habit which shapes the behaviour 
of the community as a whole.155 
 
154 Named for the classic carnival game in which motorised ‘moles’ pop up through various holes in the 
games surface, and the player attempts to whack each mole down with a mallet before the mole disappears. 
155 Much of the content and arguments in Sections 3 and following first appeared in Susan E Notess, ‘The 
Discourse Ecology Model: Changing the World One Habit at a Time’, in Rethinking Habit, ed. Jeremy 
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1. Old Jimmy, and other vicious ghosts 
We begin by taking a look at the old policy of responsiveness which Jimmy 
is moving away from. When he sees Gina’s name up next on his schedule, he feels 
himself switching into a defensive mode, anticipating the critiques he is not keen 
to hear from her. He braces, ready to poke holes in her claims, to cross-examine 
her, and to discredit her. Conversational uncooperativity takes various forms; 
McKinney’s taxonomy includes what she calls ‘willful obtuseness, affected 
misunderstanding, undue skepticism, bad listening, ignoring, and intrusive 
interruption,’156 as well as ‘pedantic literalism’.157 The first two, wilful obtuseness 
and affected misunderstanding, closely resemble the refusal of uptake detailed in 
Chapter 2. Undue scepticism is a form of testimonial injustice.158 What Jimmy 
defaults to is a form of bad listening which I call the Inquisitor mode. The Inquisitor 
questions everything he hears, but we should distinguish the Inquisitor from the 
curious, inquisitive Critic, asking questions to explore and understand. The 
Inquisitor is on a mission to expose every possible falsehood and flaw and to keep 
opposing voices from gaining influence in the community. As a rule, Jimmy is not 
given to approaching people as the Inquisitor, and it is noteworthy that Gina taps 
such a nerve in him that he turns into the Inquisitor when he meets with her. 
The Inquisitor’s approach to questioning is aimed at filtering out voices 
which do not merit full attention and engagement. The Inquisitor is not unique in 
this. Such filtering is standard behaviour, used, for example, when we identify 
junk mail which need not be opened or, more aptly, email with concerns best 
directed to someone else, which need only be forwarded on;159 Jimmy uses a similar 
 
Dunham and Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (Routledge, Forthcoming). The content is included with 
permission. 
156 McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’, 70. 
157 McKinney, 74–78. 
158 Specifically, attributing the speaker with a ‘credibility deficit’; see Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 17–29. 
159 The junk mail case differs from the redirection case in that the former takes it to be the case that minimal, 
peripheral attention (i.e., a mere glance at the envelope) is sufficient to adequately process the matter. The 
redirection case uses peripheral attention to determine that for maximum efficiency, the matter is best 
passed on to someone else and not engaged with on a deeper level by oneself. In this point I am applying to 
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heuristic when a parent comes to speak to him, aggrieved about a student’s lower-
than-anticipated marks. These are matters for classroom teachers, and he trusts 
his staff to do their jobs well. He lets the parent express their frustration, then 
redirects them to the child’s teacher. He does not particularly absorb or process 
the content of or reason for the complaint; the matter does not merit his close 
attention. 
Jimmy’s trouble with Gina is that she comes bearing district-level concerns 
which are in fact within his remit, and as a skilful communicator, Gina easily 
bypasses Jimmy’s heuristic for dismissal of grievances that are not his business. 
Gina makes him pay attention, but he does not want to acknowledge the things 
that she has to say. Because of Gina’s position in the blue parents’ network, he 
cannot avoid meeting with her altogether. So Jimmy the Inquisitor aims to 
discredit Gina on the basis of the content of her claims, relentlessly questioning 
whatever she says, to stop her utterances getting through his filter. 
Recall from the discussion in Chapter 1 that all speech involves responding 
to and altering the normative context. If Jimmy promises Gina something, then 
she has an entitlement to expect that thing from him, and he has an obligation to 
do accordingly. If Gina lodges a complaint with Jimmy, then it creates an 
obligation for him to answer her complaint, on pains of rudeness and dereliction 
of his professional duties. He need not answer her complaint in any particular 
way, but he is obliged to address it and to respond accordingly.160 Jimmy the 
Inquisitor’s urge to filter out and question everything Gina says arises from a wish 
to stop her from being able to make any changes to the normative context which 
 
non-persuasion cases the difference in approaches to processing persuasive messages discussed in the ELM 
literature referred to in Chapter 3; see Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, Handbook of Theories of Social 
Psychology, 231. 
160 For full treatment of the normativity and possibilities surrounding complaint, see Sara N. Ahmed, 
Complaint! (Durham: Duke University Press, Forthcoming). Cf. Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, ‘Exploring 
Affiliation in the Reception of Conversational Complaint Stories’, in Emotion in Interaction, ed. Anssi Perakyla 




would place Jimmy under obligations he does not welcome. Whilst Jimmy is 
unlikely to think in exactly these terms, the visceral reaction of hostile avoidance 
should be familiar, and we can gloss it aptly in this way. 
The Inquisitor has a few strategies. One is to refuse to give uptake to 
unwelcome utterances so as to avoid having to respond to them, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Refusal to listen aims to achieve silencing on a granular level, filtering 
out specific utterances from even requiring any response or engagement as such, 
by withholding uptake. These old standby methods of pretending she is joking or 
otherwise miscategorising Gina’s illocution do not tend to work well between 
these two people; Gina is a very deliberate communicator, and Jimmy prefers not 
to stoop to such tricks. He deflects her with peripherally processed responses and 
dismissals when he can, but mostly he has to take her utterances through central 
route processing, recognise her illocutionary and perlocutionary aims, and 
respond to them. So we will look here at two further strategies of the Inquisitor: 
epistemic whack-a-mole, which is what Jimmy tends to use, and a darker, more 
severe strategy of excommunication.  
Epistemic Whack-A-Mole 
What the Inquisitor does here is a familiar strategy: each of the speaker’s 
utterances gets isolated out from the context, treated in the most literal terms as 
a declarative assertion which can be true or not. In technical terms, the Inquisitor 
can be described here as deploying the Declarative Fallacy to keep all of a speaker’s 
utterances in a strict declarative realm161 and to obscure the normative 
implications of what people say. Further, the Inquisitor’s quick isolation of each 
particular utterance from the broader context of what someone is saying can be 
likened to an imposing of a stark form of a Message in a Bottle frame.  The 
Inquisitor can then show each individual assertion to be untrue in a quick game of 
epistemic whack-a-mole, ‘whacking’ each assertion down as it comes through 
 
161 See Belnap, ‘Declaratives Are Not Enough’. 
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with disagreement, counter-claims, and criticism, and on occasion by performing 
what Matthew Cull calls ‘dismissive incomprehension’.162 
This works to Jimmy’s advantage in two immediate ways. One, it makes 
Gina have to work much harder to communicate her points, because Jimmy is not 
letting her build connections between her points and situate them in appropriate 
interpretive contexts. As Rachel McKinney puts it, conversational uncooperativity 
represents ‘failures to treat one’s interlocutors as interlocutors — as the sort of 
people who make claims against one’s attention, participation, understanding, 
coordination, and accommodation, and as the sorts of people who deserve one’s 
time, energy, and effort toward such activity.’163 Two, it allows Jimmy to pose as 
the rational one in the conversation, as if he is critically examining every point, 
doing epistemic due diligence, and not being taken in by silly claims or overly 
motivated rhetoric—a flattering role for him to play. 
Beyond the immediate experience of the conversation, however, this 
tactic has a more directed purpose, and that is to avoid normative entanglement. I 
use the term normative entanglement to describe being subject to the normative 
changes enacted by what an interlocutor says. Return again to the idea that if I 
make a promise, then I incur an obligation to follow through, and the promisee 
incurs an entitlement to hold me accountable. In the terminology of Kukla and 
Lance, the normative incursions of an utterance can be agent-neutral or agent-
relative, with respect to both input and output.164 So for example, a promise is 
generally not agent-neutral with respect to input or output: it is I who promises, 
so the obligation attaches to me specifically; no one else is made accountable by my 
act of promising. My promise also entails that I have the entitlement to make the 
 
162 ‘Dismissive Incomprehension is the act of displaying one’s incomprehension (or pretending to be 
ignorant) of the meaning of some other agent’s speech, in order to dismiss that speech and the agent who 
made that speech.’ Matthew J Cull, ‘Dismissive Incomprehension: A Use of Purported Ignorance to 
Undermine Others’, Social Epistemology 33, no. 3 (4 May 2019): 263, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2019.1625982. 
163 McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’, 94. 
164 Kukla and Lance, ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’, 19. 
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promise in question. If I do not have the authority to grant legal pardons, for 
example, then I cannot rightly promise a legal pardon. Promising has agent-
relative input in that it depends on the promising agent’s entitlements and 
generates an obligation for that agent. Promising also has agent-relative output in 
that it generates an entitlement for the addressee in particular. This contrasts with 
assertions in an important way. An assertion makes a claim which, by its 
structure, licenses anyone who hears it to form the relevant belief. If I say that I 
like chocolate, and an eavesdropper overhears, then the eavesdropper is no less 
justified than the addressee in believing that I said that I like chocolate. 
There are hosts of details here that I am skimming over about how even 
plain declarative assertions can modify the normative context, but the relevant 
point is this: declaratives do not generate the same kinds of agent-relative 
obligations and entitlements as other kinds of utterances. If Gina makes a 
declarative statement about the state of things in the school district, and Jimmy 
the Inquisitor can demonstrate her statement to be false, then presumably no 
normative changes are enacted. But if Gina makes another kind of utterance (say, 
an indictment), then her utterance generates agent-relative normative changes: 
she generates an obligation for Jimmy either to respond to the indictment or else 
to stand as indicted. These normative changes attach to Jimmy specifically, and 
they restrict the options that he has for (justified) response. This point tracks the 
same idea as Elizabeth Camp’s claim that metaphors make good insults, because 
even if the declarative content of the insult is demonstrated to be false, the 
unflattering metaphor still makes us complicit in whatever normative judgements 
it implies, unless the metaphor itself can be reconstructed and diffused.165 
On the other hand, if what Gina says fundamentally is just a declarative 
statement, and if Jimmy is quite sure her statement is false and can additionally 
demonstrate to Gina that her statement is false, then no new normative 
obligations would attach to him on the basis of her statement. For her claims to 
 
165 Elisabeth Camp, ‘Why Metaphors Make Good Insults: Perspectives, Presupposition, and Pragmatics’, 
Philosophical Studies 174, no. 1 (January 2017): 47–64, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0525-y. 
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generate any obligations for him, on the model of the Declarative Fallacy, he would 
first need to accept her claims as valid. Thus, when the Inquisitor takes up the 
epistemic whack-a-mole tactic, he shields himself from incurring obligations by 
pretending that all of Gina’s utterances are false declaratives. I do not mean to say 
that this strategy is necessarily very convincing; often it is not. But it can be 
successful in avoiding normative entanglement. 
To illustrate this tactic at work, I offer a non-fictional scenario. A friend 
recently described an instance of epistemic whack-a-mole being used by the 
director of her PhD programme. She, a student representative, approached him 
with an assessment of the need for more of certain kinds of support for PhD 
students, highlighting a variety of ways that support was lacking and pointing to 
an overall pattern in the programme structure. She described the meeting this 
way: ‘Every piece that I said was waved away before I could connect it to the others. 
I said, “We need more opportunities for students to teach.” He said, “Teaching 
opportunities are available for every student who requests to teach; in fact, you are 
teaching.” I said, “The pay scale for PhD students who teach does not realistically 
reflect the work we put in.” He said, “We just re-negotiated pay raises with the 
students last year.” And so on.’166 
Every attempt she made to introduce a normative claim, that something 
ought to be done or changed or improved, was met with a claim that she was 
incorrect. She communicated the students’ requested for more opportunities than 
what they have, and the director replied that they were incorrect about not having 
opportunities. Looking at this conversation from the outside, we can see where 
the slippage is introduced by the director who, in his role as Inquisitor, either 
myopically or disingenuously seems to convert every normative claim into a false 
assertion that he can then bat away, and therefore avoid being caught up in any of 
the obligations the students are asking him to acknowledge and answer. The 
 
166 Personal communication. 
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avoidance strategy responds to a feature of what it is to pay attention to a problem 
or concern. Springer notes: 
Attention in this practical sense is poised to shift; something is going wrong 
if attention does not issue in some kind of change and transformation. 
Paying attention is more like following a butterfly than sitting still.167 
The Inquisitor who prefers to keep his seat rather than be open to change aims to 
convince himself and others that there is no real concern here that needs attending 
to. 
When the Inquisitor says, truthfully, ‘We offer teaching opportunities for 
our students; in fact, you are teaching,’ he supplies this claim as evidence to 
contradict the claim that there is a lack of teaching opportunity for students. She 
says, ‘We lack opportunities.’ He says, ‘You have opportunities.’ Claim defeated. 
This reaction is facilitated by the way the Inquisitor, when playing epistemic 
whack-a-mole, keeps each utterance isolated from its context. The students’ 
complaint about availability of teaching opportunities was intended to be 
connected to those that followed, regarding the pay scale, which was also affecting 
the extent to which students were finding the available teaching opportunities to 
be sufficient for their needs. Keeping each claim isolated from its rightful 
connection with the wider picture allows the Inquisitor to keep operating strictly 
in the ‘realm of facts’: an illusory realm in which he can easily dismiss claims by 
showing some ‘factual reason’ why the claims are not epistemically correct. This 
way he does not need to do any legwork of proving that the students do in fact have 
sufficient teaching income for their needs—proof which would be difficult to 
establish even if it were correct, and moreover is unlikely to be correct. 
This tactic is surely as enraging to the philosopher of language as it is to 
anyone subjected to it; that is not how speech acts work! But as we have said of the 
refuser in Chapter 2, the Inquisitor is also not acting in good faith. The Inquisitor 
treats the utterances of others as if they were disconnected from their context, as 
 
167 Springer, Communicating Moral Concern, 84–85. 
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if they were disguised declaratives which can easily be shown to be inaccurate. If 
Jimmy the Inquisitor engages this mode with conviction, he makes it very difficult 
for Gina to get her message across, making her look inaccurate and perhaps even 
sloppy. 
Excommunication 
Now, Gina Blue is, as we have said, a gifted communicator. She has 
encountered this Inquisitor strategy before and can navigate around it, cornering 
Jimmy into giving her the floor long enough to hear her various claims in their 
context and to make the normative implications explicit. If Jimmy the Inquisitor 
gets really upset and forgets his own moral commitments, he might reach for the 
stronger tactic of excommunication. As gaslighting is a stronger, more motivated, 
and more purposeful use of refusal to listen, excommunication is a stronger, more 
motivated, and more purposeful use of epistemic whack-a-mole. Similar in 
function to gaslighting, this tactic is meant to disqualify the legitimacy of the 
interlocutor to make claims in the first place—to undermine her standing as a 
‘deliberator and moral agent’.168 Jimmy says, as gently as he can, ‘Look Gina, it 
sounds to me like you’ve gone mama bear, and I appreciate that. You love your 
kids, you love the students, and you want the best for them. We are fortunate to 
have protective mothers like you in our district. But we don’t want our mama bears 
to run away with the facts.’169 
I call this strategy excommunication because it works by removing the 
(illocutionarily) disabling her and labelling her as someone who does not 
constitute a standpoint from which rational discursive claims can be made, or in 
Tanesini’s terms, whose intentions cannot be recognised because her utterances 
 
168 Kate Abramson, ‘Turning up the Lights on Gaslighting’, Philosophical Perspectives 28, no. 1 (n.d.): 8–10, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12046. 
169 For a non-fictional example of this type of move being used, see Alessandra Tanesini, ‘“Calm Down, Dear”: 
Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90, no. 1 (June 
2016): 71–92, https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akw011. Tanesini examines the features of virtue and vice which 
factor into an agent making use of this kind of move. 
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do not pass muster as assertions.170 If successful, the disabling of the Target results 
in her being removed from her standing in the moral community—thereby 
rendering her, or in any case, treating her as if she is someone whose claims 
cannot generate the kinds of normative entanglements described above. The 
Inquisitor does this by categorising Gina’s utterances as being of a fundamentally 
different kind from those of rational conversation. Whereas Jimmy’s and others’ 
utterances involve nice, sound things like facts, reasons, declaratives, and truth, 
Gina’s utterances are reactionary, affective, and not based in human rationality 
but in the respectable sort of instinctual self-interests of any animal mother 
protecting her young. 
By recategorising Gina’s utterances in this way, the Inquisitor indicates 
that she has ceased to participate in the activity of rational discourse. Her mama-
bear outcry is part of a different game altogether than that of rational discourse, 
and as such, the sort of normative changes brought about by discursive moves do 
not obtain. She cannot indict him, generating an obligation for him either to 
respond or to stand indicted, if she is not ‘playing by the rules’ of the game of 
rational discourse in the first place. In its strongest and darkest forms, 
excommunication amounts to a claim that the Target is not a rational person who is 
saying things for (intentional) reasons, but is an animal body making noises because 
of nonrational causes like fear or hunger. Like gaslighting, this claim is morally 
problematic because of the constitutive moral damage it causes to the Target, 
triggering fragmentation and, especially in this case, depersonalisation of the 
subject in her mind, in Jimmy’s, and in the minds of the wider discursive 
community. The Inquisitor is here, as above, acting in bad faith: a second 
similarity with the Gaslighter. 
A third similarity is that both tactics rely on unrealistic pictures of how 
rationality works. The distinction above between a person saying things for 
reasons and an animal body making noises, like the Crazy Claim in Chapter 2, 
assumes a dichotomy between rational and non-rational acting—a distinction 
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which surely does not pose a clear-cut dichotomy, and which surely does not merit 
wholesale judgements of the subject rather than the incident. Hangry Joe may be 
speaking as an animal body making noises that are caused more by his hunger 
than by propositional mental attitudes he endorses as a rational agent, but this 
does not in any way entail that Joe himself is not a rational agent who should be 
removed from his deliberative and moral standing in the community! 
Happily, let us say Jimmy has enough courage and humility not to follow 
the Inquisitor mode into such depths as deploying the excommunication tactic. 
Moreover, he has this new resolution to overcome his old habits and become 
someone who listens to blue voices, beginning with listening to Gina this week. 
We turn now to the motivational shift which is the starting point for this change. 
2. New Jimmy 
Jimmy’s resolution to change his policy of responsiveness to Gina means 
that he needs to break the habit of approaching Gina in the Inquisitor mode. He 
wants to become someone who listens to the blues, so he needs to approach Gina 
in a Listener mode. He knows straightaway that the Listener should not resort to 
tactics such as refusing uptake, playing epistemic whack-a-mole, gaslighting, or 
excommunicating Gina. So what does Jimmy the listener do? Not having the 
theoretical framework we are developing here, Jimmy reaches for a template. He 
should listen to Gina the same way he listens to someone he would always listen 
to—the way he would listen to a trusted and respected leader in the green 
community, for example. 
We should note that the situation facing Jimmy Green and Gina Blue this 
week is that they are participants in a discourse setting in which, due to the history 
of oppression of the blues, it can be difficult for blues’ claims to be fairly heard by 
greens, due to the effects of vicious peripheral processing (see Chapter 3) that 
incorporates implicit bias.171 In addition to the purposeful tactics used by Jimmy 
 
171 See Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Mather Saul, eds., Implicit Bias and Philosophy, First edition (Oxford, 
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in the Inquisitor mode, he has found that all he can think about when Gina speaks 
is her voice. It sounds grating and shrill. He is distracted by her eyebrow and the 
set of her jaw; they strike him as impudent. These perceptual effects of implicit 
bias will take time and practice to overcome. The more time Jimmy spends in the 
Listener mode, his perception will become more rightly attuned (as is standard 
when acquiring a virtue), and he will no longer need to practice so purposefully to 
overcome prejudiced perceptions.172 
Jimmy cannot merely wait around for Gina to just happen to seem more 
amenable to him; he needs a way to actively practice a new pattern. The simplest 
strategy is to reverse the assumptions behind the Inquisitor’s tactics. Instead of 
playing epistemic whack-a-mole, he should seek to listen to her.173 This means that 
instead of isolating each of Gina’s statements from their context, he should give 
her the floor space to exposit the full context of her claims. And instead of 
privileging declaratives, which do not generate such explicit agent-relative 
normative shifts and even so are easily defeated by counter-claims, he should 
attend to the normative implications of any utterance Gina makes. His aim is to 
listen to her, and that means being willing to notice and acknowledge the way that 
her utterances generate obligations for him. 
Likewise, as he seeks to listen to Gina, he should avoid the temptations of 
excommunication. That means instead of faulting Gina’s claims as failing to be 
part of rational discourse and therefore recategorising them, Jimmy the Listener 
commits himself to the prima facie validity of Gina’s claims as rational discourse 
moves. This follows from committing to Gina’s status as a rational being with 
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173 That is to say, listening is in contrast with the game of epistemic whack-a-mole, and the contrast is easily 
enough seen in Jimmy’s shift in motivation. The interesting and challenging question is how he makes that 
happen, and we come to that matter shortly. 
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standing to make normative claims on him. By committing to Gina’s status as a 
participant of rational discourse, he shifts onto himself the burden of figuring out 
how her utterances constitute valid discursive moves—that is, he needs to do his 
share of the work in the conversation, beginning with putting effort into his 
interpretive labour.174 If he assumes that her moves are valid, but does not see the 
basis for an utterance, then the burden is on him to hunt for the missing pieces 
needed to make sense of why her utterance is valid. In our terms, Jimmy needs to 
be as reluctant to excommunicate Gina as he would be to excommunicate someone 
he especially trusts. 
Suppose Jimmy recently went to a convention for school districts that 
provide outstanding science education. That year the convention managed to get 
Stephen Hawking as a keynote speaker. Jimmy listened to Hawking’s talk with 
interest, although as an administrator rather than a scientist he did not really 
follow all the theoretical details. Hawking stressed that certain subjects and skills 
are of more critical importance than others for young students to learn. Jimmy 
trusts that Hawking has reasons for saying these things, even though at no point 
did he manage to pin down what those reasons were amidst the scientific jargon. 
Later, at the hotel bar, Jimmy encountered Hawking and some others from the 
conference talking about which films of the past year were the best. Jimmy heard 
and noted Hawking’s recommendations. That night, in his hotel room, he watched 
Hawking’s favourite film, because he takes Hawking’s word for it that this is a 
good film. 
Of course, Jimmy trusted Hawking to have reasons for his claims about 
science education because Hawking is a renowned scientific expert. Hawking is 
not, however, an expert film critic. And yet, because Jimmy trusts Hawking to be 
a rational discourse participant who generally has reasons for the things he says, 
Jimmy assumed that Hawking has reasons—valid and intelligible, even if not 
necessarily widely shared—for his film recommendation. Jimmy has no doubt that 
if there had been time to ask Hawking the reasons for his recommendations, and 
 
174 McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’, 94. 
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to ask further questions about why Hawking’s tastes are as they are, the reasons 
would have been present, valid, and more or less intelligible. Even if some of 
Hawking’s tastes are far from what Jimmy can make sense of due to their personal 
differences, Jimmy is extraordinarily unlikely to interpret this as evidence that 
Hawking is violating the norms of rational discourse or in some fundamental way 
lacking in rationality. 
As Jimmy awaits Gina’s arrival, he mutters to himself: ‘Trust her like you 
trusted Hawking. Even if you do not get what she is on about or why she sees 
things as she does, assume that she has reasons, and that her reasons are good 
reasons, whether you make sense of them or not. And if you could not understand 
Hawking’s reasons for his claims you would wish for more time with him to learn 
more. Likewise, if you do not understand Gina’s reasons for her claims, then keep 
listening. Maybe next week you will understand a little bit more…’ 
This account of how Jimmy changes his policy of responsiveness to Gina is 
simplistic, but it is a beginning nonetheless. We will now leave Jimmy to take a 
crack at really listening to Gina this week; let us say he does passably well but it 
takes several such meetings before his new habits are established. As he improves 
through practice, he finds his associations changing. He no longer perceives the 
set of her jaw as insolent or her voice as shrill. The more he grows to understand 
the context of Gina’s claims and the validity of her point of view, the more 
resources he has for understanding the situation of blue families in his district. 
The changes in his perception of Gina begin to generalise so that when 
meeting blue people in general, Jimmy is less inclined to interpret them as hostile 
or threatening, as shrill or insolent, or as animal bodies (mama bears) rather than 
discourse participants. Somewhere between the contextualised events of listening 
to the interlocutor in front of him and the general pattern of his responsiveness to 
blue persons as discourse participants, Jimmy becomes someone who truly listens 
to blue voices. It is beyond the remit of my project to give a substantive account of 
this change from a lived experience of implicit bias and prejudice to one which is 
121 
 
more just.175 I am stipulating that this result occurs so that we can skip ahead to 
the next stage of Jimmy’s project. 
3. The Discourse Ecology Model 
Recall that Jimmy Green’s hope was that becoming someone who listens to 
blue voices would have bearing not only on his chances of being mayor, but also on 
the community-wide discourse situation. The greens don’t listen to the blues. 
Perhaps if Jimmy were to someday be a mayor who listens to the blues, then he 
could enact policies that are more responsive to the interests of the blues in his 
community. Even so, it would still be the case that the greens in general don’t listen 
to the blues in general. What might it look like for Jimmy’s personal listening 
habits to generalise across the community, regardless of whether he holds public 
office, so that the greens in general start listening to the blues? Is it even possible 
for one individual’s change in habit to change a community, or is this a naïve thing 
to hope for? 
We will proceed in three steps. First, we need a usable account of discursive 
behaviour across a community, for which I put forward my Discourse Ecology 
Model. Then, we need to understand how changes occur in discourse ecologies, 
which we can find through analogy with an established, well analysed, and not 
morally contentious parallel: namely, the linguistic change processes behind 
lexicalisation. Finally, we can draw inferences about how a change in Jimmy’s 
behaviour could trigger a shift in his discursive ecology by translating the 
mechanisms of linguistic shift into the conceptual framework of the Discourse 
Ecology Model. 
In the Rocky Mountains where I grew up, people flock to Rocky Mountain 
National Park each autumn to watch the herds of elk who have come down into the 
wide, flat glacial valleys, called moraines, to mate. As children we would compete 
to see who would be the first to spot a herd grazing in the valley. It was easier to 
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win if you knew that elk like to graze on willow bushes, so by looking for areas with 
dense growth of willows, one could more easily find a herd of elk. The willows, in 
turn, grow in riparian areas where beavers are active. The beavers make use of 
willow for food and for building dams. Whilst these three species have evolved to 
support compatibility and flourishing in competition, the last century has brought 
many changes to the area through human involvement. Park management are 
actively involved in supporting each of the respective species to flourish such that 
they remain in balance, supporting each other to thrive rather than posing a threat 
to each other. The aim of this adaptive management programme176 is to stabilise 
the riparian ecosystem for the welfare of willow, elk, and beaver. This description, 
informal as it is, suffices to show the relevant features of the conceptual frame we 
need: that of the ecosystem. 
Ecosystems are comprised of all the species and features that interact with 
each other in an area. The beavers, the willows, the elk, the river, and many others 
comprise the moraine ecosystem. The ecosystem affects and to some extent 
determines the behaviour of its constituents. This captures something very like 
language, and very like discourse communities: they are constituted by individuals 
whose behaviour is structured by the system they jointly constitute. The behaviour 
of individuals both structures the system and is structured by it. It is useful to view 
a discourse community as a kind of ecosystem, in which the linguistic resources, 
social structures, cultural values, and epistemic backdrop of the community 
structure the discursive behaviour of the individuals comprising the community. 
These structures, in turn, are structured by the heritage and creativity of the 
individuals comprising it. When individuals use these resources to participate in 
the discourse in novel ways, these novelties alter the resources available—creating 
 
176 For details, see the Monitoring Plan currently in force for the National Park in Linda C. Zeigenfuss, 
Therese Johnson, and Zachary Wiebe, ‘Monitoring Plan for Vegetation Responses to Elk Management in 
Rocky Mountain National Park’ (U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2011-1013, 24 July 2011), 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2011/1013/. Further details can be found on the National Park website; see National 




new possibilities, revising the epistemic backdrop, and shifting the cultural 
norms. The participants of a discourse both structure and are structured by the 
ecology of the discourse. 
Linguists have long been fascinated by the way language holds in tension 
the restrictiveness of its structures and inventories, on the one hand, with its 
infinite possibility for producing novel forms on the other. Historical linguistics 
studies the way novel utterances become institutionalised—that is, become stable 
and widespread recognised forms across a linguistic community.177 Novel words 
that become institutionalised are called neologisms.178 This is arguably one of the 
more straightforward forms of language change, and we can thank Shakespeare 
(multitudinous, dwindle), Milton (sensuous, oblivious), Spenser (blatant, askance), and 
Carroll (chortle) for contributing many words to English through this process.179 
One person uses a word that is new, constructed out of familiar roots, stems, and 
morphemes, or out of onomatopoeic syllables. Others encounter this novel usage, 
find they can make sense of what it means, have a use or need for it, and so begin 
using it. Eventually enough people know and are using the word that it becomes a 
part of the language, found in dictionaries. Thus, an individual’s novel behaviour 
becomes institutionalised across the linguistic community. 
Jimmy Green wants to know whether it is possible for his novel behaviour 
(listening to Gina Blue) to become institutionalised so that his whole community 
listens to blue voices. For that to happen, it would need to be possible for an 
individual’s novel discursive behaviour to shift the structure of the discursive 
ecology, such that the discourse participants in general become structured by the 
ecology in such a way as to be motivated to listen to the blues. Is this possible? Yes. 
It is possible in theory for Jimmy to coin a novel word which then becomes 
 
177 Laurel J. Brinton and Elizabeth Closs Traugott, Lexicalization and Language Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 45, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615962. 
178 Hadumod Bussmann, Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics, ed. Gregory Trauth and Kerstin 
Kazzazi (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), s.v. neologism; P. H. Matthews, The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Linguistics (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), s.v. neologism. 
179 Brinton and Traugott, Lexicalization and Language Change, 44. 
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institutionalised in the discourse. If he were a veritable Milton180 he could create 
novel forms which vividly change the discourse ecology by furnishing it with rich 
new communicative resources. We know this can happen because it happens all 
the time—not on Milton’s or Shakespeare’s scale, but new words are getting added 
to our dictionaries every year, especially with rapid technical innovation, the 
playfulness of internet discourse, and the scope of globalisation. Therefore, at 
least conceptually, we know that individual discursive behaviour can shift a 
discourse ecology. What we want is a way to see how Jimmy’s discursive behaviour 
can prompt other greens to change their policies of responsiveness to blue voices. 
Consider what it would look like for an individual’s habit of listening to blue 
voices to change the discourse ecology in regard to blues being listened to. First, 
we should note an important feature of how this kind of change differs from the 
kind of linguistic change referred to above. When a new word comes into being, 
an artifact of language is created, a thing which can be copied, referred to, written 
down, and glossed. Lexicalisations (new words) can occur swiftly and fairly 
frequently, but other types of language changes occur. Grammaticalisation refers 
to changes in grammatical structures used by language speakers; they are slower 
and occur less frequently, but once a grammaticalisation shift has happened it 
tends to be persistent. A common example is the shift in English by which a verb 
of motion, going to, became a grammatically functional modal verb used to indicate 
futurity. As a specific verb of motion, we get sentences like, ‘I am going to town’, 
in which ‘going to’ means I am going, travelling, to some place. As a modal 
auxiliary, the verb might have nothing to do with going anywhere, as in, ‘Try the 
casserole; you are going to like it.’ The addressee is not going anywhere. 
The grammaticalisation shift represents a new collective habit which 
spreads in much the same way new words spread: people hear and make sense of 
the new usage, and then start using it. The habit of using going to as a modal verb 
is now fully institutionalised as a part of our language system. When a new 
listening habit comes into being, it is not a public artifact that is created in quite 
 
180 He is not. 
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the same concrete way as lexicalisation. Rather, what is new is the pattern of 
choices a person makes in responding to people’s speech: a pattern of taking the 
speaker seriously, with a new and more fitting policy of responsiveness. A new 
collective habit emerges, catches on, spreads, and takes hold. This kind of habit 
change may still seem far less structural than something as formal as grammatical 
changes, but on the ecological view, we expect factors of the socio-political context 
to play a role. 
The social dynamics of change are perhaps most easily seen in language 
shifts which occur as habitual behaviour patterns not yet incorporated or accepted 
by the pedants who pose as guardians of linguistic integrity. One of the most 
iconic instances of this is the emergence of what linguists call ‘discursive like’. The 
word like has come to have multiple new functions in the last few decades. 
Previously used for comparatives or to indicate tastes and enjoyment, now it is 
also used as a quotative introducer,181 a discourse marker,182 a discourse particle,183 
and approximator adverb.184 These technical terms are applied to observed usages 
as linguists describe the grammatical patterns in how like is used; by applying 
technical labels of this kind, linguists validate linguistic innovations which many 
commentators are inclined to view as a corrupt intrusion infecting the language 
of youth. 
This is just one of the myths around the uses of like emerging in the past 
forty years or so, and as Alexandra D’Arcy argues, these myths are ideologically 
 
181 “And she was like, ‘Oh no you don’t!’” 
182 “Like, I was laughing so hard I actually snorted.” 
183 “He was, like, trying to pick a fight.” 
184 “We’ve eaten at that place like ten times already this month; let’s go somewhere else.” This four-way 
distinction is one example of how linguists have categorised newer uses of ‘like’, though other analyses have 
also been put forward. See A. D’Arcy, ‘Like and Language Ideology: Disentangling Fact from Fiction’, 
American Speech 82, no. 4 (1 December 2007): 386–419, https://doi.org/10.1215/00031283-2007-025; Katie 
Drager, ‘Constructing Style: Phonetic Variation in Quotative and Discourse Particle Like’, in Discourse-




driven.185 As children, many of us were urged to resist developing the ‘bad habit’ of 
peppering our speech with this undesirable word, lest we become ‘addicted’ to its 
use and find ourselves incapable of filtering it out to speak more formally when 
required. Hidden beneath these injunctions is a tangle of socio-political ideas—
habits of interpreting the speech of some groups as less valid than others. The 
speech pattern as characteristic of an air-headed, teenage, Californian ‘Valley Girl’ 
is the mythical source of this habitual use of like, and the resistance to adopting 
the innovation is interwoven with diminishing the voices of young women. 
Discourse like is viewed as a sloppy artefact of youthful impulse. This is why the 
pedants resist recognising the impulse-driven innovation as linguistically valid. 
Dewey notes why: ‘Impulse is a source, an indispensable source, of liberation; but 
only as it is employed in giving habits pertinence and freshness does it liberate 
power.’186 As we care for our language and the environment it creates for us, we 
may be tempted to resist letting certain utterances get added to the accreted shape 
of our norms, particularly the utterances of groups who are gaining increasing 
power to shape society through the freshness of their customs.187 The case of 
discourse like is a prime example of the embeddedness of grammatical structures 
in socio-political environments, and it shows us that social and political shifts can, 
at least sometimes, spread in ways that use the same mechanisms—the same 
functionality of the discourse ecology—as lexicalisation and changes in who 
listens to whom. 
Now, I noted above that our likeliness to take on the Inquisitor role 
depends in part on the way various social factors structure the discourse. We 
readily believe some kinds of claims; others we feel we need to critically evaluate 
before accepting. Likewise, we more readily trust some voices to be rational 
discourse participants saying things for good reasons, whilst we might feel led (by 
the structures of our discourse environment) to doubt others, unless our 
 
185 D’Arcy, ‘Like and Language Ideology’, 411–12. 
186 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
LTD., 1922), 105. 
187 This and the preceding paragraph are taken from Notess, ‘The Discourse Ecology Model’. 
127 
 
Inquisitors can be presented with satisfying reasons for what the speaker said. For 
Jimmy’s commitment to the Listener role to trigger change in listening habits 
across the green community, his behaviour needs to alter the way the discourse 
environment structures the listening behaviour of others, making his trust 
contagious. Without changing the discourse structures, Jimmy’s commitment to 
listening to the blues remains incidental and precarious. ‘To think otherwise,’ as 
John Dewey writes in regard to changing habits across communities, ‘is to suppose 
that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can 
happen and without a miracle. But only by first changing the jungle and desert.’188 
Indeed, the change Jimmy hopes to spark does not require anything 
miraculous. He need not aim for an ex nihilo creation of a new social habitus to 
spring up in his society. I contend that habits of listening are already present in 
the society, and Jimmy’s aim is to trigger a society-wide broadening in scope of 
those habits to include the blues. Support for this hypothesis comes from many 
avenues. In a Habermasian view, for example, it is an unavoidable presupposition 
of all discourse that the interlocutor is a rational being saying things for reasons.189 
Jimmy aims to change an already existing discourse environment which, it 
follows, stands on this unavoidable presupposition of trust that there are reasons. 
We can therefore assume that all discourse participants already have the following 
habits: 
H1:   of taking their interlocutors to have reasons for saying what they say  
H2: of engaging the Inquisitor role when suspiciously unreasonable-seeming 
things are said and require examination  
H3: of trusting many voices to have reasons even when those reasons are not 
forthcoming 
The entire equipment of listening is already present and deployed for all active 
discourse participants. H2 and H3 are the habits which give two routes to H1, 
 
188 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, 22. 
189 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, 




either via trusting or examining. To get people to engage H1 more widely, taking 
blue interlocutors to be valid discourse participants, we would want to see people 
shift the way they allocate H2 and H3. Specifically, we would want to see people 
shift from a course of action whereby blue voices are heard with H2, to a course of 
action whereby blue voices are heard with H3, and possibly accompanied by the 
curious Inquisitor version of H2.  
This H2/H3 interplay is a jargony way of restating Dewey’s claim about how 
we might come to raise flowers in the desert: 
A genuine appreciation of the beauty of flowers is not generated within a self-
enclosed consciousness. It reflects a world in which beautiful flowers have 
already grown and been enjoyed. Taste and desire represent a prior objective 
fact recurring in action to secure perpetuation and extension. Desire for 
flowers comes after actual enjoyment of flowers.190 
When a new behavioural status quo arises, it grows out of previously present 
habits which people begin, for one reason or another, to desire to see expanded 
into new domains. Dewey predicates the change on a formula: precedent plus taste 
equals desire; precedent plus desire leads to the alteration of the objective 
structures of habit. ‘Yet the distinctively personal or subjective factors in habit 
count. Taste for flowers may be the initial step in building reservoirs and irrigation 
canals.’191 Having seen and enjoyed flowers, we desire to see them blossom in the 
desert, so we seek to change the desert, building irrigations systems to support the 
cultivation of plants. 
Having had the experience of being listened to and having appreciated the 
value of listening to others of their own groups, greens would conceivably desire 
to see the good of listening extended into the ‘deserts’ where voices are not listened 
to. In order to move people from pre-existing listening habits to newly broadened 
listening habits, Jimmy needs to spark the desire for this broadening of habits, 
 
190 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, 22. 
191 Dewey, 22. 
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which means we need an account of how Jimmy’s own listening behaviour can 
have an effect on the public community. Susan Bickford raises this question: 
…if listening is to be understood as a political rather than a private 
phenomenon, then it must somehow appear in the world. The physical and 
imaginative processes of speaking appear, of course, as spoken words. But 
how can listening itself be made visible or audible? How can it appear in 
public?192  
Put differently, if Jimmy is to spark a movement of resistance to the systemic and 
unjust habit of not listening to blue voices, then there needs to be some way that 
his acts of resistance can become echoable, in Medina’s terms: ‘that is, they acquire 
a repeatable significance and, therefore, they are memorable, imitable, and have 
the potential to lead to social change.’ If Jimmy’s listening behaviour can take an 
echoable form which others can repeat, then the repetitions may ‘coalesce in such 
a way that they become a traceable performative chain, with each action in the chain 
having traceable effects in the subsequent actions of others.’193 In our terms, 
Jimmy’s behaviour should not only constitute a change in the discursive 
ecosystem; it should also function in some way as a signal that provokes reactions 
from the social networks in which Jimmy is embedded and that reverberates 
through the wider performative structure of shared discourse habits.194 
In what follows, I propose a simplified picture of the mechanisms by which 
Jimmy’s behaviour is made public and can act as the motivational complex which 
activates the ‘desire for flowers’ amongst the green public. The motivational 
complex I put forward here includes two components. A prompt serves to trigger 
the observer’s awareness of a discrepancy in listening habits—an awareness 
Medina would call ‘lucidity’.195 A source of normative pressure supplies the 
motivational energy that compels the observer to resolve the discrepancy—in 
 
192 Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy, 153. 
193 José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant 
Imaginations, Studies in Feminist Philosophy (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 225. 
194 Medina, 226. 
195 Medina, 229. 
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Medina’s terms, a ‘reverberation’ which leads to individuals’ increasing uptake of 
their forward-looking responsibilities.196 
We want to stay focused here on how individuals’ listening behaviour can 
change the discourse ecology, so we do not have in view the exhortational aspect of 
motivation. Sure, Jimmy could use his platforms to call for his fellow greens to 
listen to blue voices, and this would provide an additional kind of prompt. If he is 
quite a persuasive speaker, he might even find rhetorical ways of engaging their 
desires sufficiently to provide the drive for change. I am not precluding the 
possibility of this kind of motivational complex, and in an ideal world, Jimmy 
might well seek to use such an approach in addition to the approach we are 
concerned with here. As Dewey notes, ‘The stimulation of desire and effort is one 
preliminary in the change of surroundings. While personal exhortation, advice 
and instruction is a feeble stimulus compared with that which steadily proceeds 
from the impersonal forces and depersonalized habitudes of the environment, yet 
they may start the latter going.’197 
4. The Motivational Complex 
I call this move the I TAKE HER POINT move. When Jimmy listens to Gina or 
any of the blues, the people most likely to have experience of Jimmy’s listening 
behaviour are Jimmy and the blues in the room. But when they leave the room and 
Jimmy makes the claim that I TAKE HER POINT, he is making a claim which is 
incompatible with the possibility of the Inquisitor recategorising Gina’s speech as 
noise. Rather, what we have in view is how Jimmy signals whether he trusts Gina 
to have reasons for her claims such that he can believe them to be valid (other 
things being equal) acts of participation in rational discourse. 
 For this reason, when Jimmy makes the I TAKE HER POINT move, he is 
flagging Gina as a person who has a point, a point which moreover Jimmy has 
taken up—at minimum given uptake to the illocution, although this move implies 
 
196 Medina, 227; Iris Marion Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model’, Social 
Philosophy and Policy 23, no. 01 (7 January 2006): 123, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052506060043. 
197 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, 22. 
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further that he has taken on her point to some extent.198 Suppose Jimmy were to 
make this move when he and Gina are addressing the district board of trustees. 
Many of them would be inclined, as Jimmy was previously, to approach Gina in the 
Inquisitor mode, more likely to disqualify her as having standing to make claims 
on them than to listen to what she has to say. Thus, when Jimmy flags Gina as a 
legitimate discourse participant with the standing to make claims on them—
flagging her voice as signal, not as noise—he places a burden of answerability on the 
trustees. 
Additionally, if the trustees have the Inquisitorial habit of embracing the 
Declarative Fallacy in order to disqualify and dismiss unwanted claims, they can 
be tripped up with the I TAKE HER POINT move: If Jimmy, a rational discourse 
participant, takes Gina to have a point, then the trustees cannot tell Jimmy why he 
is wrong unless they figure out what that point is and evaluate it. And they cannot 
simply excommunicate Gina now without either excommunicating Jimmy as well, 
or else finding some other means of discrediting and dismissing Jimmy as a 
discourse participant. 
Thus, the prompt provided by the I TAKE HER POINT move shifts the burden 
of stance-taking responsibility onto the observer, turning the observer into a 
presumptive respondent. The motivational complex includes both this prompt 
and the drive provided by the pressure that it places on the observer to become a 
respondent. This pressure can be seen as taking at least three forms: 
Endogenous to the discourse 
When discourse occurs between two agents making utterances, they are by 
default taken to be broadly rational, to be saying something contentful, and to 
have standing to make claims on the interlocutor. As we discussed above, the 
 
198 One reviewer mentioned that we might often hear this phrase in the following way: “I take her point, but 
nevertheless…” In such cases, the phrase ‘I take her point’ is being used to mask that the listener has not in 
fact taken on the speaker’s point, but is merely raising it to dismiss it. This usage of the I TAKE HER POINT move 
is functioning disingenuously, similar in usage to a ‘figleaf’; see Jennifer M. Saul, ‘Racial Figleaves, the 
Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump’:, Philosophical Topics 45, no. 2 (2017): 
97–116, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201745215.  
132 
 
Inquisitor has a series of increasingly complex and laborious strategies for proving 
to himself and Gina that Gina is not in fact a rational discourse participant with 
standing to make claims on others. The I TAKE HER POINT move attributes Gina with 
explicit standing in the discourse, so that the reluctant respondent himself has to 
do the work of excommunicating her in order to avoid listening to her. 
Exogenous to the discourse 
We have a banal reflex to respond to the claims of others with 
competitiveness or contrariness.199 When Jimmy has something controversial to 
say about a claim made by Gina, it is our reflex to find out what that claim is so 
that we can take a stance on Jimmy’s stance. Even in the friendliest of cases there 
will be trustees on the board who enjoy outflanking Jimmy and showing him why 
he is mistaken. If Jimmy claims to take Gina’s point, then the competitive trustee 
cannot play his hand until he figures out what the point is that he seeks to defeat. 
The I TAKE HER POINT move is a strategy of baiting the reluctant respondent into 
finding out why the claim he opposes is invalid, motivating the trustee give uptake 
in order to then take a stance. 
Phenomenologically 
Discourse respondency is a deeply embedded part of what it means to be 
human.200 The merest suggestion of agency is enough to arouse us to a mode of 
respondency. If the dog grunts in her sleep, I find myself answering her with 
playful replies. The sun goes behind a cloud while my friend is sunbathing, and my 
friend scolds the sun. If the television freezes for a second, I swear at it for its 
insolence, and if my computer takes too long to boot up, I stroke it and say 
encouraging things. We do these things with an awareness of the whimsy involved 
in our responding to inanimate objects as if they were discourse participants.  
We return to the basis for this tendency in Chapter 6, but for now the 
contrast shows all we need it to: to excommunicate a rational discourse participant 
 
199 At least, many of us who are philosophers particularly have this reflex. 
200 McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’, 63; Michael Tomasello, Origins of Human 
Communication, Reprint edition (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2010). 
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and then swear at inanimate objects is absurd. The most minimal suggestion of 
agency or noise that could be loosely communicative elicits our respondency. So 
when Jimmy makes the I TAKE HER POINT move, he creates a foil against which the 
trustee’s excommunication move shows up as the disingenuous absurdity that it 
is. 
The phenomenological structure of respondency, the baiting of banal 
competitiveness, and the endogenous implications of the structure of discourse 
all contribute to the observer’s reflexive drive to take a stance when prompted by 
the I TAKE HER POINT move. More compellingly, a fourth form of pressure can arise 
over and above the other three, namely, the normative pressure of knowing that I 
have treated a person as less than a full participant of rational, discursive 
humanity. Knowing that I have miscategorised someone in such a substantial way 
creates a moral pressure to resolve the issue by recategorising the speaker as a 
person with standing to make claims.201 
 The aim here has been to show how Jimmy’s individual listening behaviour, 
as flagged by the I TAKE HER POINT move, can give rise to changes in others’ 
behaviour by way of a motivational complex which prompts and motivates others 
to extend their listening habits to the voices of the blues. As I mentioned before, 
there are additional ways Jimmy could affect the system, given his hoped-for 
platform as a community leader, but I have purposefully tied the motivational 
complex not to Jimmy’s prestige, but rather to the public impacts of their 
interactions, to show that any individual’s behaviour, as a constituent of the 
discourse ecosystem, constitutes a change in the discourse ecology, which could 
in principle lead to an overall change in the way the discourse structures the 
behaviour of its constituents in general. Let’s assume that Jimmy does not in the 
end run for mayor. His change in behaviour can still trigger changes in the wider 
discourse ecology, albeit with a different path of influence through his personal 
 
201 As with moral pressures generally, the effects will not be universally and equally felt. Some speakers will 
be inclined to be territorial about their voice’s share in the discourse ecology. This reaction to moral pressure 
is vicious in ways which are beside the point of the discussion at hand. 
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social networks. The motivational complex gives us the machinery of this. It 
remains now to look at how Jimmy’s change scales up and ripples outward across 
the discourse ecosystem. 
5. Large-Scale Change Across the System 
The empirical literature on how changes spread across social networks is 
vast and heterogenous, and discussing these models is well beyond the scope of 
this project. Even so, we need a way to rigorise the idea of Jimmy’s new listening 
habits spreading across the discursive ecosystem. We do not want to be blithe 
about assuming that Jimmy’s idealistic behaviour can and will rectify a deeply 
entrenched and subtly operative state of discursive injustice between the greens 
and the blues. For a more measured approach, therefore, I return to the linguistic 
literature on language change, which explores the progression of novel usages, for 
example, from novel coinage and ‘nonce’ words to established word. 
The processes by which new words get added to a language is called 
Lexicalisation. Lexicalisation includes many different kinds of processes. Common 
to all kinds of lexicalisation is the progression from novelty to institutionalisation, 
as I mentioned in Section 3. In their research survey on language change 
processes, Brinton and Traugott note, ‘The focus here is not strictly on structural 
processes; rather, ‘‘institutionalization’’ refers to the spread of a usage to a 
community and its establishment as the norm. It is ‘‘the integration of a lexical 
item, with a particular form and meaning, into the existing stock of words as a 
generally acceptable and current lexeme.”’202 
What Jimmy hopes to accomplish can also be described as a process of 
institutionalisation, in that he hopes his listening behaviour will spread across his 
 
202 Brinton and Traugott, Lexicalization and Language Change, 45. They are citing Leonhard Lipka, English 
Lexicology: Lexical Structure, Word Semantics & Word-Formation, 3rd revised edn. of An Outline of English 
Lexicology (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2002), 112; who refers to similar definitions by Randolph Quirk 
et al., A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (London and New York: Longman, 1985), 1522; and 
Laurie Bauer, English Word Formation, Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 48; see also Leonhard Lipka, ‘Lexicalization and Institutionalization’, ed. Asher and 
Simpson, vol. IV, 1994, 2164–67. 
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community and become established as the norm. As with lexicalisation, the 
behaviour begins as something local, novel, and in a sense ‘private’, since it is a 
shift in Jimmy’s attitudes and actions in meetings with Gina and following 
conversations in which Jimmy makes the I TAKE HER POINT move. And again, as with 
lexicalisation, this local, novel behaviour becomes exposed to wider swathes of the 
community, becoming a public phenomenon which is recognised, and then 
integrated as an option, and then established as a norm.  Of course, these 
processes are not mechanistic; it is often the case that people employ novel usages 
which never become lexicalized. If all it took to rectify the injustice in the green 
and blue discourse ecology were one idealistic mayoral candidate, Jimmy’s 
world—and ours—would look unrecognisably different. 
The unpredictability of lexicalisation processes is two-fold: we can never 
quite predict how the meaning of the novel form will settle as it becomes 
institutionalised, and we can never quite predict when a novel usage will spread 
widely enough to become institutionalised. Both these uncertainties are 
instructive for Jimmy’s case, so we’ll take both in turn. First, Brinton and Traugott 
note that for a novel usage to take off, it should be a construction which can be 
derived from familiar words and bits and processes (or, technically: stems, 
morphemes, and derivational rules); it should serve an immediate communicative 
need and be understandable from its context.203 But in the process of 
institutionalisation, the meaning ‘often comes to be limited, specialized, or fixed 
in meaning. It may narrow to a subset (perhaps one) of its possible meanings, 
become relatively independent of context, and be included in the dictionary along 
with more generic meanings.’204 When word bits join up, they have the potential 
to imply a range of different meanings; this is the feature which gives language its 
incredible productive and creative capacity. 
 
203 Brinton and Traugott, Lexicalization and Language Change, 45. 
204 Brinton and Traugott, 45; citing Mary Ellen Ryder, ‘Complex -Er Nominals: Where Grammaticalization 
and Lexicalization Meet?’, in Between Grammar and Lexicon, ed. Ellen Contini-Morava and Yishai Tobin 
(Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1999), 305–6. 
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Consider the different implications of ‘over’ in OVERLOOK, OVERSEE, and 
WATCH OVER. All three formations combine the preposition ‘over’ with a verb of 
vision, but the first implies failure to attend to something. The second implies 
responsibility to attend to something. The third implies constancy of attending to 
something, whether out of responsibility or otherwise.  The bits do not mandate 
or determine that the meanings land as they have done; rather, the meanings are 
established by social institution and norms of usage. Thus, ‘What makes an 
expression a lexical item, what makes it part of the speech community’s common 
dictionary, is, firstly, that the meaning of the expression is not (totally) predictable 
from its form, secondly, that it behaves as a minimal unit for certain syntactic 
purposes, and third, that it is a social institution.’205 The establishment of familiar 
and stable usages is a matter of social convention, without which we would have 
no particular means (apart from context, sometimes) of discerning the different 
implications of ‘over’ in the verbs above. 
In my view, the whimsical conventionality of lexicalisation helps to make 
sense of what Jimmy is hoping to achieve with respect to his discourse ecology. As 
we’ve already mentioned, the I TAKE HER POINT move engages only a very thin 
concept of listening, and it could misfire. Jimmy’s observers might simply 
conclude that Jimmy is acting out of mere sentimentality, or out of politically 
instrumental motivations, and ignore the pull of the I TAKE HER POINT move. The 
observers might take Jimmy to be patronising the blues in the worst sense of the 
term, rather than legitimately listening. The observers might even doubt whether 
Jimmy could have listened to the blues, as he claims to have done, perhaps through 
a failure on his part as a prestigious green aspiring politician to empathise with 
the lived experiences of those in the blue community. Assuming (as I stipulated 
above) that Jimmy has in fact learned to be a good listener to the blues, and that 
they as a community attest this, Jimmy’s hope is that his novel listening behaviour 
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and use of the prompting move would be the grain around which a new social 
institution crystalises. 
What makes this possible, as with lexicalisation, is that Jimmy’s behaviour 
is made up of familiar processes (because all greens already have the habit of 
listening to at least some people), serves an immediate communicative need 
(resolving the pressures invoked by the ‘I TAKE HER POINT’ signalling move), and has 
a meaning which can be inferred from context (since Gina is a rational being and, 
as we have stipulated, is credible as well). These features together provide a 
bridging context206 in which the new behaviour makes at least as much sense as 
the old behaviour and can be adopted with little effort or cost. Both behavioural 
possibilities co-exist; some people listen to the blues (like Jimmy) and some people 
do not. 
When Jimmy makes the I TAKE HER POINT move he adds to the precedent for 
listening rather than not, and because both behaviours are equally in reach, 
observers may easily enough respond to the motivational complex enacted by this 
move. The bridging context is what makes it feasible for the behavioural change to 
come in incrementally and then subsequently scale outward across the 
community. Put otherwise, the bridging context is the ground where the 
cultivation of the new social institution can take place. As Dewey says, when we 
desire flowers in the desert, we are inclined then to undertake ‘the work that 
makes the desert blossom, [the] cultivation of plants. Every ideal is preceded by an 
actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition in inner image of the actual. It 
projects in securer and wider and fuller form some good which has been previously 
experienced in a precarious, accidental, fleeting way.’207 
Changing the discourse ecology is possible because the new norm 
(listening to blue voices) is already present, albeit in a ‘precarious, accidental, 
fleeting way’. Jimmy’s use of the I TAKE HER POINT move takes his precarious, 
individually cultivated habit of listening to the blues (trusting them, just as he 
 
206 Brinton and Traugott, Lexicalization and Language Change, 25–31. 
207 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, 23; italics original. 
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would trust Hawking, to be people saying things for reasons) and makes it show 
up to others in the ecosystem, giving it an increased presence in the ecosystem 
alongside the established alternative (taking the blues to be animal bodies making 
noises with strident voices and an insolent eyebrow), adding some motivational 
pressure in a way which invites observers to join him in practicing listening to the 
blues: cultivating flowers in the desert. 
When Jimmy’s appeal is successful, we would expect to see his observers—
those exposed to his discourse behaviour by the I TAKE HER POINT move—start to do 
the same as Jimmy. They listen to the blues. They make use of the I TAKE HER POINT 
move, prompting those in their own networks to notice they have been 
epistemically negligent with respect to the voices of the blues and seek to resolve 
this discrepancy. The scale of growth would, we can assume, depend on the usual 
social network factors that structure social change. Suppose some of the people 
around Jimmy are poised to be network brokers who participate in multiple 
overlapping networks. When they adopt the behavioural change, they introduce 
the possibility for geometric growth in people listening to the blues as, through 
them, several networks within the discourse ecology become simultaneously hit 
with the I TAKE HER POINT move. If some of the people in these networks are trusted 
figures and social influencers, the change will be further spurred on. 
This series of ‘ifs’ mirrors the same uncertainty which characterizes 
linguistic change processes, including lexicalisation. It is immensely difficult to 
predict which people will take up a new usage, when the usage will spread, and 
whether the usage will be adopted only in isolated network clusters or will spread 
across the community as a whole. It depends on what choices people make. It 
depends on how people respond to the behaviour of others in their discursive 
ecology and what choices they make in response to the I TAKE HER POINT move. For 
this reason, we cannot provide Jimmy with a sure-fire recipe for social change. All 
we can do here is to affirm the conceptual possibility for his individual discursive 
behaviour to constitute a change in the discursive ecology, which could potentially 
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give rise in due course to the institutionalisation of a new norm of listening to the 
blues. 
It Could Happen 
The argument we have made here strikes me as being at once both 
strikingly minimalist and frighteningly audacious. Using the Discourse Ecology 
Model, we looked at how a shift in one person’s listening behaviour (conceived 
here as led by a change in motivations) could lead to system-wide shifts in 
discursive habits. If, despite the unpredictability of social change, the I TAKE HER 
POINT move carries as much force as we hope it would, then we theoretically have 
a model for how individuals’ morally motivated decisions to listen to people to 
whom they have not been in the habit of listening could initiate a system-wide 
change in a discourse ecology. For this model to help us conceive how we might 
actively pursue such changes, it will need to be fleshed out with a precise, positive 
account of the conversational behaviours that actually constitute listening. That 






Pragmatics of Listening 
 
‘Words are events, they do things, change things. They transform both speaker and 
hearer; they feed energy back and forth and amplify it. They feed understanding or 
emotion back and forth and amplify it.’ 
—Ursula K. Le Guin208 
 
The aim of this chapter is to build an account of what infra-doings, in 
terms of patterned conversational behaviours, comprise the policies of 
responsiveness we evaluate as being praiseworthy or blameworthy. In the last 
chapter, we looked at how Jimmy might deploy his motivation to change his 
listening behaviour by thinking about the differences in how he feels about and 
responds to the things people say when he is, or is not, inclined to listen to them. 
But perhaps Jimmy would like a more specific set of guidelines to help him look 
directly at his conversational behaviours and change them out for better ones—
certainly, we want a theory of listening to provide this! Moreover, the motivational 
shift helps Jimmy attend to what he is doing in conversation, but it does not help 
Jimmy see how what he is doing alters or differently constitutes Gina’s 
participation in, and the progress of, the conversation. That is, a conversation is 
something that two interlocutors build together; Gina quite literally cannot have 
the conversation she wants to have with Jimmy if he is being conversationally 
uncooperative. If Jimmy wants to move himself out of Gina’s way and let her say 
 
208 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Wave in the Mind: Talks and Essays on the Writer, the Reader, and the Imagination 
(Boulder: Shambhala, 2004), 199. 
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what she needs to say, and if he wants to hear and respond rightly to whatever it is 
that she is saying to him, then he should probably go further than just not blocking 
her. Rather, in McKinney’s terms, he should take responsibility for his part of the 
bargain of being a conversational co-participant.209 He needs to do his share of the 
conversational labour. 
Some of the things he should do can be expressed as truisms: pay more 
attention, do not interrupt, do not be distracted. These are indeed important 
things to do as part of listening well, but they do not offer much by way of 
explaining how. Other guidance available includes items from Medina’s list of 
what a virtuous listener does, as mentioned in Chapter 1: know when to shut up, 
listen for silences, let the other person set the tone, and so on.210 These suggestions 
are also wise, and they might serve Jimmy well as reminders not to block Gina from 
saying her piece. But what he seeks now, and what people ask me for most often 
in connection with this project, is a description of what to do to accomplish good 
listening, and how to make those things happen. We want a list of infra-doings 
with enough theoretical depth and complexity to give us a robust account of how 
conversational norms work, given how conversations work, and how we can 
practice behaviour that honours those norms. 
Thus, we begin by looking at how conversations work. We need a model 
based not on an idealised theory of language in a vacuum or a bottle, but on 
empirically informed theory of conversation as it happens ‘in the wild’, in real 
contexts, with all the mess of socio-political and normative contexts. We find such 
theories in a specialist literature based in sociology, sociolinguistics, 
psycholinguistics, interactional linguistics, and communication science. (What 
‘field’ the literature is found in is subject to the vagaries of how institutions and 
departments name their subfields, hence the muddy variety here.) Two parts of 
the conversation literature will be in focus here: Ethnomethodology and 
Conversation Analysis (henceforth EMCA) and a strain of empirical, quantitative 
 
209 McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’, 56–57, 94. 
210 Medina, ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice’, 48. 
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research I will lump under the term Interactional Linguistics (henceforth IL), for 
present purposes. 
This chapter differs from the previous chapters in that it is heavy on 
empirical insights and does not deal so closely with the conceptual analysis themes 
from the previous chapters. This is by design. The rhythm of what follows can be 
described in this way: each section involves the introduction of a body of empirical 
work, and how that work can be brought to bear on conversational norms and 
behaviours. Once the empirical lens is focused on the behaviours in question, I pull 
away from the originating body of empirical work and start building out 
arguments by analogy; brief narrative scenarios are provided so that we can see 
how these conversational behaviours work (and break down). Across each section, 
then, we begin with citation-heavy subsections and then move toward 
increasingly original reflections on what interpretations can be drawn. This is not 
the most conventional method of philosophical writing, but it provides a 
reasonably sturdy basis for articulating what conversational behaviours are most 
apt for description as infra-doings of listening as such. 
Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis 
EMCA first grew out of sociologist Harold Garfinkel’s work on trust and 
interaction in the 1960’s.211 Specifically, Garfinkel was exploring how trust plays a 
role in action itself, and how we create meaningful order and structure in everyday 
interactions by our actions and reactions.212 The patterns by which we do this are 
often implicit, but Garfinkel would instruct his students to complete ‘tutorial 
exercises’, or little experiments, in which they would purposefully flout ordinary 
norms in mundane social situations in their lives. By acting in such unexpected 
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ways, they create an occasion for the people they interact with to take explicit steps 
to restore meaningful order and structure in the interaction.213 
It is interesting to see just how far they could go with these exercises—
which later came to be called breaching experiments, before the people around 
them would react explicitly to the breaching of the tacit norms. This is the core 
idea of Ethnomethodology: 
In this view, social order arises in, and through, the methodical production 
of action. It is the aim of ethnomethodological research to reveal the 
methods that underlie the ongoing production of social order. They produce 
descriptions that exhibit these methods from the perspective of the actors 
and that can be treated as accounts for actions.214 
One lesson we can take from the ethnomethodological approach is that when 
things seem to be out of order, people take explicit action to rebuild order. To 
understand the underlying structure of interpersonal interaction, we may want to 
look at where things have gone wrong, in order to see how people react, and how 
they try to make it right. For our purposes here, we want an understanding of not 
just of the structures and constitutive norms driving conversational behaviour, 
but also a sense of where moral norms come into play. From conversation analyses 
we can get a sense of the point at which point people’s reaction indicates that 
something is out of order, to what degree, and how severe the breach seems to be. 
Think of this in terms of our metro station platform from Chapter 2: if an 
elbow bumps you, you might think nothing of it, or possibly expect an apology, but 
fine, this happens. But how directed, obvious, repetitive, persistent, or forceful 
does the elbow bump have to be before you start taking it personally? How bad do 
things have to get before you shift from being vaguely annoyed with ‘people’ to 
being angry that this person did this to you? We might say that periodic elbow 
bumps are to be expected, but this person ‘crossed a line’. That line is what we are 
looking for. Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology inspires the idea that one way to find 
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out where the lines are is by crossing them. The more hostile the reaction to 
crossing the line, the more likely we are dealing with a line that represents some 
kind of morally significant norm. 
We revisit the breaching approach to locating norms in more detail in 
Section 1.2, but before we get to that, we look at what came out of his work: 
specifically, the Conversation Analysis part of EMCA. Following Garfinkel’s lead, 
sociologists Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson recorded and 
closely analysed ordinary conversations between people, evaluating them for their 
structure, for how the elements of conversations are organised into turn 
sequences, and how conversations go off the rails and either get repaired or break 
down. Jefferson devised a system for transcribing recordings to facilitate 
conversation analysis and to highlight its turn taking structure; Charles Goodwin 
and John Heritage helped codify the growing body of work into a coherent 
literature.215 Today, EMCA work is being done under a variety of disciplinary 
headings, but most of my examples in the thesis are drawn from the work of 
professor of social interaction Elizabeth Stokoe and linguist Nick Enfield, who 
have both published books quite recently, giving accessible and up-to-date 
overviews of what Conversation Analysts have learned.216 
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In 1970, a paper was published by Victor Yngve, a linguist who helped 
pioneer computational linguistics, which involves getting computers to analyse 
language: a field that has flourished and seen application in the refining of 
Google’s search algorithms, the responsiveness of Apple’s Siri, and even the 
friendly voice reading out directions from a GPS. Yngve noticed, as often happens 
when we try to teach computers to do tasks that seem relatively straightforward 
for us to do, that the realities turn out to be much more complex than we tend to 
assume. In this case, Yngve noticed that, we tend to think of conversation being 
the sort of thing where one person signals across a channel, like a phone line, at a 
time. But the reality of talk shows that we signal across multiple channels at once, 
in both directions. In the paper, called ‘On Getting a Word in Edgewise’, Yngve 
pointed out that we actively participate in the conversational turns others take, via 
what he called the back channel.217 Participation from the back channel is part of the 
structure of how we talk, and without it, communication does not go so well. 
Despite the seeming obviousness of his claim, Yngve’s point was not given 
prominent attention for a few decades. As with the Message in a Bottle 
framework, we find it much easier when building theories to think of conversation 
as a single sequence of messages being swapped, in order, via one channel, 
because then we can look at discrete actions without being troubled by the mess 
and noise of the back channel—certainly for the computational linguist and the 
programmer of communication technologies, it is easier this way as well. 
But in a landmark study in 2000, Janet Bavelas, Linda Coates, and Trudy 
Johnson set up a series of laboratory experiments to measure the effects of what 
happens in the back channel.218 Subjects were paired; one would tell a story from 
their life while the other listened. Some listeners were instructed to listen so they 
could retell the story themselves; some were instructed to listen and count the 
verbs. Some were instructed to listen whilst counting backwards from one 
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hundred, and so on. Bavelas and her team were able to measure what kinds of 
signals came from the back channel under each condition, as well as how the 
narrator’s telling was altered by the various back channel conditions. According to 
Enfield, their findings show that ‘there is an especially close relationship between 
the behavior of speaker and listener, where their contributions interlock.’219 In 
measuring how closely related the speaker and listener roles are, Bavelas et al. 
found that speakers need a listener’s participation, without which the fluency and 
quality of not just the narrative overall, but of the narrator’s speech itself, are 
worse.220 
What do we do with this? 
To build a theory of how to listen to people, particularly one which holds 
that listening is behaviour which we evaluate as morally significant, we need a way 
to process what the literatures above tell us. Inspired by ethnomethodology, we 
will take it that a good way to find ‘the line’ is to see where people react to behaviour 
they perceive as ‘crossing the line’. In the sections that follow, we look at 
conversational behaviour in three ways:  
§1 Inter-turn: EMCA work from Stokoe shows us the patterns which 
structure a conversation across turns, especially in short, primarily 
functional exchanges like getting information from a barista. 
§2 Intra-turn: IL work from Bavelas et al. shows us the patterns in main 
channel and back channel behaviour within an extend turn, like telling a 
story from one’s own life. 
§3 Meta-turn: Returning to formal pragmatics for a bit to pick up some 
conceptual materials, we look at what people are doing with their turns, what 
those turns accomplish, and how subsequent actions and reactions are 
structured by the whole picture of the conversation. 
Within each of these three sections, we work in three stages. First, we look at the 
patterns of behaviour—the infra-doings—which comprise the structure at the 
level of analysis under consideration. That is to say, we find out the constitutive 
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norms for that level: the norms which tell us how to do conversation. Then, we look 
at patterns of behaviour which are seen as breaching the normal structure. Finally, 
we look at how the hostility toward breaches shows us in each case what it is that 
people care about; which conversational norms seem to have moral weight, and 
what this shows us about what people take to be the moral normativity of listening.  
It may be helpful to think of this chapter as filling in the matrix below. 
Table 1 












   
 
1. Inter-Turn Structure (EMCA) 
People often assume221 that the ordinary, unscripted ‘chat’ of daily life is too 
chaotic and unstructured to be of interest for building up theories of 
communication, language, and social life. But the transcriptions of CA 
consistently reveal that conversational talk is highly organised and systematic. 
Stokoe writes, 
And we are quite unaware of how systematic our talk is, and how different 
words lead to different outcomes. So while we all keep talking, we are not 
good at understanding precisely what went wrong in an encounter, or what 
 
221 For example, even Noam Chomsky described conversation as a ‘disorderly phenomenon’, which I find 
astonishing; see Stokoe, Talk, 2. 
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went right. Analysing real talk in the wild—and in slow motion—shows us 
the incredible power talk has to shape our daily lives.222 
CA relies on gathered archives of recorded speech from real interactions, 
especially in situations where conversations would already be recorded anyway. 
Customer service interactions are often recorded so that companies can work on 
improving customer satisfaction, and negotiators in high-risk situations (such as 
active shooter situations or suicide risk situations) wear body cameras in order to 
record the interactions. These are just two of the examples Stokoe gives of the 
kinds of conversation she has archived, often by request, both for her own research 
purposes and in order that her research might be able to inform improvements to 
services in these areas. 
Stokoe notes at the outset that when we begin to analyse real-time 
transcripts, we find many cliches and assumptions about talk to be untrue. In 
particular, she writes: 
The idea that taking a turn in a conversation requires ‘processing time’, 
producing pauses, is another myth about our talk that we will bust in this 
book. In fact, we can and do respond very quickly within milliseconds. 
Indeed, speakers are actually monitoring reactions while their own turn is in 
progress, which is what enables such rapid interchange to take place. And 
the fact that we (can) respond quickly provides us with the evidence that 
delays, gaps, silences indicate an upcoming problem… 223 
There are two key features of talk reflected in these statements which will figure 
heavily in the arguments that follow. One is that talk does not follow a rigid 
sequence in which a participant speaks, waits, hears, decides, speaks, waits, 
hears, decides, speaks, and so on (as if they were sending messages back and forth 
in sealed bottles across a wide sea). Rather, participants in an exchange are both 
actively involved at all stages in monitoring and responding to each other, 
overlapping turns simultaneously, and slipping words in ‘edgeways’ while others 
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speak. From a structural standpoint, CA shows that this kind of pattern is normal 
for talk. 
The other key feature is that talk is filled with variations from the patterns. 
Some such variations are unobstructive; some are loaded, but these variations are 
normal. When talk varies too far from the norms, we have an indication that 
something is beginning to go wrong. The interaction is likely either to turn into 
conflict, or to dissolve into incoherent nonsense. Stokoe clarifies this point: 
Conversation analysis is not a branch of behaviourism. Saying ‘hello’ does not 
guarantee a ‘hello’ in response. In fact, a missing ‘hello’ can indicate 
mishearing, rudeness, or some other potential communication problem. But 
the take-home message is that because conversations do regularly open [in 
patterned and predictable ways], something interesting is happening when 
the pattern breaks.224 
This point is important to stress, if the methodology in this chapter is to work. We 
saw in Chapter 4 that language structures are in many ways elastic, evolving, and 
open for creative innovation. Likewise, conversational patterns can sustain a lot 
of novel variation—bending, so to speak—without actually breaking down. The 
ethnomethodologist plays with this elasticity, seeing how much variation can be 
sustained before a breach is accomplished. Usually, pattern breaks trigger the 
participants to initiate ‘repair’ tactics, which are themselves highly structured, 
patterned behaviours of getting things back on track.225 So to see where the 
normative lines fall, a breacher will need to not only break from the pattern, but 
likely also flout several attempts at repair sequences before the breach is 
accomplished. But before we get to that, we look at the constitutive patterns 
themselves. 
 
224 Stokoe, 19. 
225 Enfield, How We Talk, 145 ff. It is interesting to note that, in this book, Enfield gathers CA data from 
linguists working across several major language families to see what varies between them and what holds 
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To begin, we look at the simple exchanges of customer service such as those 
Stokoe references throughout, and which are common in CA literature on the 
whole. The formulaic, brief interactions have an overtly functional aim—to sort 
out something a customer needs—so it is fairly easy to tell whether or not the 
conversation goes well and whether the pragmatic aims of the speakers are 
accomplished. 
1.1 Infra-Doings 
 Consider two variations of a familiar interaction, in which you (‘Customer’) 
are at a coffee shop and are hoping to connect to the WiFi. You hail a barista, and 
have the following exchange: 
Barista A 
Customer:      Do you have WiFi here? 
Barista:         We do! The network name and password are there, on the wall. 
C:         Thanks! 
B:         [Smiles] 
In this case, the barista provides good customer service (relative to convention-
specified norms of how to do customer service), understanding what the customer 
is asking for and replying with the needed information. Now consider a variant: 
Barista B 
C:    Do you have WiFi here? 
B:    Yep. 
C:    Great, er, and what is the network called? 
B:    Same as the name of the café. 
C:    Thanks. And is there a password needed? 
B:    Yes. 
C:    Uhm, oh. And what is the password please? 
In this case, the barista does not provide good customer service. Although she 
responds to each request for information with an answer of information, the 
responses she provides do not properly fit with the customer’s queries. If we look 
just at the surface structure of the exchange, we see validly formulated questions 
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and answers falling in a reasonable sequence. The barista is not lying, nor is she 
failing to supply her ‘turns’ in the conversation at the right points. 
 According to CA, conversation is structured by a turn-taking rhythm. 
Sequences of activity are constructed from units called ‘adjacency pairs’.226 Each 
‘turn’ in the conversation is followed by an adjacent turn which responds to the one 
before. In any conversation, these alternating adjacency pairs form the basic 
building blocks. Stokoe explains: 
After one speaker has produced a ‘first pair part’, their recipient is expected 
to respond with a turn that delivers a second action. The second action is 
paired with, and fitted to, the first one – for instance, ‘question-answer’; 
‘greeting-greeting’; ‘invitation-acceptance’; ‘request-offer’. The second 
action is the ‘second pair part.’227 
These pairings should look familiar, following the sorts of categories we cite in 
philosophy of language when identifying types of illocution, or similar. But what 
CA goes on to show is the wide range of variability in how these types of turns are 
combined into adjacency pairs. 
 For example, a question could be met with an answer which does or does 
not correctly fit with the type of information that the question was meant to elicit. 
A question could likewise be met with a telling hesitation or a damning silence, 
instead of an utterance. Stokoe notes: 
Once the first pair part has been produced, almost anything produced next 
comprises the second pair part. This includes silence and delay. The second 
pair part may be inspected for its timeliness… whether or not it is fitted 
properly to the first… and whether or not it helps the overall sequence 
progress smoothly or stall and falter.228 
If utterances are the basic building blocks of speech, adjacency pairs are the basic 
building blocks of the turn-taking, joint communicative endeavour we call 
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conversation. That pairs of turns are the basic unit is demonstrated across 
countless examples from Stokoe’s archives of recorded interactions, in which the 
outcome of a conversation radically changes whenever a question, for example, is 
met with a pause rather than an immediate response. 
 What the Barista scenarios show is the difference between well-fitted and 
poorly-fitted adjacency pairs. In Barista A, the first adjacency pair is a question-
answer sequence. The question is of the type requesting information, and the 
answer is of the type providing that information. Notice that this is also true of the 
four pairs in Barista B: questions requesting information are met with answers 
providing that information. However, the answers do not fit so well. Barista B 
gives precise, accurate answers to each question asked, whilst disregarding the 
rather obvious aim with which the questions are asked. 
Table 2 
INTER-TURN: Conversation Analysis 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent recognises the 
aims of the speaker’s turns; 
completes adjacent pair 
structures with appropriately 
fitted second pair parts. 
  
 
 An aside about convention: we have a rich array of tacit social conventions 
that prescribe polite ways of saying things or asking for things. Politeness often 
involves being somewhat indirect in various ways—ways that vary by context, by 
social group, by class, etc. Again, these norms of politeness are stable and 
recognisable. Much of the humour in sit-coms comes from characters behaving in 
ways that misapply or flout these norms, making them suddenly show up 
explicitly. A character who takes an indirect request literally reveals to the 
audience the slight mismatch between the form of the request and the aim of the 
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request. We will not get caught up in these issues here, interesting as it would be 
to explore the social implications of a listener who exploits this tension.229  
Further, if we are assuming epistemic and conversational competence, 
and an interlocutor shows evidence of not being subscribed to the same 
conventions of conversation, this could be down to a difference in the specific 
subset of conversational norms, such as would arise if the interlocutor is from a 
different social group to mine (this often happens with language learners or when 
communicating across in-group/out-group lines). Alternatively, the non-
subscription to certain norms may arise if the interlocutor has some unique 
idiolectical tendencies. This may be down to quirkiness, as in the case of Phoebe 
from the TV Show Friends, who consistently breaches conversational norms 
because that’s who she is, in ways which her friends take to be non-hostile features 
of Phoebe’s quirky approach to life and relationships in general. Phoebe’s 
idiolectical breaching of conversational norms is a regular and recognisable part 
of the show’s humour, as Stokoe notes.230 
Similarly, idiolectical variation might be put down to a general individual 
tendency to be difficult in a non-personally directed way, i.e., for reasons of 
pedantry or to pose an air of superiority or punk mystique. A person with 
nonstandard proclivity for breaching conversational norms is the sort of person 
whose particularities are likely to be noted to you upon introduction. No doubt any 
of their friends would be able and quick to unpack the person’s breaching tendency 
for you with a wry smile or a knowing shake of the head, saying, ‘Don’t take it 
personally.’ 
 
229 For example, committing to a norm specific to one’s own social group and refusing to recognise another 
group’s slightly different norms may function as a way of ‘othering’ a question asker by being obtuse, or by 
taking needless offense; see Dotson, ‘Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing’; Rini, 
‘How to Take Offense’. 




 To understand what is so strange about the literalist Barista B, we should 
first take a look at a couple examples of full on breaches from Garfinkel’s tutorial 
exercises, which have come to be known as breaching experiments. Garfinkel 
instructed his students to ‘engage an acquaintance or friend in an ordinary 
conversation and, without indicating that what the experimenter was saying was 
in any way out of the ordinary, to insist that the person clarify the sense of his 
commonplace remarks.’ Here are some excerpts from the results (‘S’ indicates the 
subject of the experiment; ‘E’ indicates the student experimenter): 231 
Case 3. On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My 
husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, “How are you tired? Physically, 
mentally, or just bored?” 
(S)    “I don’t know, I guess physically, mainly.” 
(E)    “You mean that your muscles ache, or your bones?” 
(S)    “I guess so. Don’t be so technical.” 
(S)    (After more watching) “All these old movies have the same kind of old 
          iron bedstead in them.” 
(E)    “What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or 
          just the ones you have seen?” 
(S)    “What’s the matter with you? You know what I mean.” 
(E)    “I wish you would be more specific.” 
(S)    “You know what I mean! Drop dead!” 
 
Case 6. The victim waved his hand cheerily. 
(S)    “How are you?” 
(E)    “How am I in regard to what? My health, my finance, my schoolwork, 
          my peace of mind, my…” 
(S)    (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) “Look! I was just trying to 
          be polite. Frankly, I don’t give a damn how you are.” 
 
 




What we see in each case is that, within a very short sequence of turns, the subjects 
of the experiments became hostile with frustration, resulting in ‘interactional 
breakdowns which were extraordinarily rapid and complete’.232 Heritage explains 
the phenomenon, saying, ‘In each case, the S took for granted that the E would 
supply whatever unstated understandings would be required in order to make 
recognizable sense of his talk. This requirement, as we shall see, pervades all 
interaction’.233 This interpretation of conversational breakdown due to breaching 
has given rise to a sub-branch of Conversation Analysis which looks at how people 
talk about morality and knowledge, and the moral obligations and entitlements 
that govern how we lay claim to, discuss, and evaluate knowledge.234 
 We will return to this point about background knowledge and reciprocal 
perspectives throughout this chapter. In this case, what I want to focus on is the 
point that when conversational norms are breached, the resulting disturbance has 
two ways it can go: toward senselessness and incoherence, or towards a hostility, 
when the breach is interpreted as a kind of motivated choice on the part of the 
experimenter. As Heritage notes, ‘failure to apply background knowledge when 
interacting with others has moral consequences. Reflecting on these experiments, 
Heritage concluded that “there is no quicker way, it appears, of provoking moral 
outrage than by not using background knowledge to make sense of other people’s 
actions.”’235 
 Our instinct as philosophers at this point would be to look to Austinian or 
Gricean frameworks to find ways of labelling the malfunction in Barista B, as a 
mistake about implicatures or illocutions or some such, focusing on charting the 
 
232 Heritage, Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology, 81. 
233 Heritage, 81. 
234 Tanya Stivers, Lorenza Mondada, and Jakob Steensig, The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
235 Trine Heinemann, Anna Lindström, and Jakob Steensig, ‘Addressing Epistemic Incongruence in 
Question–Answer Sequences through the Use of Epistemic Adverbs’, in The Morality of Knowledge in 
Conversation, ed. Tanya Stivers, Lorenza Mondada, and Jakob Steensig (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 107, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921674.006. Citation is to Heritage 1984b, 182. 
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language structures at play in an impersonal, functional way. A benefit of working 
from sociological texts here is that the sociologists’ instinct is to look at the way 
people’s actions and choices in conversation play out as relational moves. If the aim 
of the breaching experiments was to introduce such a disturbance of 
conversational norms that the exchange would fall into senseless incoherence, this 
aim was rarely realised; instead, the subjects of the experiments consistently 
attributed the upheaval not to chaotic malfunction but motivated choice, 
responding not with baffled inactivity or discontinuation of attempts at discourse, 
but with intra-discursive reactions of moral outrage and hostility: not a failure of 
conversational norms, but a wilful usage of departures from the norms on the part 
of the experimenters, employed for some communicative end.236 
So persistent was this effect that even once the experimenter explained to 
the subject the reason for the breaching, the subjects were reluctant to be pacified. 
Even once they understood that the breach behaviours were merely done as part 
of an assignment for a class, the subjects continued to interpret the breaches as 
being chosen and interpersonally directed (‘Why did you choose me to try this on?). 
Heritage notes, ‘These individuals accountably treat their own and one another’s 
actions as the products of “motivated choices” and, as such, designed with respect 
to the specifics of settings and their constituent participants.’237 Our 
communicative success depends on an underlying expectation that the various 
behaviours in a conversational exchange are, by and large, chosen and 
meaningful. This expectation is called a relevance framework, which we will 
return to in Chapter 6. This expectation is also the reason why, as Stokoe noted 
above, anything which follows a move in a conversation is liable to be interpreted 
as a response to the preceding turn, even silence and pauses.238 
 
236 Heritage, Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology, 98–99. 
237 Heritage, 101. 
238 For example, a two second pause before answering a question like, ‘Do you still love me?’ would be taken 
as indicative of a problem, even if the answer given is ‘Of course I do!’ The fact that the pause came first is 
not something conversation participants ignore, and might serve as a very efficient way to signal the 
beginning of the end of a relationship; see examples from Stokoe, Talk, 33–36. 
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The expectation of relevance allows us to interpret people’s subsequent 
conversational behaviours as meaningfully related to what came before. If a 
behaviour does not seem to bear any meaningful relation, we assume repair tactics 
are needed. If an interlocutor’s responses to a turn are noticeably inappropriate, 
we are generally left to choose between interpreting the turn as an error, or as a 
motivated choice.  This is why, if we are not Ethnomethodologists, we stop to 
repair mistakes and misunderstandings, and why we apologise for incidental 
behaviours that might skew our interlocutor’s interpretations of what we mean. 
One might explain a hesitation, for example, by saying ‘I was not hostile, just 
nervous!’ Or perhaps, ‘I was not judging you; I just had a headache, hence my 
furrowed brow,’ as if to say, ‘Please do not interpret my weird response as a 
motivated choice indicating hostility to you.’ 
With this in mind, let’s look back at the Barista B scenario. Suppose that 
you are the customer seeking access to WiFi. You can fairly assume, as it is 
common background knowledge by anyone familiar with English conversational 
norms and cafes as a social space, that the Barista knows perfectly well what the 
aim of your questioning is. You are not asking out of idle curiosity for information 
about whether WiFi is available and password protected; you are asking because 
you want to connect to the WiFi. This is why the Barista A scenario works: when 
you ask if the café has WiFi available, you are opening an inquiry the aim of which 
is clearly to get connected. You don’t need to go through every single little 
inferential step in question and answer sequences, as if you were a philosopher-
bot. Once you ask the opening question, Barista A understands the aim of your 
question and then answers you in the most efficient way possible, by directly 
providing you with access to the network ID and password. This is a familiar, 
normal interaction, especially for anyone working in a café. 
Barista B chooses not to utilise this available background knowledge to 
make sense of your conversational moves, so although she answers with 
structurally apt adjacency pair parts, her turns serve to undermine any efficiency 
you might have hoped for in achieving your conversational aims. This is a 
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breaching pattern which Barista B might use for any number of reasons which 
means, as we noted above, the breaching likely serves some communicative or 
interpersonal aim. Perhaps Barista B thinks she is being comical, or, more likely, 
she is frustrated with a long stream of customers annoying her with petty 
concerns, so she wishes to return a bit of this frustration to the customers. 
Whatever the reason, her breaching of the normal pattern is not wrong, but rather, 
loaded. 
It is for this reason that you could be expected, according to Garfinkel and 
Heritage, to respond with hostility and outrage for being treated by Barista B as 
someone for whom she would sooner depart from the norms and spend five 
adjacency pairs to accomplish what could have been done in one, rather than 
acknowledge your conversational aims. The choice appears as motivated and 
directed at you, the customer, implying that Barista is hostile to your 
communicative aims.239 This account of the breaching pattern explains why we so 
easily become riled at sulky or unhelpful customer service. Even though we know 
that the reason for the breach in many cases is due to a generalised frustration 
with ‘customers’ and should not be taken personally, it is difficult not to feel 
personally affronted when Barista B takes her frustration out on us. 
Realistically, we expect our conversational obligations to each other to be 
greater or less depending on the roles we occupy, and the socio-political features 
that accompany those roles. Barista B is occupying a service role, and I would be 
reluctant to suppose that this kind of breach would have any moral weight; I would 
even be inclined, despite the reactive feeling of hostility, to decide upon reflection 
that her intransigence was not blameworthy, just annoying. But suppose a similar 
type of exchange occurred between a struggling student and a professor, when the 
student asks for clarification about an assignment. If the professor uses a 
breaching pattern like Barista B’s, giving answers to every question but in the most 
unhelpful way possible, the normative stakes would be higher. Or suppose that an 
oncologist recommends a new treatment still in clinical trials, and to all questions 
 
239 This isn’t a particularly mysterious hostility, as anyone who has worked in a café can attest. 
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about the risks and factors for consideration, the oncologist gives perfunctory and 
vague answers, and redirects the patient to go read about it for themselves online. 
A professional negligence of this scale might be grounds for judging the breacher 
as morally blameworthy. 
Table 3 
INTER-TURN: Conversation Analysis 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent recognises the 
aims of the speaker’s turns; 
completes adjacent pair 
structures with appropriately 
fitted second pair parts. 
A respondent utilises second 
pair parts which structurally fit 
but are unhelpful for achieving 
the speaker’s aims, putting an 
extra burden on the speaker to 
advance conversation through 
extra, unnecessary turn pairs. 
 
 
1.3 Inferring Normativity 
The first item that requires attention as we look at the possible morality of 
inter-turn structure in conversations is the role played by the details of context, in 
the final two examples above. If we think about normativity in terms of 
interpersonal harms here, we might ask, ‘What is the interlocutor doing to the 
speaker by giving inapt responses, that we deem it a harm warranting a moral 
judgement of blameworthiness?’ This is a question which cannot be answered 
without consideration of the context—not just the immediate linguistic context, 
but the wider discursive environment, the roles the interlocutors play in their 
ecosystem, and normative context (the entitlements and obligations) upon which 
they are performatively enacting changes by their utterances. 
On the traditional Message in a Bottle frame, we can factor in various bits 
of the context to bring some dimension to these kinds of exchanges, but on the 
Discourse Ecology Model, we expect the whole context to matter. Looking back at 
the paragraph above Table 3, imagine that instead of being written by a single 
author for an absent audience, the argument of the paragraph is instead unfolding 
as a conversation. You are sceptical that breaches brought about by ill-fitting but 
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structurally apt second pair parts are really something that merits moral attention. 
I say, ‘Okay, but suppose it were a professor… a professor with a vulnerable, struggling 
student!’ You say this example is more frustrating, but it would be difficult to 
prove the frustration truly merits moral blame. I say, ‘Okay, but suppose it were 
an oncologist…’ and so on. 
On a frame which is built to exclude context, we mostly get a sense of 
utterances as being neutral in the vast majority of cases. Context can be factored 
in on such accounts, but doing so feels much like the rhythm of the multiple ‘Okay, 
but suppose’ sequence above. The harder we have to work to add in context, the 
more it feels like we are making excuses, or trying to justify a point that is a stretch. 
The ecological frame, however, expects context to be a vital part of the story. We 
cannot really evaluate what someone is doing to someone else via their 
conversational infra-doings if we do not know who they are, the socio-political 
relation between them, the role-based duties which may shape the normative 
context, and the way that the interlocutors are trying to performatively alter the 
normative context through their speech acts. 
Inefficiency in achieving one’s aims in conversation might seem a strange 
way to judge an interlocutor for purposeful use of ill-fitting second pair parts, if 
we are looking for moral normativity in conversational behaviour. But look back 
to Jimmy Green and Gina Blue. Jimmy’s conversational uncooperativity made it 
difficult for Gina to say her piece. Divorced from context, that fact alone might not 
render his actions morally problematic. If a friendly supervisor reads a doctoral 
student’s article draft and highlights every possible objection that Reviewer 2 might 
make, in order to optimise the student’s chances at producing a publishable piece, 
this kind of uncooperativity would be a kindness. But Jimmy is not helping Gina 
strengthen her points—not intentionally, anyway. Rather, he is, as we said, 
seeking to avoid normative entanglement. Gina is trying to enact certain 
performative changes to their normative context by registering certain 
complaints, and if she is successful, she puts Jimmy under obligation to respond 
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in some way, preferably by conceding that the school district can do better by its 
blue students, and by making real world changes accordingly. 
The normative entanglement is a necessary part of the picture for 
analysing what interlocutors do to each other by breaching or being 
conversationally uncooperative, as is the contextual information about the power 
dynamics in play. Jimmy is part of an oppressor class; Jimmy holds a powerful 
administrative position; Gina is part of a historically oppressed class; Gina has a 
powerful position with respect to the blue community but aside from her agile 
communication skills, she is in a down-power position relative to Jimmy. Jimmy’s 
game of epistemic whack-a-mole can be traced out again here, this time in terms 
of conversational infra-doings, like those of Barista B, which have a surface-level, 
purported rightness of fit as responses to Gina’s turns. But Jimmy’s turns do not 
really fit well with the plainly manifest aims of Gina’s conversational moves. 
What infra-doings would give a better result here, when Jimmy starts 
really listening to Gina? We want to see three things. 1. Jimmy should pay attention 
what Gina is aiming to accomplish with her turns on the whole, acknowledging 
what her obvious purpose is and giving responses which best fit with her 
overarching aims, rather than which ostensibly fit only with each turn when the 
turns are snipped from context.240 
2. Jimmy should pay attention to what Gina’s turns are aiming to 
accomplish with respect to changes in their normative context, particularly where 
she is introducing moves which would put him under some sort of obligation. 
Jimmy’s responses to these moves should fit not just the grammatical structure of 
her turns, but should acknowledge and accept the normative implications of her 
turns. 3. Jimmy should be mindful of the socio-political context; specifically, he 
 
240 One may ask, if this is the case, should Jimmy just give Gina whatever she wants, and that way the do not 
even have to talk about matters? Her overarching aims are met, but it does not seem to right to describe this 
as ‘listening’. This is because Gina’s aims, and the aims of interpersonal communication in general, are 
directed not only at real world outcomes, but at the relational outcome of having expressed one’s viewpoint 
and secured its uptake in the interlocutor’s attention. See Chapter 6, Section 4. My thanks to Benedict Smith 
for raising this point. 
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should be mindful of the significant power he holds over the lives of a number of 
vulnerable and marginalised children as well as the comparative power he holds 
relative to Gina. When processing and responding to her turns, he should ensure 
that he compensates for this differential. Like giving himself a golf handicap, he 
should err on the side of taking Gina’s turns to have more merit, rather than less, 
and to have more force in modifying the normative context than his own turns do. 
To distil this picture of listening: A poor listener puts extra, unnecessary, and 
unwarranted burdens on a speaker to clarify, repair, and follow up in order to 
achieve their aims. To get their meaning across, the speaker is made to do most or 
all of the conversational ‘work’, with little to no support from the other party. The 
poor listener frustrates the aims of the speaker and undermines the efficiency of 
the conversation. A good listener reduces the speaker’s conversational burden to a 
minimum, using best-fitted second pair parts to support the speaker in achieving 
her aims with maximum efficiency. The good listener does her own conversational 
work rather than putting it on the speaker.  
Table 4 
INTER-TURN: Conversation Analysis 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent recognises the 
aims of the speaker’s turns; 
completes adjacent pair 
structures with appropriately 
fitted second pair parts. 
A respondent utilises second 
pair parts which structurally fit 
but are unhelpful for achieving 
the speaker’s aims, putting an 
extra burden on the speaker to 
advance conversation through 
extra, unnecessary turn pairs. 
A respondent recognises the 
overall aims of speaker beyond 
the individual turns, and replies 
with best fitted second pair 
parts, obviating need for extra 
pairs and alleviating the burden 
on the speaker to advance the 
conversation. 
 
2. Intra-Turn Structure (IL) 
We turn now to a more extended form of conversation than the functional 
exchanges of ordinary talk. This register is perhaps more apt for what we usually 
have in mind when we talk about good and bad listeners. This register is where we 
have people telling their stories, explaining their thoughts, and sharing their 
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feelings in extended conversational turns. A good listener, such as a skilled 
therapist or kind boss, might be someone who says ‘mmhmm’ in all the right 
places, does not cut off the speaker’s turn prematurely, and generally ‘gets it’. 
When we try to become good listeners we might think about tips and tricks for 
getting those ‘mmhmms’ in the right places, for example. These are fair enough 
approximations of what good listening behaviour might look like on the surface 
within the scope of an extended turn, but it is a partial picture at best. 
As noted in Section 1, it is a myth that the turn taking units of conversation 
require processing time, being sequentially ordered with gaps and ‘uhms’ in 
between turns. We listen and respond at the same time, often overlapping turns 
and communicating our responsiveness even while the other person is still 
speaking. To be sure, there are ways of getting this sort of thing wrong, in which 
case one is taken to be interrupting or cutting off the speaker’s turn, and we 
actively sanction this sort of behaviour. But despite the familiarity of the picture, 
it is not the case that conversation is a single channel in which only one signal at a 
time is transmitted, in only one direction. 
Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson refer to this monadic view as the Classical 
model of conversation, in which ‘there is only a one-way channel from sender to 
receiver at any given moment; the receiver has no way to respond until he or she 
becomes the sender and takes over the channel.’241 Schober and Clark contrast this 
autonomous view of conversation with their collaborative view, according to which 
addressees play an active role together with speakers in conducting the progress 
of conversation.242 The benefit of the autonomous models is that they allow 
analysts to focus on the speech signal as a free-standing structure, eliminating 
much of the interfering complexity that would make our linguistic models even 
more complicated. However, if these views were right, there would be no such 
thing as getting all the ‘mmhmms’ in the right places. 
 
241 Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson, ‘Listeners as Co-Narrators’, 941. 
242 Michael F Schober and Herbert H Clark, ‘Understanding by Addressees and Overhearers’, Cognitive 
Psychology 21, no. 2 (1 April 1989): 211–32, https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(89)90008-X. 
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The strange narrowness of these monadic views was noted as early as 1970, 
when Victor Yngve observed: 
[T]he distinction between having the turn or not is not the same as the 
traditional distinction between speaker and listener, for it is possible to 
speak out of turn, and it is even reasonably frequent that a conversationalist 
speaks out of turn. In fact, both the person who has the turn and [his or her] 
partner are simultaneously engaged in both speaking and listening. This is 
because of the existence of what I call the back channel, over which the 
person who has the turn receives short messages such as “yes” and “uh-huh” 
without relinquishing the turn.243 
As Yngve rightly points out, we do frequently speak while listening, and we listen 
while speaking. This is not an observation about turn interruption but about how 
turns, especially extended turns, are structured in the first place. While the 
speaker occupies the main channel with an extended turn, the listener feeds back 
indications of comprehension, sympathy, and dubiousness from the back 
channel. It is only if these bits of feedback become so obtrusive as to force the 
speaker to relinquish the turn that they constitute an interruption. The problem 
with speaking whilst being spoken to arises not whenever the listener issues any 
sort of communication at all, but rather when the listener starts issuing 
communication over the main channel, taking over the turn, instead of giving 
support and feedback via the back channel.  
The studies done by Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson bring this collaborative 
dynamic into focus. They divide back channel responses into two types, generic 
and specific.244 Generic back channel responses are the sort of thing that are not 
specific to the content of the speaker’s narrative but could be used in virtually any 
situation, as if to signal that the listener is still attending the speaker’s turn and 
getting the speech signal okay. Generic responses include things like nodding and 
vocalizations (those ‘mmhmms’). Specific responses are based on the content of 
the narrative itself, enabling the listener to show not just continued reception of 
 
243 Yngve, ‘On Getting a Word in Edgewise.’, 568. 
244 Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson, ‘Listeners as Co-Narrators’, 943–44. 
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the signal but increasing understanding of the signal. Specific responses include 
motor and affect mimicry (making faces and gestures to echo those of the 
speaker), illustrative hand gestures (such as might show how the listener is 
visualising the content of the narrative, for instance), and brief verbal 
interjections, such as helpfully supplying descriptive words or even finishing 
sentences simultaneously with the speaker to indicate understanding. 
The studies in question measured the rate of occurrence of these different 
kinds of back channel responses over the course of a narrative under various 
experimental conditions. One subject would recount a story from their own life 
experience of a close call, risky situation. The other subject would be assigned to 
listen to the story under various experimental conditions, from just listening, to 
listening with the aim of being able to retell, to listening whilst doing distracting 
mental maths. Normally, one would expect the listener to make generic responses 
at the start of the narrative and then begin making increasingly specific responses 
as the story unfolded. The experimental conditions were intended to change the 
kind of attention listeners could pay to the unfolding narrative. Unsurprisingly, 
the more distracted a listener was by the mental maths, the less capable they were 
of generating specific back channel responses. 
2.1 Infra-Doings 
 To get a picture of what competence looks like in this register, we look at 
how the respondent patterns her back channel responses. In short, the basic job of 
the respondent is to maintain continued attention to the content of the main 
channel, and signal understanding via the back channel, moving from generic to 
specific responses as appropriate, without usurping the main channel or cutting 
off the speaker’s turn. As with the inter-turn infra-doings, competence looks like 
supporting the speaker in achieving their aims, but this time instead of having 
well-fitted second pair parts in an alternating sequence of turns, the listener has 
well-fitted back channel responses occurring at well-fitting points over the course 
of the speaker’s extended turn. The back channel responses indicate continuing 
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attention, comprehension, and a willingness to affiliate with the content and 
meaning of what the speaker is conveying. 
 Early specific responses recorded by Bavelas et al. include listener’s 
making facial displays of concern, when concerning situations are described, or 
facial displays of fear, when the speaker describes feeling afraid.245 The 
correspondence between the affect described by the speaker and the affect 
displayed by the listener is what we refer to as affiliation.246 Note that this does not 
mean that the listener feels what is being described, although this may occur in a 
particularly vivid retelling or when a story is told by someone for whom the listener 
cares a great deal. Rather, the listener is displaying a signal of the kind of affect 
described, in order to signal that they have, on some level, a willingness to take the 
same evaluative stance toward the situation as the speaker: to affiliate with the 
speaker. 
Towards the end of the narrative, specific responses become increasingly 
complex and involved. Take this excerpt from one of the experimental scenarios 
describing a close call situation: 
Example 5 
Narrator: I, like an idiot, decide to climb up the cliff instead of… 
Listener: …going up the road 
Narrator: …taking the easy way out and going up the road. 
The authors elaborate on this excerpt: ‘Here, the listener actually provided a phrase 
that fit the narrator's main point, which was that it was foolish to try to escape 
rising water by going up the nearby cliff when there had been a better option. 
Moreover, he did so in a way that exactly fit the narrator's syntax, and the narrator 
immediately incorporated the listener's interjection into the narrative.’247 
 
245 Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson, 943. 
246 Tanya Stivers, ‘Stance, Alignment, and Affiliation During Storytelling: When Nodding Is a Token of 
Affiliation’, Research on Language & Social Interaction 41, no. 1 (11 March 2008): 31–57, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08351810701691123. 
247 Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson, ‘Listeners as Co-Narrators’, 944. 
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 The interjection from the listener does not elicit the sort of response which 
would indicate the narrator felt interrupted. Rather, the narrator’s extended turn 
carries on undisrupted. The words from the listener do not take over the main 
channel. The words come via the back channel and serve to participate, even 
collaborate in the speaker’s ongoing turn. The response is highly specific to the 
exact content of that point in the narrative. They show an affiliative response, in 
that they are suited to the speaker’s evaluative stance towards what they are 
telling, and they further show that the listener has absorbed sufficient details from 
the story thus far to understand what the layout of the scene was, what the options 
were, and what could have happened instead. This is a highly involved listener. 
These kinds of specific responses are not possible to produce without 
paying sufficiently close attention, as the other experimental conditions indicate. 
Listeners who are busy doing things like counting verbs or attempting mental 
maths do not absorb details about the scene setting, the availability of a road one 
could go up, and so on. The more distracted a listener is, the more they stick with 
generic responses, the loose ‘uh-huh’ tokens which indicate little more than ‘I am 
still here and am aware that you are still speaking’. Particularly as the narratives 
advance toward the climax of the risky situation, and situations of threat toward 
which the speakers take vivid evaluative stances, bland tokens of ‘uh-huh’ do not 
convey willingness or ability to affiliate with the content and meaning of what the 
speaker is saying, nor even a basic comprehension of the story so far. Persistently 
generic responses around the climax of a close call story would tend to be read as 
indicative of something, much like the inapt responses of Garfinkel’s breachers. 
Depending on context, the speaker may assume that the lack of 
appropriate and affiliative, specific back channel responses indicates either that 
the listener is very distracted and not taking in the content, or that the listener is 
unwilling to affiliate with the content. The latter might occur if, say, a person 
known for exaggeration tells a story of being in a perceived threatening situation 
which the listener assumes was not really threatening at all. The listener’s ‘uh-huh’ 
sounds blank, rather than affiliative, or even may begin to sound like a sarcastic 
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confirmation, indicating that whilst they entirely understand what the speaker is 
saying, they are not willing to share the speaker’s evaluative stance and affiliate 
with the interpretation of the situation as threatening.  
Table 5 
INTRA-TURN: Interactional Linguistics 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent provides 
appropriate generic & specific 
back channel responses, 
uptaking speaker’s meanings 
without interrupting or 




 If the point of the back channel is that it allows the listener to communicate 
feedback to the speaker without causing the speaker to relinquish her turn, then 
we would expect that breaching in this register would take the form of either 
withholding the needed feedback or responding in an intrusive manner that 
causes the speaker to relinquish her turn. Both forms of breach can occur for 
reasons varying from polite and acceptable to rude or hostile. The commonality 
across cases is that the breaches present interference from the listener, prompting 
the speaker to renegotiate the way she is conducting her turn.  
 Suppose Katy, who is not a philosopher, asks me what I am writing about. 
I launch into an in depth explanation of the pieces I’m currently writing. Katy is 
usually supportive and curious about my work, but suppose that in this case my 
enthusiasm takes over and I become far more long winded than I should. As I carry 
on about my projects, she becomes bored and wishes I would wrap it up. When I 
first started telling her about my work, she gave some generic back channel 
responses, to indicate basic understanding. Occasionally she may have given a 
slightly more intrusive indication of confusion, especially when I use jargon. She 
doesn’t really cause me to relinquish the turn, just indicates through confused-
face and a ‘What?’ that I need to explain something. As I elaborate, she is able to 
169 
 
make increasingly specific responses, demonstrating that she gets the point and 
is tracking. 
 However, as she becomes bored with my excessive telling, she starts 
looking for a way to encourage me to finish my telling. She could start withholding 
all back channel responses, ‘going quiet on the line’, in order to stop encouraging 
me forward with my telling. Bavelas et al. note that this level of back channel drag 
has the effect of significantly undermining the quality of a narrator’s telling. 
Especially when a narrator passes the climax of the story with no appropriate 
recognition from the listener, the telling suddenly becomes choppy where it had 
been fluid, limping awkwardly to a poor ending.248 If this happens due to some 
distraction in the environment, it is not especially likely to give rise to hostility, 
but if it happens due to an intentional withholding of back channel support, the 
speaker is likely to interpret this move by the listener as a general, personally-
directed lack of supportiveness or what I call ‘mutinous silence’. Whether this 
interpretation is correct or not, the breaching patten interrupts the flow of 
conversation and requires repair manoeuvres from the participants in order to set 
things back to rights. 
 Intrusive responses most obviously include blatant interruption, but even 
this type of breach is not necessarily rude. Suppose Katy says, ‘Sorry to cut you off; 
I’m going to need to go in a minute. So can I just check that I have this right? What 
you’re saying is that…’ This case typifies Stokoe’s point that I made above: 
deviation from a pattern is not usually the end of discourse, but a way of 
continuing the discourse in a manner that meaningfully alters its course. This 
intrusive response is politely done; she apologises, gives a reason for cutting me 
off, and suggests a continuing interest in my work in general (albeit perhaps not 
in so much detail), which implies an affiliative stance despite the temporal 
constraints. 
 
248 Bavelas, Coates, and Johnson, 949. 
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Other forms of intrusive responses introduce dissonance from the back 
channel by using specific but inappropriate feedback to muddle the speaker’s turn. 
Ordinarily, specific back channel responses serve as an efficient way for the 
listener to signal that they understand both what the speaker is saying, and what 
the speaker is saying about the content. If the speaker is telling me something sad 
and I start giggling, there is dissonance. If the speaker is telling me something 
joyful and I wear a look of pity and sad compassion, she might stop and ask why. 
A listener is of course not required to fully mirror the speaker’s affect, to feel 
likewise, or to agree with the speaker’s perspective on whatever is being narrated; 
furthermore, a dissonant response could result from unrelated events in the 
environment. I might say, ‘I’m sorry, at the table behind you there is a small child 
who just exploded into the saddest tears ever. My attention is back on you now; 
you were saying…’ One such event is not likely to enact a breach, but if I were to 
show this level of distractibility persistently and repeatedly, the speaker might 
interpret them to imply that I am not interested in participating collaboratively in 
whatever story she is telling, and she becomes frustrated. 
The more substantially inappropriate my back channel contributions are, 
the more likely the narrator is to interpret me as breaching the basic expectations 
that storytellers have of their audiences—expectations which may be greater or 
lesser, depending on the contextual factors such as the relationship between us, 
the occasion of the telling, the kind of attention she asked for, and so on. Say she 
had told me she was having a really hard time and asked if she could tell me about 
it. Then I start giggling at things in the environment and reacting to things 
disconnected to what she is telling me. My response is not only disaffiliative; it is 
out of step with the kind of attention I presumably agreed to give. Once again, we 
note that such situations are not rigid; a disaffiliative response well handled could 
serve to help someone find the humour in an unfortunate situation. But 
persistent, obstinate refusal to affiliate with anything a speaker says can have a 
cumulative effect. Since an affiliative response does not entail agreement with the 
speaker’s evaluative stance, but only acknowledgement of their stance, persistent 
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refusal to affiliate might imply that the speaker’s perspective is somehow 
incomprehensible, incoherent, or utterly unrelatable. 
Table 6 
INTRA-TURN: Interactional Linguistics 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent provides 
appropriate generic & specific 
back channel responses, 
uptaking speaker’s meanings 
without interrupting or 
usurping the turn. 
A respondent’s back channel 
responses are withheld, 
inappropriate, intrusive, or 
disaffiliative; it becomes 
laborious for speaker to 
complete their turn. 
 
 
2.3 Inferring Normativity 
As always, the wider discursive context must be considered if we are to get 
an accurate reading of the moral stakes revealed by breaches that are ‘crossing the 
line’. When looking at extended narrative turns, the particulars of the scenario we 
imagine will have much to do with how ready we are to suppose that any back 
channel infra-doings are normatively owed to speakers. It is in our closest 
personal relationships that we may be inclined to recognise the greatest—and 
paradoxically, also the least—obligation to be an involved listener who 
collaborates and affiliates via the back channel. We are also likely to imagine the 
obligations of the listener to be greater when we imagine ourselves as the tellers, 
whilst being jealous of our entitlement as listeners to choose when we collaborate 
with a speaker what they are saying. This variation is to be expected, and within 
the Discourse Ecology Model, it does not pose a problem. Of course the context 
matters for determining the scope and scale of the normative stakes. 
As before, we want to consider a range of scenarios in order to get at the 
underlying moral dynamic, and in this case, that means we need to look at 
scenarios which vary from the experimental cases of Bavelas and her team in two 
ways. They had participants tell close call stories from their own lives, to 
interlocutors to whom they had not particular personal relationship. This means 
that there was a minimal role played by contextual factors like the social 
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relationship between teller and listener, the power differences between them, and 
the epistemological reflex to question the veracity of things. In the experimental 
conditions, tellers could largely be trusted to know their own life stories, and the 
listener had no grounds to dispute the veracity; no power dynamic to leverage for 
or against the speaker, and no obligations of friendship, just the obligations 
incurred from the experimenter’s instructions. To see these things in play, we look 
first at a fictional scenario where personal attachments do apply, and then at a 
scenario where political disparities and epistemic contentiousness come in. 
First, the personal attachments scenario: Kirk tells his good friend Luke 
about a time he nearly died. Kirk was driving across the Rocky Mountains on I-
70249 one snowy winter, and a sudden pile up caused by a drunk driver in front of 
him left him with no room divert or slow down. Kirk’s car was smashed into half 
its original length as it was hit from in front and behind. When everything stopped 
crashing and sliding around, Kirk’s bumper was hanging off the edge of the road, 
where it curved around a drop-off into a deep valley. One car had already fallen off 
the edge, killing whoever was inside, but Kirk was lucky. Now, given that Kirk is 
telling Luke the story, it is evident that Kirk survived. Naturally, Kirk’s fear in the 
moment will have had a different feel and intensity to what Luke feels on hearing 
the story of his friend’s life having been in danger. 
Consider then the difference between two contextual variations on this 
scenario: 
V1: It is later the same day. Kirk has called Luke to come pick him up and take 
him home. Luke has just arrived, and Kirk is still rattled and shaking. 
 
V2: It is ten years later. Luke did not know Kirk at the time of the accident, 
and they are comparing tales of disastrous events they’ve faced throughout 
their lives. 
 
249 I-70 is the name of a winding motorway stretching Westwards from Denver, Colorado. Although it is 
often dangerous to drive this route in wintry conditions, it is also notoriously busy in winter, as it is the 
main route of travel to and from the busy ski resorts. 
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Let us assume that, in both versions, Luke knows Kirk well. So in V2, Luke would 
know a Kirk who has already fought through the trauma and the strangeness of 
survivor’s guilt. He doesn’t have nightmares anymore about the screams of people 
falling off cliffs, and he’s reasonably comfortable driving mountain roads in wintry 
conditions again. Kirk is fine now, and it is important that he is fine. 
Think how cold Luke would seem in V1, if he shows up to collect a shaking, 
frightened Kirk and his reaction to hearing Kirk’s recounting is an emotionless 
shrug. ‘Whatever dude, you obviously survived to tell the tale so why should I 
pretend to be afraid for you?’ What we might expect of Luke as a listener is that he 
give appropriate back channel feedback to Kirk’s telling, and this includes not just 
the danger Kirk is reporting but what Kirk is conveying about his affective stance 
in relation to the danger. Luke’s task is not just to digest the content of the 
narrative, but to assess its significance to Kirk in the moment and respond to the 
rattled state of his friend.250 Even a first responder, a paramedic, or a stranger 
standing by would seem cold to give the above response. 
By contrast, in V2, Kirk is telling the story in a calm, stoic fashion. He is 
okay now, after all he went through. But as he tells the story, Luke starts falling 
apart. He appears rattled and shaken, his fate white with terror as he imagines his 
friend’s close call with death. It is appropriate for Luke to signal from the back 
channel that he grasps how frightening and dangerous the incident must have 
been, but there is a kind of dissonance between the raw fear Luke seems to signal 
and the calm with which Kirk tells the story. We might imagine Kirk reacting to 
Luke’s reaction: ‘I’ve fought so hard to recover from the trauma of this, and seeing 
you fall apart when obviously I’m standing here alive and settled is a reopening of 
the wound that I just don’t need. Pull yourself together, man!’251 
 
250 This example gestures towards the difference between listening to an utterance and listening to a person. 
251 An exception: if Kirk tells his story and Luke bursts into tears because, unbeknownst to Kirk, Luke's father 
recently died in a similar accident, then surely Luke has in no way shirked his responsibilities as listener. It 
may, however, take a few extra conversational turns for the two to sort out what has led to the mismatch in 
reactions, before the dissonance is resolved. My thanks to David Faraci for raising this point. 
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Luke’s reaction in the second case indicates that he has clearly understood 
the narrative, grasped what Kirk is saying, and in some way is showing a 
responsiveness that seems affiliative. There is no problem of comprehension, and 
yet the reaction is not what would have been appropriate. Luke’s reaction fails to 
appropriately match what the speaker is conveying in terms of what the content 
means to the speaker. This might seem an odd place to focus, but I think it points 
us to the essential pivot on which good listening turns. Luke’s reactions are ill-
fitting because they are responding to what he is feeling about the narrative, rather 
than to Kirk’s telling of the narrative itself. Luke is ticking the boxes of a competent 
listener’s infra-doings, but it takes a good listener to be able to keep separate the 
story as told by, experienced by, and assessed by the speaker, and the story as it 
affects the listener. A good listener performs their collaborative, back channel role 
of supporting the speaker in communicating their narrative turn, including what 
the content of the narrative means to the speaker, without getting distracted by 
what the turn means for them—the listener—as an individual. This is arguably 
part of the special skill set developed by therapists, who routinely need to be able 
to supportively listen to narratives of things outside their own experience, 
including narratives of painful, traumatic events, and give adequate back channel 
responses without their own affective reactions intruding.252 
A particularly poor listener, by contrast, would produce a magnified 
version of Luke’s ill-fitting responses. A poor listener would be someone who, in 
giving back channel responses, fails to accomplish things like affect mimicry, and 
can only give affective responses based on their own perspectival standpoint. For 
example, suppose Kirk tells Luke that everyone at his workplace will be 
participating in a 10k run for charity campaigning against drunk driving. Kirk 
loves running. Luke hates running. On hearing this news, Luke groans loudly and 
expresses sympathy and condolences to Kirk. This is absurd: he should be happy 
for Kirk, because Kirk gets to do something that Kirk loves to do. Luke’s dislike of 
 
252 In The Virtuous Psychiatrist, Radden and Sadler view the special skill set as including a virtue they call 
‘unselfing’, which ‘refers to the personally effaced yet acutely attentive and affectively attuned toward the 
patient, the relationship, and its boundaries’ Radden and Sadler, The Virtuous Psychiatrist, 132. 
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running has nothing to do with the conversation. This example is silly, but I think 
it helps to pinpoint through its absurdity the pivotal difference between good 
listening and poor listening: namely, an ability to keep sorted one’s own 
perspectives, values, and desires from those of the speaker. How self-absorbed 
must Luke be to give this particular reaction to Kirk’s news?  
The matter does not seem silly, however, if we shift to a context where the 
interlocutors are not on an equal footing with each other. Once again we can 
analyse Jimmy’s game of whack-a-mole through the lens of intra-turn infra-
doings. Suppose Jimmy knows that a decent listener should at least ‘shut up’, in 
Medina’s terms, long enough to let Gina get a few points out and sketch the 
relevant connections between them. While Gina speaks, Jimmy tries not to play 
whack-a-mole in his head. He tries not to walk the line too ambiguously between 
a genuine-sounding and sarcastic-sounding ‘uh-huh… sure…’. Now, instead of 
paying attention to Gina’s eyebrow and the set of her jaw, he is paying very close 
attention to the intonation of his generic back channel responses and the tension 
at the sides of his mouth. Is he implying an affiliative or disaffiliative stance? He 
is still reluctant to agree with Gina’s evaluation of how things stand in the district, 
but how much does his new commitment to being a good listener require him to 
go along with what Gina says? 
Were we to counsel Jimmy through this stage of learning to listen, we 
might remind him of two things. First, we would remind him that an affiliative 
response need not signal that the listener agrees with and feels the same way as 
the speaker. No, an affiliative response shows first and foremost that the listener 
has understood what the speaker’s evaluative stance is, and shows that the listener 
has a handle on what it is about the content of the turn that is important to the 
speaker. Just as Luke should be able keep track of the difference between his 
feelings about running or about the accident and Kirk’s feelings, Jimmy should be 
able to tell the difference between his feelings about Gina’s message (a feeling of 
reactive hostility) and the stance Gina portrays about her own stance. If he does 
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not keep these separate, then he is likely to interpret everything Gina says as 
hostile and aimed at undermining him. 
But if he can track that these are his feelings based on his evaluative stance, 
and can hold those to one side while Gina speaks, then he opens up space to notice 
that Gina is actually quite friendly towards him, and she wants him to succeed. 
She just also wants blue students to be well supported in their district. A good way 
to test this is to see what happens when Jimmy tries offering those specific back 
channel responses. If he supplies a clause via the back channel, collaborating with 
Gina in her turn, and that clause is closely aligned with what she is saying, her eyes 
will light up, and she will take his words and incorporate them. If the clause he 
supplies is dissonant with what she is saying, then every time he tries to help 
complete a sentence she will stop and say ‘no, it’s not that.’ Her flow will be 
disrupted and she will grow increasingly frustrated, as his out-of-sync responses 
indicate that he is not grasping what she is saying is important about their 
discussion. 
Since the two have a long history of misunderstanding, the first time that 
he puts his defensiveness aside long enough to hear what she’s saying will likely 
produce quite a reaction from Gina, a sense that finally, they are getting through 
to each other! But again, the power differential between Jimmy and Gina means 
that Jimmy has extra responsibility here. The clauses he supplies via the back 
channel as specific responses can do more than just annoy Gina by putting words 
in her mouth; they can overwrite what she is saying, blocking her from completing 
certain utterances in the way she aims to, or from making the point that she is 
trying to develop over her extended turn—and this has real implications, once 
again, not just for Gina but for the wider community of blue families. The stakes 
are high, so if Jimmy can focus on the infra-doing of supplying back channel 
responses which most accurately participate in the unfolding of Gina’s turn and in 





INTRA-TURN: Interactional Linguistics 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent provides 
appropriate generic & specific 
back channel responses, 
uptaking speaker’s meanings 
without interrupting or 
usurping the turn. 
A respondent’s back channel 
responses are withheld, 
inappropriate, intrusive, or 
disaffiliative; it becomes 
laborious for speaker to 
complete their turn. 
A respondent provides 
supportive & specific back 
channel responses, interpreting 
content as speaker tells it, 
minimising the burden of effort 
for speaker to complete turn. 
 
3. Meta-Turn Structure (Pragmatics 2.0) 
Within Conversation Analysis studies, we find discussions of what they call 
epistemics. While epistemologists tend to be concerned with exploring when and 
how we come to know things, and how to test the actual validity of knowledge 
claims, the focus of epistemics is on the way that people in conversation negotiate 
their claims to knowledge, with respect to each other.253 This is a sociological 
viewpoint: the lens is focussed on what people tend to do, and the patterned 
behaviours they use to do it, rather than on what ideal knowers ought to do.  
In her Presidential Address to the APA Central Division in 2019, Jennifer 
Nagel picks up the literature on epistemics to look at how we negotiate with each 
other (we the people, not we the philosophers) around knowledge claims in 
conversation. She notes, ‘Philosophers may be more accustomed to working with 
ideas from Grice (1975) or Stalnaker (2002) in this general area; however, there is 
value in picking up a somewhat different, if often overlapping, set of theoretical 
tools, and in exploring data that may be novel to at least some of us.’254 Nagel traces 
the significance of epistemics as arising from the cooperativity which underpins 
 
253 See, for example, Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig, The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation. 
254 Jennifer Nagel, ‘Epistemic Territory’ (Presidential Address, APA Central Division, Denver, CO, 22 
February 2019), 2. 
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communication itself—an idea familiar in philosophy as well as language 
studies.255 
Nagel notes that, as a species of cooperative beings, our conversation 
serves to pool and refine knowledge, relying on a ‘social division of epistemic 
labour’ which, in order to work, requires us to be able to track, evaluate, and keep 
up to date on who has domain over any given epistemic territory.256 This idea 
works beautifully in an ecological framework: we have a shared world, shared 
linguistic resources for communicating about it, and shared accumulation of 
knowledge about our world. We do not all have equal claims to expertise on all 
things. I am more at home in the epistemic territories of philosophy, music, food, 
and Colorado geography than I am in the epistemic territories of actuarial maths, 
sculpture, baseball statistics, or oceanic weather patterns. None of the above are 
things which are my territory, per se, in the way that medical expertise is the 
territory of the NHS and the CDC, but they are territories where I am familiar and 
at home. Part of the context important for understanding the social, moral, and 
political dynamics between speakers in a conversation is the extent to which the 
conversation covers epistemic territories where one or the other has dominance. 
 In epistemics, the conversation analyst looks at some of the tokens we use 
to negotiate epistemic territories. For example, ‘Oh!’ marks a change of state from 
not knowing to knowing, in the following case. I tell my niece that a pub we are 
going to has very good, very fluffy chips. She is incredulous. Fluffy chips? Since 
when can chips be fluffy? I note that she is thinking of what Americans call chips 
(UK: crisps), whereas I’m referring to that triple-fried wonder of an upgrade on 
 
255 Margaret Gilbert and Maura Priest, ‘Conversation and Collective Belief’, in Perspectives on Pragmatics and 
Philosophy, ed. Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo, and Marco Carapezza, vol. 1, Perspectives in 
Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2013), 1–34, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3_1; Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication; Fricker, Epistemic 
Injustice; McKinney, ‘Communication, Labor, and Communicative Labor’. 
256 Nagel, ‘Epistemic Territory’, 10. The notion of epistemic territories is derived from Akio Kamio’s work on 
‘territories of information’; see Akio Kamio, Territory of Information, Pragmatics & Beyond, N.S., 48 
(Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1997). 
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the humble fry. ‘Oh, I see! I did not realise that chips are actually something else in 
the UK.’ She uses the ‘Oh!’ token to mark her transition from being confused to 
knowing what I’m talking about. In so doing, she acknowledges my claim as 
having given her knowledge about a regional, potato-based food. 
A similar function is played by ‘Actually!’. This token is used when someone 
imparts knowledge in a territory in which they take themselves to have primacy, 
but the listener takes themselves to have a superior claim to knowledge. For 
example, I mention to my niece at the pub that classic chips are not vegetarian, as 
they are fried in duck fat. ‘Actually,’ replies the waiter, ‘they are classically fried in 
beef dripping.’ The ‘Actually!’ token is a signal that recognises what I am saying 
and what I mean, but, as one with better knowledge of the subject matter, he has 
information with which to gainsay me. 
Similarly, ‘Of course!’ can function to contest the askability of 
something.257 If someone asks me, ‘Did you cite Miranda Fricker in your paper on 
listening to people?’ I might reply, ‘Of course! I always cite her in everything I do; 
after all, she said back in 2007 that to rectify epistemic injustice it might help if we 
are virtuous hearers.’258 The reply implies that the asker should have known the 
information, that the information was not really up for questioning. More 
precisely, my reply indicates that the asker should have known this about me, that 
I am aware of this important piece of work and that I have responsible citation 
practices. The claim that the question was not really up for questioning might in 
some cases imply that this is not an epistemic territory where I am out of my 
depth, but in this case, it implies that the asker herself should know the epistemic 
territory (namely, me and my citation practices) better than her question 
indicates. 
 
257 Tanya Stivers, ‘Morality and Question Design: “Of Course” as Contesting a Presupposition of Askability’, 
in The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation, ed. Tanya Stivers, Lorenza Mondada, and Jakob Steensig 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 82–106, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921674.003. 
258 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 169. 
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In order to effectively navigate our world, we collaborate and share 
knowledge, which requires us to keep track of which things are commonly known, 
which are up for question, which are only known to some parties, and so on. The 
knowledge which must be kept track of is not just the facts-first or function-first 
knowledge of epistemology and instrumental know-how, but also the 
interpersonal knowledge of mutual acquaintance, character, and the shared 
histories which are an important feature of building trust. Even at our most 
competitive, even when Supreme Court Justices debate the most contentious 
questions of the decade, our conversational practices presuppose this 
collaborative backdrop, for if we were not trying to pool information and 
understanding about our shared world, we would not share our views in the first 
place, nor contest them against each other. 
3.1 Infra-Doings 
To understand the infra-doings of the listener at the meta-turn level, we 
begin looking at what interlocutors do with knowledge claims and negotiations of 
epistemic territory. The purpose of starting here is to pick up the notion of a 
common ground. In using this term, I am appropriating a term which has various 
meanings both in its colloquial usage and as a term of art. This is important to flag 
up at the outset, because various technical literatures use terminology of ‘common 
ground’, ‘common knowledge’, and similar, and they use these terms in differing 
and sometimes conflicting ways. For example, sociolinguist Herb Clark uses the 
term to cover a range of meanings, from those that pick out ethnographic claims 
about what is shared, culturally encoded knowledge, to things that are counted as 
common ground in a specific conversation because we have already said those 
things and are agreeing to take them as given.259 
In formal pragmatics, the term ‘common ground’ refers to what we all 
know. This includes things that we all know that we all know. Also included are 
things that we know we are taking to be under consideration because it is a thing 
some other person thinks. Even if some discourse participants take themselves to 
 
259 Herbert H. Clark, Using Language (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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know something is not true, they still represent it in the common ground as a 
belief they have to navigate around (in this conversation, with these people, at 
least). Exactly how the pragmatician frames the status of contested claims with 
respect to their model of the common ground depends on their particular theory 
and model of the conversational scoreboard, which we need not explore in detail 
here.260 Both these uses differ from the logician’s idea of what is common 
knowledge and from a broad idea of what is common sense, or what is familiar 
enough knowledge that it need not be cited, such as this claim. Instead, using what 
we have learned from EMCA and IL so far and the resources of the Discourse 
Ecology Model, I will build out my own technical notion of Common Ground in 
conversation. Wherever I refer to my own notion of the Common Ground, it is 
capitalised. 
To begin, however, we look at how the idea of a Common Ground figures 
in a classic case from formal pragmatics, in which Stalnaker illustrates the state of 
‘common knowledge’ in the case of a fictional murder mystery story, which he calls 
the whodunit case. I quote at length: 
There are just three possible suspects for the murder—the butler, the 
gardener, and the chauffeur—and it is common knowledge that whoever did 
it acted alone. Alice was with the gardener at the time of the murder 
(although she is reluctant to reveal this fact), so she is absolutely certain that 
he is innocent. Bert has conclusive evidence that rules out the chauffeur, 
which he has shared with Alice, so it is common knowledge between Alice 
and Bert that either the butler or the gardener did it. Alice concludes that 
since it wasn’t the gardener, it must have been the butler. But Bert has what 
is in fact misleading evidence that he takes to exonerate the butler, so he 
infers that it must have been the gardener. Alice and Bert each tell the other 
who he or she believes was the guilty party, but neither is convinced by the 
other. Alice, in particular, is far more certain of the innocence of the 
gardener than she is of the guilt of the butler. Were she to learn, to her 
surprise, that the butler was innocent, she would conclude that the 
 
260 But for examples, see Lewis, ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game’; Stalnaker, Context and Content; 
Stalnaker, Context; Roberts, ‘Information Structure in Discourse’; Habgood-Coote, ‘Group Inquiry’. 
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chauffeur’s alibi must not be as good as it looks, and that he must be the 
guilty party. But that won’t happen, since in fact, the butler did it. 
Bert says, “We disagree about who did it, but we agree—it is common 
knowledge between us—that either the butler or the gardener did it, and 
each possibility is compatible with our common knowledge. So even though 
you are convinced that the butler is the guilty party, you should agree that if 
the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did. … 
Alice agrees that it is common knowledge that either the butler or the 
gardener did it, and that each of these two possibilities is compatible with 
their common knowledge. But she will be reluctant to accept the conditional, 
which conflicts with her conditional belief—perhaps with her conditional 
knowledge—that even if the butler didn’t do it, the guilty party is still not the 
gardener.261 
The example is designed for reflection on the epistemic status of modal claims, 
such as how Alice evaluates the claim that it could have been someone she knows did 
not do it. What we want out of this example, however, is to look at what 
conversational behaviours arise in how Alice and Bert negotiate their 
disagreement, and how they navigate their respective epistemic territories, which 
differ (at least in Alice’s case) from what is included in the conversational Common 
Ground. 
We see that each of them has some bits of information which they take to 
be knowledge. For the most part, when Bert tells Alice he has an alibi from the 
butler or chauffeur, she takes his claim to be knowledge—which is now common 
to both of them—and it is added to the Common Ground. There is also some 
knowledge that Alice has regarding the gardener, but because she does not share 
it, it does not become part of the Common Ground. Thus, she accurately takes Bert 
to not know what she knows about the gardener, and she cannot blame Bert for not 
knowing what she knows. It is important for her interests that she preserves this 
disconnection between what she knows and what gets added to the Common 
Ground. Now suppose Bert secretly knew about Alice and the gardener. Bert 
knows about Alice’s knowledge, but neither of their knowledges gets added to the 
 
261 Stalnaker, Context, 163–64. 
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conversational Common Ground, until something in the course of the 
conversation suggests, implies, or otherwise gives away the fact that something is 
being held back, and the secret information gets acknowledged into the Common 
Ground.  
To acknowledge something, colloquially, does not necessarily mean to 
agree with it. If Bert dislikes the gardener, Alice may acknowledge Bert’s dislike, 
without sharing it. Likewise, she can acknowledge Bert’s state of ‘knowledge’ 
about the whodunit case, without having the same view about the epistemic status 
of all the elements of Bert’s understanding. We are going to be looking here at what 
is done in conversation with acknowledged divergences, so we will leave Stalnaker 
and friends to puzzle over the metaphysical truth status of claims. 
We want to take a stance closer to that of epistemics, where we look at how 
two interlocutors handle partially overlapping epistemic territories, but 
conflicting claims therein. These epistemically divergent, contradictory positions 
are taken up in conversation when the participants hold and are expressing 
discrepant views of the world, which sociologist Melvin Pollner calls ‘reality 
disjunctures’.262 That is to say, on Pollner’s view, the way we manage knowledge 
discrepancies involves juggling two or more different pictures of how reality is. 
Where the epistemologist’s main order of business is to figure out how to 
adjudicate and settle between differing accounts of reality, the sociologist’s aim is 
to look at how differing accounts of reality diverge, and why, and what people tend 
to do about it. He is, in short, looking at the infra-doings of how we handle 
knowledge discrepancies. If such a discrepancy occurs within an epistemic 
territory in which both interlocutors have parity, then the discrepancy may stand 
while the matter is under consideration. If a discrepancy occurs within an 
epistemic territory in which one interlocutor is considered to have significant 
 
262 Melvin Pollner, ‘“The Very Coinage of Your Brain”: The Anatomy of Reality Disjunctures’, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 5, no. 3 (1 September 1975): 411–30, https://doi.org/10.1177/004839317500500304; Melvin 
Pollner, Mundane Reason: Reality in Everyday and Sociological Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




primacy, the other person may be expected to relinquish their view rather than 
insist that it remain in the Common Ground as if it were a live possibility. 
 What I propose to do here is to work with an expansive picture of a 
conversational Common Ground, which should include not just what we know and 
take each other to know, and our beliefs about reality and modality, but also a 
whole host of normative and affective considerations. Recalling the Scoreboard 
frame, on which we jointly deliberate over model possibilities, we can expect a 
Common Ground on most accounts to include: 
i. What Alice believes and knows 
What Bert believes and knows 
ii. What Alice knows/believes Bert to know/believe 
What Bert knows/believes Alice to know/believe 
iii. What Alice takes to be possibly the case, to be impossible, etc… 
What Bert takes to be possible, impossible, etc… 
iv. What Alice takes Bert to think possible, etc… 
What Bert takes Alice to think possible, etc… 
v. Alice’s desires, projects, values, and preferences 
vi. Bert’s desires, projects, values, and preferences 
vii. Alice’s knowledge of Bert’s desires, projects, values, preferences 
viii. Bert’s knowledge of Alice’s desires, projects, values, preferences263 
To correctly navigate the Common Ground, Alice needs to be able to keep straight 
the difference between (i) what she knows about the gardener, and (ii) what Bert 
takes her to know about the gardener—which is to say, that he doesn’t take her to 
know anything different to what he knows, since her knowledge has not been 
shared. 
 
263 We can think of i-iv as dealing with epistemic and modal concerns, and things likely to be the object of the 
German verb wissen, whilst v-viii are dealing with value and affect concerns, and things likely to be the object 
of the verb kennen.  
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 However, as soon as we leave the particularly epistemic subject matter of 
the whodunit case, we realise that to correctly navigate the Common Ground, 
Alice also needs to be able to avoid making errors like the error Luke made when 
Kirk announced his workplace 10k. Luke’s error was to overlook (vi) his 
interlocutor’s desires, projects, values, and preferences, and so he gives an 
affectively inappropriate response to Kirk’s announcement. Kirk would be 
justified in being offended at this if he has rightly apprised that (vii) Luke has 
knowledge of Kirk’s desires. Now, a traditional Common Ground model would 
include that participants know about each other’s likes and dislikes, and this can 
be processed with value-claims (i.e., ‘Running is fun!’) that are disguised as 
epistemological claims about the value judgements of the interlocutors. The infra-
doing in question is that Luke cross-checks the value of the statement about 
anticipated 10k participation with what is already in the Common Ground, which 
includes rich detail based on the shared history of friendship between Luke and 
Kirk, and all they have reason to know about each other.  
Suppose that Kirk has run many races, in which Luke has cheered him on. 
Kirk would rightly find it strange that Luke responds to the announcement on the 
basis of his own desires rather than Kirk’s. But perhaps it is the case that they are 
newer friends, and although Kirk tends to mention his running habit frequently, 
it just so happens not to have come up yet with conversation with Luke. Kirk might 
be offended at Luke’s refusal to use his background knowledge to come up with a 
right reaction to the announcement of Kirk’s 10k plans. When he calls Luke up on 
it, Luke says, ‘What, really? You are a runner? I did not know that. I really hate 
running so that’s my default reaction, but now that I know you love running, I’m 
excited for your sake!’ 
The sensible thing at this point is for Kirk to no longer be offended, but 
merely bemused that he’d somehow never mentioned this before—it had not made 
it into the Common Ground represented by the whole conversational record 
between them, so it gets added in now. Both Luke and Kirk update their appraisal 
of the Common Ground with regard to their own and each other’s desires. In 
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future, when race related news arises, Kirk can express his position knowing that 
Luke will be able to process the comments with respect to the knowledge he has of 
Kirk’s desires. Of course, if Luke were to pull a Garfinkel-style breaching 
experiment on Kirk in such a case, Kirk would be well justified in being outraged 
at Luke. They have already explicitly covered this topic; Luke knows Kirk likes 
running, so his refusal to make use of this background knowledge in responding 
to Kirk in conversation would be interpreted as some kind of hostility. 
Table 8 
META-CONVERSATIONAL: Common Ground Pragmatics 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent participates in 
negotiating territories of 
primacy, resolving modal 
differences, and tracking 
content of the Common Ground 




 What should we say then about breaching behaviour with respect to the 
conversational Common Ground? Naturally, different constraints apply to the 
Common Ground when we are looking at things like truth, knowledge, and 
possibility in their strictest senses, than when we are looking at things like an 
individual person’s desires, projects, values, and preferences. There is no 
contradiction entailed by including both ‘Running, yay!’ and ‘Running, boo!’ in the 
Common Ground, provided these are each indexed to Kirk and to Luke 
respectively. 
But if there is a contradiction in what Bert believes to be possible (i.e., that 
it was the Gardener) and what Alice knows to be impossible, then there is a 
disjuncture in the Common Ground of the sort which we feel drives us to resolve 
the contradiction (especially we the philosophers). Note that even for the sleuth on 
the whodunit case, the Common Ground can sustain the contradiction; if people 
know each other to hold differing beliefs, then the Common Ground includes 
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those beliefs, each indexed to whoever holds it. But for as long as this disjuncture 
remains in the Common Ground, there will be a felt pressure to resolve the 
contradiction and get at the fact of the matter—a pressure that does not arise from 
the contradiction between Kirk and Luke’s views on running.264 The idea of a 
reality disjuncture is that when we have two competing pictures of the way reality 
is, and those pictures cannot both be true, than we have a disjunct, an ‘or’ between 
propositions, which must be settled before we can be sure of reality. 
Such disjunctures bother us to a greater or lesser extent depending how 
existentially significant we find the subject matter. If the disjuncture is about how 
enjoyable running is (a personal preference), this is not existentially threatening. 
If this disjuncture is about whether Alice’s secret lover should go to prison on 
unwarranted charges of murder, the disjuncture is rather more pressing 
(involving epistemic facts of the matter). If the disjuncture is about whether a 
department is characterised as being a safe or a dangerous place to be a racial 
minority, the disjuncture picks out issues which are morally important to the pride 
of those affiliated with the department (rather significant), but it also picks out 
issues which are significant to the safety and wellbeing of members of staff who 
experience racial harassment or marginalisation in their work environment (both 
morally and existentially significant). 
If we work with a Scoreboard frame to model the Common Ground, then 
we want open questions to be settled for the record, when possible. We should all 
want the murder solved, though we will not all attach as much significance to this 
as Alice and the gardener do. We may want to shift things in favour of our 
preferences, say, by attempting to share our love of certain hobbies with our 
sceptical friends. Unfortunately, the pressure to resolve the dispute about racism 
in the workplace would incline many to want the open question about their own 
moral standing to be resolved as quickly as possible. The department members do 
 
264 Pollner, Mundane Reason, 77. 
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not want to look up at the scoreboard and see a question about whether they are 
guilty of complicity in racial harassment, marked as an open possibility. 
They might contest the askability in the first place, ‘Of course I am not 
racist!’ They might work out who specifically has been accused and say, ‘Oh, that 
person is accused of complicity in racial harassment, not me. That seems like an 
open possibility after all then.’ But if they were to be told, ‘Actually, you were named 
as one of the problematic people,’ then there is a worry of losing both moral good 
standing and of losing any pretensions they had to claiming epistemic primacy in 
the territory of who is upstanding in the department. The urge is to swiftly resolve 
the question by eliminating from the Common Ground the possibility that one is 
part of the problem. In the rush to show oneself not complicit in racial harassment, 
one risks being overly hasty in dismissing the claims of those who are already in 
the vulnerable position of being subject to such threats. 
What is distinctive about the characterisation I am giving of the Common 
Ground, as a matter of epistemics, is that it has (once again) been designed to 
integrate the whole ecological context, involving who the interlocutors are, their 
socio-political context, the literal time-and-place context of the exchange (i.e., is 
it in public or in private), and more. We also are including, again, the normative 
context. The worried colleague who contests askability by using the of course token 
is contesting whether someone is entitled to investigate the option that the person 
may be guilty of complicity in racial harassment—because, of course, if so, then 
the person has an obligation to respond in some way to the charges. The colleague 
who wants to avoid such normative entanglement has a reason to want to 
eliminate certain possibilities from the scoreboard. 
Breaches occur when the Common Ground is not modified in a way that is 
warranted by the turns taken in the conversation. When the complaint is made 
about racial harassment, the complaint should, in theory, go straight into the 
conversational Common Ground, as we have figured it here. It should go in as a 
complaint, as something which is more within the epistemic territory of some 
(those in a position to know) than of others, and if necessary, it can go in with all 
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sorts of indexing, to the agents who hold certain beliefs, to the agents have certain 
interests (i.e., safety, or being thought well of). If an interlocutor in a conversation 
refuses to acknowledge what a speaker is putting into the Common Ground or 
restricts the option on the form the Common Ground addition can take, we may 
have an instancing of refusal to listen, as described in Chapter 2. 
Table 9 
META-CONVERSATIONAL: Common Ground Pragmatics 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent participates in 
negotiating territories of 
primacy, resolving modal 
differences, and tracking 
content of the Common Ground 
across conversational instances. 
A respondent burdens a speaker 
by excessively contesting their 
perspectives, eliding 
disjunctures, and resisting 
adding the speaker’s (indexed) 
claims to the Common Ground. 
 
 
3.3 Inferring Normativity 
In Sections 1 and 2, we looked at the normativity of supporting or 
obstructing someone in accomplishing their communicative aims, on the basis of 
whether or not one does one’s share of the conversational labour. Additionally, in 
Section 2, we brought in the matter of affiliative responses, and whether a listener 
is willing to acknowledge the speaker’s perspective, and what they find important 
about what they are saying, even when these differ substantially from the listener’s 
perspectives and feelings on the matter. This also is a kind of labour, a preserving 
of a disjuncture rather than giving into the urge to ‘resolve’ the disjuncture by 
overwriting the speaker’s perspective with one’s own. Here, a third element of 
normativity comes into play. In addition to the matters of conversational labour 
and affiliative responsiveness, we now have the element of access: when the 
listener refuses to acknowledge the claims that the speaker is adding to the 
common ground, there is a line crossed. Refusing to be persuaded can be 




Return to the idea of a reality disjuncture. Luke has a certain picture of how 
reality is, and that picture includes data about claims which others believe, that 
Luke does not, and so on. When Luke speaks with Kirk, they have a shared 
Common Ground, which incorporates their context within their discourse 
ecology, as well as whatever they have made available to each other from their 
respective points of view. It includes data about what Kirk thinks, believes, likes, 
wants, and is trying to accomplish, as far as Luke knows. Now, if Kirk makes a 
claim which Luke finds difficult to stomach, then Luke may resist letting that 
claim be added to the Common Ground. If Kirk says, ‘We need to take 
responsibility for making this department a safer place for people of diverse 
backgrounds,’ and Luke worries that this claim indicts Luke’s past involvement in 
the department, he may attempt to ignore, gloss over, or brush past Kirk’s 
comment. This is not acknowledging Kirk’s addition into the Common Ground, 
and the normative entanglements it brings to bear. 
If Kirk presses the point, Luke may be inclined to respond in such a way 
that acknowledges Kirk’s claim into the Common Ground, but only in a way which 
mutates it, for his own protection. ‘Kirk thinks we need to pander to the masses 
with some sort of virtue signalling around racial inclusion, even though we 
obviously do not.’ Here, Luke is acknowledging what Kirk said and, in a sense, 
adding it into the Common Ground, but in a way that is concerning for two 
reasons. First, Luke is stripping the claim of all its normative entanglements 
before acknowledging it. Second, Luke is not allowing Kirk to access the 
metaphorical Scoreboard himself; rather, Luke is trying to broker Kirk’s access to 
the Scoreboard. Luke will acknowledge his own version of things Kirk may have at 
one point said, but he will not acknowledge Kirk’s claims as such. 
If we, as interlocutors, have some sort of obligation to do our fair share of 
the conversational labour, then it is unsurprising that we also have certain 
entitlements to make our own contributions. When the familiar complaint is made 
that a woman made an excellent point in a business meeting, which was ignored 
until a male colleague made the same point, the complaint is that this entitlement 
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has been disregarded. The woman’s right to access and modify the Common 
Ground herself, in her own voice, was blocked, and her claims filtered and added 
in by others instead. 
We already know that Jimmy Green had a habit previously of not doing his 
share of the conversational labour, making it difficult for Gina Blue to say her 
piece, and that he was reluctant to give affiliative responses to what she says and 
what is important to her about the points she relays. We would not be surprised, 
then, to hear Gina admit that she frequently goes into meetings with Jimmy 
needing to suggest things in such a way that makes him think they were his ideas. 
If Jimmy, being unwilling to hear the critical aspects of what Gina has to say, has 
always successfully avoided the normative entanglement that would result from 
her claims being added to the Common Ground, then it seems Jimmy has quite a 
chokehold on Common Ground access. 
To begin a better habit of listening to Gina, one step would be for Jimmy to 
let her make her contributions to the Common Ground directly, and to 
acknowledge whatever she puts in, even, and especially, when she puts in claims 
that introduce reality disjunctures. As analytic philosophers, this notion may 
sound unreasonably risky, but we should consider what Iris Marion Young says 
about the democratic, deliberative virtue of reasonableness: 
Reasonable people often have crazy ideas; what makes them reasonable is 
their willingness to listen to others who want to explain to them why their 
ideas are incorrect or inappropriate…Since reasonable people often disagree 
about what proposals, actions, groundings, and narratives are rational or 
irrational, judging too quickly is itself often a symptom of 
unreasonableness.265 
We can sympathise with Jimmy’s instinctive wish to block Gina’s claims from 
being added to the common ground, because if her views are as contradictory or 
threatening to his as he anticipates, then presumably blocking out those claims 
 
265 Iris Marion Young, ‘The Deliberative Model’, in Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader, ed. Colin Patrick 
Farrelly (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE, 2004), 229. 
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would be the reasonable thing to do. But as Young highlights, this would in fact be 
a symptom of unreasonableness. The reasonable thing to do would be to engage 
with Gina wherever there may be likely disagreements, because disagreements 
present an opportunity for refining his own ideas. 
The same dynamic is at play even when the stakes are not judgements of 
rightness or rationality, but rather are feelings of security versus threat. Recall the 
scenario in which Kirk recounts a near-death accident from ten years ago, and 
Luke falls apart, as if there is some imminent threat. Part of what went wrong in 
that moment is that Luke was failing to keep a separate evaluative standpoint from 
his own; he was not distinguishing between how he felt about Kirk’s story, and 
what was important to Kirk about Kirk’s story. Recall also the department member 
using epistemic tokens (Oh! Actually!) to settle for the record any questions about 
her standing with respect to complicity in racial harassment. 
The trouble with reality disjunctures is that they itch, so to speak, and the 
higher the evaluative stakes about the matter about which we disagree, the worse 
the itch to settle the question. One of the hard parts of listening is that, as noted 
above, listening involves a willingness to affiliate with and facilitate the 
conversational aims of the speaker, whilst also keeping a sustained openness to 
their perspectival standpoint, including whatever risks and normative 
entanglements that may bring. It takes energy and effort to keep disjunctures in 
the Common Ground, like holding a hot potato in one’s hands. It takes courage 
and humility to risk letting someone register a complaint or rebuke you, disagree 
with you or call you to account.266 The greater the reality disjuncture Gina 
introduces, the more Jimmy has to pour his energy and effort into gathering the 
courage and humility to let her introduce them and keep them open, rather than 
settling them for the record—in his favour—as swiftly as possible. 
 
266 As Tanesini notes, humility requires self-acceptance of one’s own limitations; see Alessandra Tanesini, 




That is the view from Jimmy’s side. From Gina’s side, given the power 
differential, there is a further trade-off. Sustaining reality disjunctures around 
morally and existentially important issues may itch, but it is preferable to facing 
fragmentation, depersonalisation, or dis-integration. If Jimmy’s chokehold on the 
Common Ground forces her to choose between being truthful and being heard, 
then she faces the fragmenting effects of leaving some key piece of her perspective 
outside the Common Ground. If she can only speak and be heard when she speaks 
not as herself, but as an ‘acceptable’ voice, she then faces the effects of 
depersonalisation. If she speaks and the clear intention of her utterances is 
consistently flouted by the outcome of her conversational attempts, she faces the 
dis-integration of her capacity as an agential, conversational subject.  
Table 10 
META-CONVERSATIONAL: Common Ground Pragmatics 
Infra-doings Breaching Normativity 
A respondent participates in 
negotiating territories of 
primacy, resolving modal 
differences, and tracking 
content of the Common Ground 
across conversational instances. 
A respondent burdens a speaker 
by excessively contesting their 
perspectives, eliding 
disjunctures, and resisting 
adding the speaker’s (indexed) 
claims to the Common Ground. 
A respondent uses their own 
cognitive/emotional resources to 
preserve speaker’s values, 
projects, perspectives in 
Common Ground, even when 
involving reality disjunctures. 
 
 
Listening as Labour, Listening as Risk 
My proposal, then, is that to begin to listen to Gina, Jimmy needs to 
undergo a kind of revolution. If Jimmy were a child, or a narcissist, he would need 
to undergo a Copernican revolution and realise that he is not the centre of the 
conversational Common Ground (see Figure 1). But as we said, Jimmy usually does 
better at listening than he does with Gina. Jimmy quite likes to be right, and wants 
to be known as fair, objective, responsible, and a good leader. Jimmy, like so many 
of us, has a notion of a Common Ground which is centred around an idealised 
notion of the truth, and his aim in all conversations is to be epistemically 
responsible in treating the conversations as opportunities to get nearer the truth. 
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This works well enough when he is not under threat, perhaps, but when Gina walks 
in, we start to see Jimmy’s idealised, truth-centric Common Ground getting 
deployed as the basis for epistemic whack-a-mole. This is my diagnosis of Jimmy, 
as well as of much of what goes wrong in post-Enlightenment dominant 
discourses. What we claim is a truth-centric orientation turns into a basis for 
batting away inconvenient truths under the guise of due diligence. 
 
What Jimmy needs is a different kind of post-Copernican revolution. 
Whereas the child must shift from a Jimmy-centric to a truth-centric Common 
Ground, here, we want to see a shift to a Jimmy-and-Gina-centric Common 
Ground. Like an ellipse has two foci (see Figure 2), the Common Ground has 
distinct standpoints, and they stay that way. Gina’s contributions do not get 
collapsed under Jimmy’s sense of his pursuit of truth; rather, he and Gina join 
forces in a shared pursuit of truth. 
Incorporating multiple centres in the Common Ground means accepting 
that all claims, even one’s own, are perspectivally contingent, even when we feel 
sure. But more importantly, incorporating multiple centres means 
acknowledging a responsibility for doing one’s share of the work, supporting the 
speaker in accomplishing her communicative aims. It means participating with 
the speaker actively from the back channel, giving specific and affiliative, but non-
Figure 1: The post-Copernican Shift 
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intrusive, responses wherever possible. It means acknowledging the other 
person’s entitlement to make her own Common Ground modifications and to 
performatively enact changes to the normative context through her speech. 
 
Listening involves downgrading one’s own centre from being the centre to 
just a centre from which to look out on the Common Ground. In a dyadic 
conversation, this might look like an ellipse. When we factor in the broader 
context of the discourse ecosystem, we see how Jimmy’s actions toward Gina are 
part of the system-wide shape of the Common Ground of public discourse. If 
Jimmy can learn to listen to Gina, and if he can spread this change to those around 
him, then the centre of public discourse itself can shift to have the plural foci we 
would expect from a complex, pluralistic ecosystem. 
To conclude this chapter, we re-sketch the shift made in Chapter 4, this 
time with infra-doings (intentions and outcomes) in view, rather than just 
motivations. When Jimmy Green makes the shift from Inquisitor mode to Listener 
mode, Gina Blue will notice a difference in their conversations. Jimmy used to play 
at being obtuse, making her take several extra turns to get her points across. 
Figure 2: A Jointly-Centred Common Ground 
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Instead of letting her tell her story on her own terms, Jimmy used to jump out of 
the back channel with intrusive responses, blocking her from giving context to her 
claims, undermining her interpretation in order to dismiss her. 
Instead of noticing what is important for Gina about what she is saying, 
Jimmy would persist in evaluating every one of her claims against the backdrop of 
the world as he sees it, treating her like an item in the Jimmy-centred Common 
Ground, in which every claim is either true or false, plain and simple. Each 
meeting he seemed to have forgotten what he had learned about the blues in the 
previous meeting, so each time Gina had to labour re-establish the blue-centred 
perspective in the Common Ground and to re-open reality disjunctures that had 
been conveniently eliminated from the scoreboard. 
Table 11 




A respondent recognises the overall aims of speaker beyond the 
individual turns, and replies with best fitted second pair parts, 
obviating need for extra pairs and alleviating the burden on the 





A respondent provides supportive and specific back channel 
responses, interpreting content as speaker tells it, minimising the 





A respondent uses their own cognitive/emotional resources to 
preserve speaker’s values, projects, perspectives in Common Ground, 
even when involving reality disjunctures, and does not broker her 
access to modify the Common Ground. 
 
Now that Jimmy has made the switch in his policy of responsiveness, he is 
much calmer about letting her take extended turns, actively participating from the 
back channel to support her in painting a picture for him of the context and 
significance of the blue families’ concerns. As he lets her tell the story without 
blocking or usurping her turn, he begins to get a much more integrated picture of 
the situation. Using his Hawking heuristic, Jimmy gets into the habit of accepting 
197 
 
things Gina says into the Common Ground even when he does not know the 
reasons for her claims. He comes to trust that she has good reasons, and that if he 
lets her, she will tell him what they are. 
He starts treating Gina’s perspective as independently valid and not subject 
to Jimmy’s vetting; what Gina says gets put into the Common Ground—indexed to 
her, of course, and often not without follow-up questions. Together they are 
building a jointly-centred Common Ground, with both their perspectives 
preserved. Jimmy is now putting effort into remembering from one meeting to the 
next what is in the Common Ground on Gina’s side. They still do not always agree, 
but Jimmy is learning not to elide Gina’s perspective out of the Common Ground 
whenever they stumble on a reality disjuncture—and this happens fairly often. If 
Jimmy accepts and preserves the reality disjuncture, he thereby has to live with the 
possibility that he might be wrong about some things, or even in the wrong. It still 
itches, sometimes, and he has to keep his courage and humility about him when 
she enacts normative claims which place him under obligation to respond. 
The more he respects and listens to Gina, however, the more he realises 
that he does not need to be afraid of turning out to be wrong: Gina wants as much 
as he does to promote a thriving school district where all children, green and blue, 
can flourish. When Jimmy is wrong, Gina is on his team to help fix the issue. Both 
of them can see the benefits their collaboration has brought about for the district, 
now that Jimmy listens to Gina. 
What remains, now, is to draw together this assemblage of infra-doings 
and breaches into a single, coherent picture of the normativity of listening, pulling 
out general principles for guiding our practices and our judgements of others’ 






Obligations and Entitlements 
 
“Good listening is often as tactile, and visual, as it is auditory: thus neither 
disembodied nor closed to affect, and neither purely objective nor perfectly rational. 
It shelters and encloses… it invites and honors trust… it starts from a presumption of, 
and respect for, the integrity of tellers and listeners. 
—Lorraine Code267 
 
“We are responsible and yet not in charge; we cannot control the situation, but we 
are accountable. This kind of fear can lead to not-listening as well, the reluctance to 
admit another as a “co-builder of a common world.” 
—Susan Bickford268  
 
When we approach the concept of listening, imagining ourselves in the role 
of speakers, it is easy to support normative claims which hold our interlocutors 
morally responsible for listening to us. When we approach the same concept but 
imagine ourselves in the role of listener, it is easy to feel protective of our ‘right’ to 
screen out voices or claims that we find objectionable or harmful. Both sentiments 
are reasonable, and a normative account of listening needs to respond to both. 
Both sentiments pull on us in debates around hate speech, freedom of expression, 
silencing, deplatforming, and, to be sure, in the ever-flourishing self-help 
discourses which urge the setting of healthy boundaries to filter out the voices that 
abuse. For this reason, the question that inevitably comes up in response to any 
 
267 Code, Ecological Thinking, 234. 
268 Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy, 153. 
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discussion of the ethics of listening to people is the question of whether it is ever 
permissible, or even morally praiseworthy, to not listen to someone whose voice 
one deems harmful. 
One too-quick way to answer this question is by appeal to self-defence. It 
is normally not permissible for me to go around throat-punching strangers, but if 
a stranger is attacking me and I use a throat-punch to get away, then my action 
would generally be considered excusable. This response works reasonably well as 
a heuristic: ‘Listen to people, except when doing so puts you in danger’, but it does not 
provide a principled basis for determining which situations are those in which a 
listener is entitled to block her ears against someone’s speech. Ideally, we should 
see obligations and entitlements to not listen as being generated by the same 
normative basis which generates obligations and entitlements to listen and be 
listened to. 
Put differently, we want a clear basis for deciding when and to what extent 
we must admit someone as a joint perspectival centre in our Common Ground. 
Conversation is a game we play together, so when deciding whether to play with 
someone, we might want to know whether or not they can be trusted to play fair. 
We can derive this basis from the instrumental and conventional norms for the 
joint activity of conversation, much as the entitlements and obligations of tennis 
players are generated by the norms which constitute the joint activity of a game of 
tennis. The task in this chapter is to articulate that resulting broad basis for the 
moral normativity of listening, the grounding for and limits of our obligations and 
entitlements to listen and be listened to. This chapter begins with the same rhythm 
as the last chapter, looking at a body of empirical work—this time another arm of 
EMCA—followed by application of the concepts to the case of listening. Then we 
shift gears and look at the bigger picture, bringing together the themes of all 
former chapters to create an integrated picture of what praiseworthy and 
blameworthy listening would look like.  
First, in Section 1, we orient the collaborative picture of conversation 
within what should be a familiar picture of joint action, and the kinds of norms 
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generated by engaging in joint activity. Then in Section 2, we look at how an 
instance of this particular joint activity is bounded by a framework of relevance, 
called an Enchronic Frame.269 (This is not a frame in the Johnsonian, metaphorical 
sense used in previous chapters; this is a ‘frame’ in the sense of scaffolding which 
holds up and supports the overall event structure.) In Section 3, we revisit the 
various damages and harms covered in previous chapters, seeing how they can be 
represented on this model. Here we also see how this model gives us a basis for us 
to think about when we might have a moral entitlement not to listen to someone. 
In Section 4, we look once more at what Jimmy did right, before closing with an 
illustrative case study.  
1. Generating Obligations and Entitlements 
Herbert H Clark argued that language use is a form of joint action, like a 
duet, a waltz, or a game of chess.270 A duet, a waltz, and a game of chess all have 
rules which govern the progress and flow of the activity: in a waltz, both parties 
act simultaneously, and the activity is largely scripted. In chess, the players 
alternate turns, but the turns are not scripted. In a duet, musicians play scripted 
parts that are simultaneous as standard, but may include scripted elements of turn 
taking. If I undertake to play a duet, but I abruptly stop playing midway through 
and leave my fellow player ‘hanging’, then I have violated the ‘rules’ of duet playing, 
which include that we progress together through the score. Now it may be that I 
need to stop for a breather and will signal this with gestures and or make apologies 
to my fellow player for dropping out; I have violated the rules of the duet in a non-
pernicious way. I acknowledge the violation with apologies, and we will together 
sort out whatever went wrong and try again. The violation does not end our joint 
activity in the broad sense, but rather triggers repair manoeuvres. 
 
269 Here, as in Chapter 5, I will maintain a capitalised usage of ‘Enchronic Frame’ to indicate that I am 
employing it as a technical term with a meaning fit for our purposes here, based on but not necessarily 
strictly following the meaning as used by Nick Enfield; see Enfield, ‘Sources of Asymmetry in Human 
Interaction: Enchrony, Status, Knowledge and Agency’. 
270 Clark, Using Language. 
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Conversation is not scripted; much like an improvisational duet, the 
conversants follow a set of rules that guide the unfolding of their joint activity, 
whilst the content of their turns remains up to each participant’s choices. Some of 
those choices may be invalid with respect to the rules of the duet (and therefore 
trigger repairs), but many of those choices will respond to and feed into the prior 
and subsequent elements of the unfolding joint activity of musicmaking. What 
sort of rules are these? Nick Enfield writes, ‘These are not rules for how a person 
should act. They are rules for how a team player should act. The rules make sense 
if you think of their function as regulating the flow of conversation as a kind of 
group activity. In conversation, everyone involved has a set of implicit rights and 
duties in the interaction.’271 The same holds true for chess and for waltzing: if a 
chess player makes two moves at a go instead of one, then the flow of the joint 
activity is disrupted, leading to an unbalanced game. If Ginger decides to switch 
to Foxtrot mid-waltz and collides with Fred, then Fred will be justified in rebuking 
Ginger for not being a team player, for flouting the rules of waltzing.272 
Enfield continues: ‘When we cooperate, we enter into a (usually unspoken) 
pact to join forces toward a common goal. Through this pact, we become morally 
accountable to that commitment and to seeing that commitment through. Joint 
action is not just a way of behaving; it implies a special way of thinking.’273 Some 
cooperative activities are more prescriptive than others. Sitting down in front of a 
chessboard with someone is tantamount to entering into a pact with that person 
to play a game of chess—and a commitment to abide by the rules of chess. If one 
player does not see this commitment through, wandering off partway through or 
making illegal moves, then the other is justified in holding the other accountable. 
On the other hand, if players sit down to a game of poker, the pact will be made 
 
271 Enfield, How We Talk, 16. 
272 Enfield, How We Talk; Enfield and Kockelman, Distributed Agency; Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992). 
273 Enfield, How We Talk, 16. 
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explicitly, when the players agree on which type of poker game they will play, and 
what kinds of betting will take place. 
Conversation is a joint activity which includes many variations: some are 
highly formulaic, such as ordering food at a drive-through window, and can be 
conducted without explicit negotiation because of that formulaic context. Others 
are flexible and wide-ranging. Negotiation may become explicit when parties are 
not on the same page: an employee has a meeting with the boss in which the 
employee seeks a raise, but the boss intended the meeting as a (disciplinary) 
performance review. When their cross-purposes collide, they will stop ordinary 
conversation to negotiate what kind of conversation they are having. 
Variations of this sort abound, but all conversational behaviour involves 
interlocutors signing up to a joint project of verbal communication which entails 
agreeing (more or less) on a shared set of rules. To enter into conversation with 
someone is to make oneself accountable to the norms which govern conversation. 
Some of these are familiar: participants should use mutually understood 
languages, should reply in a timely fashion, should be sincere or appropriately 
signal if being sarcastic, and so on. Even so, conversation involves an astonishing 
array of highly sophisticated behaviours which require participants to understand 
and make themselves understandable; to interpret, to improvise, to coordinate, to 
monitor the flow of the conversation, and to make repairs when the flow is 
disrupted for any number of reasons. 
Conversation involves one person responding to another person, via the 
medium of language, and this is, in Enfield’s words (above), a very ‘special way of 
thinking’. He explains: ‘The cognition that people need for language must of 
course be found in the head, and in that sense, cognition for language is located in 
individuals. But much research on how the mind works has shown that cognition 
is radically distributed. Much of our thinking and reasoning is not done solely 
between our ears. When we use our brains, we often hook them up to external 
systems. These may be physical objects, such as pencil and paper or smartphones, 
that supersize our capacities for memory and reasoning. In conversation, the 
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external systems to which we hook ourselves up are the bodies and minds of other 
people.’274 
Think about some of the phrases we use to describe reasons for initiating 
an open-ended conversation: I want to ‘get some things off my chest’. I’m not after 
anything; I ‘just want to talk’. I’m just ‘thinking out loud’. I want to ‘bounce some 
ideas off you’. I want to ‘run something by you’. The use of these phrases occurs 
around a specific subtype of conversation, in which the joint activity is that of 
conversation itself, and the purpose is to gain the benefit of ‘hooking up’ one’s 
mind to someone else’s for improved processing. 
Think how strange and inappropriate it would be, however, if one 
approached a drive-through window ‘just to bounce some ideas off’ the restaurant 
personnel. That conversational context is not designed for this kind of hooking up 
of minds. But one essential step in placing orders verbally is that the cashier reads 
back the order to the customer as he has recorded it, enabling the customer to 
check that he has said all he meant to say, and requested everything he would like 
to request.275 Standard cashier phrases like, ‘Would you like fries with that?’ serve 
as prompts to help the customer think through their options and aims. 
On the other hand, mismatches do regularly happen. A surgeon friend 
once told me, ‘Sometimes people come see me just because they need to talk to 
someone. Distinguishing these cases from the ones with more specific medical 
aims is vital to figuring out what the patient needs.’ A patient may be seeking 
reassurance and the comfort of having spoken to an authoritative healthcare 
figure, seeking expert information, reviewing their treatment options, or seeking 
to jointly evaluate together with the expert the extent to which certain of their 
bodily experiences should be taken to be causes for concern. Despite the stark 
 
274 Enfield, 12. 
275 The purpose in doing so is not likely to be altruistic, here. The cashier wants to check that the customer 
did not forget to (or miss an opportunity to be persuaded to) add some extra items to their order. Even so, 
structurally, it is still the case that the cashier is supporting the customer in considering various options. My 
thanks to David Faraci for raising this point. 
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differences in each party’s access to information and expertise; despite the 
presence of instrumental ends, the process of speaking with a doctor is 
nevertheless a joint activity of thinking through a situation together in a certain 
sort of way—a way not replicated, for example, by running internet searches on 
one’s symptoms. 
Contexts contribute to people’s expectations for how conversations will go. 
I do not generally expect people to speak to me on train station platforms if they 
are not traveling with me, although it occasionally happens. If someone 
approaches me to confirm the time or which train is expected next, I am not taken 
aback; we conduct a brief, ends-driven conversation which involves pooling our 
understandings of the rail service situation to confirm important details. 
However, if in the course of doing so, the person launched into a long, rambling 
discussion of details of their personal life, I would find myself perplexed and 
uncomfortable. This particular discomfort does not arise at a cocktail party, 
however, where it is expected that conversations will be open-ended and of a 
personal nature. But in both cases, on the station platform and at the cocktail 
party, once a person has hailed me and caught my attention, we enter into the joint 
activity of conversation, and the norms of conversation come into force. 
To underscore this point, suppose I very much want to avoid talking to the 
person hailing me. If I turn and walk away when they are still trying to claim my 
attention, an onlooker might say, ‘I guess she did not hear you.’ But if I meet eyes 
with the person, or in any way acknowledge being hailed, then my turning and 
walking away will be taken as a personal affront, purposeful and meaningfully 
connected to the person’s attempts to converse with me. The acknowledgement of 
a hail means that the conversants are now bound by certain entitlements and 
obligations, which govern the flow of the joint activity of responding to each other 
for the duration of the conversation through appropriate turn sequences, where 
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each turn responds appropriately to the foregoing turn and provides the occasion 
for the subsequent turn. This linked chain of respondency is called enchrony.276 
2. The Special Glue 
As noted in the previous chapter, conversation analysis is not a branch of 
behaviourism; the responses elicited by a particular turn are not inevitable or 
scripted. Nevertheless, as soon as the joint activity of conversation is initiated and 
the norms are in force, whatever follows a particular turn is taken to be a response 
to the foregoing turn, whether it fits or not, and will be interpreted as 
meaningful.277 Enfield elaborates: 
The key point here is that human conversation is an exchange of co-relevant 
moves, not an exchange of simple or planned calls… Something in the 
conversation machine not only drives the fine timing of conversation; it also 
provides for meaningful connections between each move that allow us to 
create coherent conversations without a script. This connection comes from 
a special glue called relevance. 
Relevance is one of the most powerful cognitive components of the 
conversation machine. There is a deep-seated human propensity to see 
meaningful connections between events, whether or not the events are 
actually related. We find it hard not to see events as being meaningfully 
connected when in fact they are simply adjacent. Many superstitions work 
 
276 Enfield, ‘Sources of Asymmetry in Human Interaction: Enchrony, Status, Knowledge and Agency’. 
277 Enfield, Relationship Thinking, 28–35. For context, Enfield casts enchrony as one of eight levels of 
connection between behaviour and what occasions it or what it means, as below (p. 31): 
Eight Methodological Frames for Studying Human Behavior, 
Each Defined by a Distinct Causal-Temporal Profile 
Causal  What is the mechanism by which the behavior occurs? 
Functional What is the survival value of the behavior pattern? 
Phylogenetic How did the behavior pattern emerge in evolution? 
Ontogenetic How does the behavior emerge in an individual’s lifetime? 
Microgenetic How is the behavior processed as it occurs? 
Diachronic How does an acquired pattern of behavior develop in history? 
Synchronic What is the abstract relational structure of the behavior? 
Enchronic How does the behavior fit in a contingent sequence of moves? 
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on this basis: If I stub my toe, I might see this as connected with the black cat 
that just walked across my path.278 
The tendency we have to see meaningful connections between events takes on 
norm-generating force when we commit to the joint activity of having a 
conversation. Every turn taken is glued to whatever comes before and behind it by 
the norm of co-relevance. If I chat at the cat and the cat flicks his tail, I may assume 
a relevant, meaningful connection, that the tail flick is a response to my 
addressing the cat, although this may not be true. But if I speak to a friend, and 
my friend rolls her eyes, I will take that eye roll to be a meaningful response to what 
I said. 
I might follow up and ask why I have been given an eye roll. Perhaps my 
friend says, ‘Oh, I’m so sorry, I was rolling my eyes at something going on over 
there, behind you. What were you saying again?’ Whatever follows my 
conversational turn will be glued to my turn by the assumption of meaningful 
relevance, so if whatever follows happens to not refer to my turn, a rule has been 
violated, triggering a repair manoeuvre from me (requesting explanation), an 
acknowledgement of violation from my friend (Oh I’m so sorry), and an explicit 
‘ungluing’ of the gesture from the progress of our conversation by positioning the 
eye roll as a response to something outside the enchronic frame—the chain of co-
relevant moves—of our conversation.279 
Such a response may work once; I can forgive a friend for being 
momentarily distracted. But in many cases, people would be unwilling to look past 
more than a couple such incidents before ‘reading something into’ the friend’s 
distracted state. Recall the breaching experiments from the last chapter: even once 
the experimenters explained the assignment to their subjects, subjects remained 
 
278 Enfield, How We Talk, 132–33. 
279 This talk of ‘ungluing’ an incidental but non-relevant moment from the Enchronic Frame is my own 
notion, and to my knowledge it is not talked about in this way by relevance theorists. Instead, I take 
inspiration here from the common philosophical notion of bracketing—we use repair type sequences to 
bracket out moments which we wish not to be considered by our interlocutors as part of what is happening 
in the conversation. 
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hostile and inferred meaning from having been chosen as subjects for the 
experiments. So strong is our tendency to find meaningful connections that as 
soon as a commitment is made to the activity of conversation, it becomes 
extremely difficult to extract any action from the glue of relevance. 
The same holds true for how we ascribe meaningfulness to the way an 
interlocutor handles the Common Ground. Consider the contrast between how 
the Common Ground looks in each of these two cases: in one, Luke asks Kirk if he 
would like to come along on a lake trip next week. In the other, Luke asks Kirk if 
he would rather ride a centaur or a hippogriff. The relevant content of the 
Common Ground in the first case answers to reality in a way that the second does 
not, and likewise generates obligations in a way that the second does not. If Kirk 
agrees to go along on the lake trip, but then Luke leaves without him, Kirk would 
be justified in rebuking Luke for having failed to uphold the obligation to which he 
committed himself when inviting Kirk to join the trip. 
Such obligations do not arise from the speculative conversation about 
centaurs and hippogriffs. Kirk would be justified in being astonished if the 
hippogriff question followed right on the heels of his accepting the lake trip 
invitation. The implication would be that Luke needs to know for purposes of 
planning the lake trip what fantasy animal Kirk prefers to ride. If Kirk goes along 
with this premise, then he might expect to be offered a chance to ride a hippogriff 
at the lake. If Kirk finds the premise to be too far outside the relevant content of 
the Common Ground to be an appropriate move in a lake-trip-planning 
conversation, then he will presumably ask follow-up questions to clarify what sort 
of transition in subject matter has been made. 
A similar picture of expectations arises around conversational 
participants. If Kirk addresses Luke, and some bystander replies instead of Luke, 
the bystander’s comment is an intrusion from outside the enchronic grain of the 
conversation. If Luke fails to acknowledge or respond to Kirk in any way, Kirk will 
likely look for reasons why—Luke perhaps left the room, or could not hear Kirk, or 
for some other reason has not engaged. We could imagine Kirk realising that he is 
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now alone, and playfully answering ‘for’ Luke in some silly voice, as if continuing 
the conversation: ‘Sure Kirk, you can have my boat.’ Whatever he imagines Luke 
to say would extend the surface structure of the conversation forward, but it fails 
at that point to be a multi-centred conversation. This means that whatever Kirk 
imagines Luke to say would not generate the sort of obligations for Luke that 
would be generated if Luke had made that move himself (Luke has not bequeathed 
the boat, so no obligation to give Kirk the boat obtains). 
This brings us to the first pivotal point of the chapter. Just as the content 
of a conversation refers to and enacts changes to a multi-centred Common 
Ground, so also the activity of a conversation derives its structure and 
meaningfulness from the multi-centred Enchronic Frame—that special glue of 
relevance that causes the actions of the interlocutors to hang together as a 
conversation. Take away one of the participants—one of the agentive centres—
and it is not longer a conversation as such; a soliloquy or apostrophe, perhaps, or 
a monologue, but not a conversation. 
If one chess player departs a game of chess, then the game can no longer 
proceed; the remaining player is no longer playing chess unless someone takes 
over the other player’s side. For as long as the game is in play, the player would be 
wrong to sweep all the pieces off the board or reset them to their starting positions. 
Once the game is no longer in play, either because it ended or because it was 
forfeited, the norms which prohibit sweeping pieces off the board into the box no 
longer apply. When one of the agentive centres of the game disappears, the other 
agent no longer has the option of being involved in that particular chess game. The 
joint nature of the activity means that the decision of one agent to exit the game 
has implications for the other agent. This idea forms the bedrock for what follows.  
3. Damages 
The argument in previous chapters has been that, according to the folk 
normativity of listening, the unjust listener harms someone in her capacity as a 
speaker. If a speaker is silenced, then some important part of her agentive 
personhood is damaged; her ordinary communicative actions do not receive 
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uptake, and she is blocked from adding claims into the Common Ground unless 
they fit with what the interlocutor is willing to acknowledge. We can now exposit 
this kind of problem in theoretical terms. 
First, we take it as granted that the participants of a conversation are 
bound by the ‘pact’—the entitlements and obligations generated by their joining 
into the joint activity of conversation with each other—in virtue of the fact that 
they are talking with each other. (We will address the issue of entering into or not 
entering into such commitments below.) The participants are bound up in the 
Enchronic Frame, which means that every move they make is a response to what 
came before, and begets what follows. Every move is co-relevant, and anything the 
participants say or do which disrupts the flow of the conversation or the chain of 
co-relevance will trigger repair manoeuvres, for as long as the conversation carries 
on. This is the normal pattern. 
 
When one move in the conversation is infelicitous—that is, when there is 
no uptake—the speaker is likely to clarify, to try again, to re-phrase, or to change 
Figure 3: The Enchronic Frame (depicted in orange) holds even when a domineering listener (in green) does not share much 
Common Ground Access with the interlocutor (blue). 
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tactics. But when the move is infelicitous because the listener has refused to grant 
uptake—in bad faith, as discussed in Chapter 2—the listener has violated the 
obligations that obtain in virtue of having entered into the joint activity of having 
a conversation. That is, one of the obligations which obtains is that of tracking the 
flow of the activity, which includes making sense of how each move refers to what 
came before, taking the relevance link as meaningful, and endeavouring to 
understand in what way it is meant to be meaningful by the speaker. 
Described this way, in prose, the procedure sounds clunky and 
burdensome, but recall Enfield’s comment that we have a deep-seated propensity 
to find meaningful connections between events even when there is no relevance 
gluing those events together. We saw this in the phenomenological aspect of the 
motivational complex in Chapter 4, and it highlights even further the wrongness 
of the excommunication move. When a listener refuses to acknowledge the 
relevance connection between the speaker’s move and what came before, the 
listener is countervailing their own anthropological reflexes as well as violating the 
obligations which obtain from having entered into conversation with the speaker. 
We can depict what a problematic listener does using the Common Ground and 
Enchronic Frame together, for each of the blameworthy listening patterns 
described in the preceding chapters. 
Silencing 
The violation in question here can be pictured as in Figure 4 below: by 
refusing to incorporate the speaker’s move into the enchronic frame of the 
conversation, the listener has violated the rules for how to be ‘a good team player’ 
in a conversation. As a result, the conversation cannot proceed as it stands. There 
are a few options for how this scenario can go. If this is a one-off incident, then 
the speaker may take on the labour of making specific repair moves to rebuild the 
enchronic frame around the rupture. If the refusal to listen is persistent and 
resists repair, or if the refusal occurs in a context of systemic silencing such that 
the speaker does not have the resources to take on that labour, then the 
conversation may be aborted. 
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A middle option is that the speaker may take a beat and start the 
conversation anew, on different terms, but this is essentially a new conversation. 
If a chess game suddenly ends because players disagree about the validity of a 
move, they may agree to reset the pieces and start again, but at this point they are 
playing a new game. Suppose this option is taken. The speaker has been unable to 
secure uptake for her speech act due to resistance on the part of the listener, so she 
starts fresh, reopening the conversation on new terms. In the broad sense, it 
appears that the conversation continues (the players ‘keep playing chess’), but it 
does so by accepting the rupture of the enchronic frame and building a new one. 
Again, if this is a one-off incident, then the damage is unlikely to be 
noteworthy, but if the speaker finds that every time she attempts to make a certain 
move the conversation has to end and be restarted, then we identify the speaker as 
being ‘silenced’ with respect to that speech act. And if the silencing is persistent, 
causing cumulative moral damage to the agent, undermining her in her capacity 
as a speaker, then she may become unable to constitute a subject able to enter into 
the joint activity of conversation [with this person, on this topic, etc]. The damage 
she suffers through silencing comes from the fragmenting choice she has to make 
about whether she will accept the conditions of whoever has a chokehold on the 
Common Ground. If she says only things her interlocutor is willing to accept, then 
her speech acts are found felicitous, but if she follows her own intentions and 
motivations for communicative action, her utterances are treated as breaches of 
the chain of co-relevance. 
One reason why this might happen, as argued in Chapter 2, is that a 
listener may be unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of how the speaker’s move 
aims to enact changes to the normative context. For example, if the listener has 
made sexual advances and the speaker says ‘No, please stop,’ the listener may be 
unwilling to countenance the possibility that he is in fact being rejected, or that he 
is doing anything wrong by persisting in his advances. As argued in Chapter 5, if 
the speaker’s move goes through, then it must be added to the Common Ground 
in an appropriate way—‘She does not want me to do this’—and the normative 
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change acknowledged, namely, that she is putting him under obligation to 
discontinue his advances, on pains of being charged with sexually assaulting her.  
Now we have said that the Common Ground allows for disjunctures, but 
our urge is to settle them for the record. ‘She does not want me to do this’ gets 
added to the Common Ground, which also contains, ‘I want to do this to her.’ The 
resulting disjuncture does not, structurally speaking, need to be resolved; indeed, 
a skilful listener in many cases seeks to preserve the distinct perspectives of the 
other and so holds open space for such disjuncts to remain. However, allowing 
disjuncts to remain in the Common Ground also means allowing the inferences 
licensed by the disjunctive claims, which include normative entanglements. If 
both claims, the listener’s desire and the speaker’s rejection, are preserved in the 
Common Ground, the disjuncture licenses certain critical inferences, such as, for 
example, that there would be something morally wrong with the listener pursuing 
his desired course of action under the circumstances. Similarly, and more simply, 
preserving a disjuncture in the Common Ground means preserving the possibility 
that one might be wrong about something, or in the wrong. 
Some Variations on the Above 
What we have so far is this: entering into conversation involves committing 
to the obligations and entitlements of that activity. Speakers are entitled to choose 
their own next moves; to interpret each move as meaningfully glued to the 
foregoing, and to have their claims added to the Common Ground in some 
fashion. Speakers are expected to attend to how each claim is meaningfully 
connected to the foregoing; to allow each other to add claims to the Common 
Ground even when this introduces disjunctures, and to maintain the flow—the 
Enchronic Frame—for as long as the conversation continues. Both speakers can 
initiate repair manoeuvres, request clarification, and modify the conversation’s 
progress. Both speakers take partial responsibility for moving the conversation 
forward and for working around ruptures. 
How much of a burden for these tasks falls on each participant is mediated 
by the kind of conversation, the roles of the participants, and the power gradient 
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between them. A parent talking to a small child takes most or all of the 
responsibility for managing and repairing the conversation, because the child 
does not have the resources to be able to do this. A friend who is feeling stubborn 
and obstreperous may renege her responsibilities, causing them all to fall on her 
interlocutor who will likely become frustrated with the continuous stream of 
misunderstandings. 
The above applies to speakers who have entered into conversation; the same 
obligations do not apply to people who are not already interlocutors. We have the 
freedom to choose, generally speaking, when we want to talk to people and with 
whom we are willing to converse. If one person does not wish to speak to another 
person, they are not compelled—at least, not by the structure of discourse—to 
enter into conversation. The case differs for people with role-based 
responsibilities. Doctors and teachers, for example, have less elective freedom 
over whether they will converse with particular patients and students. Even so, 
medical practices have policies for addressing inappropriate patient behaviour, 
and teachers have corrective options for handling students who violate social or 
moral norms. It is beyond our scope here to examine the ways that such 
institutional structures shape and interact with conversational norms. 
We should also note that the focus here is on individuals in conversation 
with each other. The obligations and entitlements generated by participation in a 
conversation do not straightforwardly apply to the issue which has come to be 
known as deplatforming. What we owe to our personal interlocutors does not tell 
us much, if anything, about what is owed to public speakers by their audiences, or 
which people are ‘owed’ (if indeed any one is owed) a public platform. When a 
person is offered a public platform, but the offer is subsequently withdrawn due 
to widespread political objections to the person’s anticipated message, it is said 
that the person has been deplatformed. Understandably, people in such positions 
tend to feel they have been ‘silenced’, in that they have not been allowed to speak 
where they had expected to be allowed to speak. If deplatforming is a kind of 
silencing, it is a very different kind of silencing to what we are dealing with here, 
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since it refers not to the norms of conversation but to norms of publicity, and is 
not structured by the same kind of mutually-responsive Enchronic Frame. 
Therefore, we leave the matter of deplatforming aside.  
Gaslighter and Inquisitor 
 The same structure applies with the more extreme forms of cumulative 
moral damage, specifically, gaslighting and excommunication. As argued in 
Chapter 2, the aim of gaslighting is to ensure that the Target no longer constitutes 
an independent discursive standpoint capable of disagreement or accusation. 
Excommunication does similarly, by predicating the breakdown on the Target 
having supposedly already ceased to function as a rational discursive participant. 
When a person is so severely harmed in her capacity as a speaker that she is no 
longer taken to constitute a discursive standpoint, she is not able to enter into 
conversation—at least, not on the topics on which she has been gaslit. Her 
utterances are not taken to be co-relevant in the right way with the utterance of 
the other for them to become part of an Enchronic Frame. 
 Whereas silencing in the broad sense is about blocking certain speech acts 
from occurring as moves in the enchronic frame, gaslighting is about blocking the 
Target from being able to make [certain categories of] speech acts altogether. A 
silenced subject may still be able to constitute one of the two foci of the ellipse, one 
of the perspectival centres of the multiply centred Common Ground, so long as she 
plays by the rules added by her interlocutor’s patterned refusal to uptake certain 
utterances. She can play along as long as she plays by the extra rules prohibiting 
certain conversational moves that the other person is unwilling to incorporate into 
the Common Ground and enchronic frame. The fully gaslit or excommunicated 
subject is not even able to ‘play’. 
Disabled in her discursive function, the gaslit subject does not occupy her 
own perspectival centre, but rather is placed within the epistemic and pragmatic 
‘Common Ground According to the Gaslighter’ (depicted in green) by the claims 
the Gaslighter makes about her. Since the target is not able to participate in the 
joint activity of conversation, the usual obligations and entitlements generated by 
215 
 
the tacit ‘pact’ or participation are not in this case generated—and this is the aim. 
The Gaslighter would be obligated by the rules of conversation to acknowledge 
claims that the Target adds into the Common Ground, but this obligation does not 
obtain if there is no conversation with the Target. The Gaslighter would be 
obligated also to follow the meaningful connections of co-relevance between 
himself and the Target, which requires on some fundamental level a tacit 
assumption of parity: we are both speaking subjects saying things. If the Target is 
not taken to be a speaking subject saying things, then any word-chains she 
produces would not be acknowledged as adhering to, linking up with, or 
responding to his own claims in the manner of conversational moves.280 
 
 
280 It is worth noting here that talk about gaslit subjects quickly becomes strange, because in most cases it 
should be manifestly obvious to outside observers that the gaslit subject is a speaking subject saying things. 
The Gaslighter acts as if she is not a speaking subject saying things, playing a sort of game of pretence to 
avoid placing himself under the usual conversational obligations. In some cases, however, gaslighting goes 
so far that the subject is indeed damaged and made unable to participate in discourse; she may be taken by 
others and even herself to be ‘raving’ rather than making discursive claims.  
Figure 4: Depersonalisation 
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The Inquisitor undermines the subjectivity of the speaker in quite a similar 
way, and also aims to avoid accepting conversational obligations. However, the 
Inquisitor’s move is made from within an established Enchronic Frame, and, at 
least on the surface, follows the ordinary rules: the Inquisitor looks for the 
meaningful connection between the speaker’s moves and his own. But the 
Inquisitor claims to find no such relevance link and initiates something like repair 
manoeuvres—asking for reasons, or testing the rational validity of the speaker’s 
conversational moves, which may resemble a game of epistemic whack-a-mole. 
When the Inquisitor does not find a suitably rational relevance link and is 
‘unable’ to repair the Enchronic Frame, the speaker is deemed to have placed 
herself or fallen outside the rationality requisite for conversational involvement. 
Whereas the Gaslighter avoids playing the ‘game’ of conversation with the Target, 
the Inquisitor plays the game and appeals to its rules and norms in order to rebuke 
and, finally, remove the speaker from the ‘game’. The code phrase for this strategy 
is, ‘I can’t talk to you when you’re like this.’ What it really means is, ‘I refuse to 
listen to you when you say these kinds of things; game over, you forfeit.’ 
 
On this view, we judge a listener to be morally blameworthy when they 
shirk their obligations and denies the entitlements of a speaker. A listener who 
Figure 5: Excommunication 
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violates conversational norms in this way may be frustrating to talk to, and may 
require an unfair amount of labour on the part of their interlocutors. To the extent 
that these violations are limited in scope, disrupting the Enchronic Frame and 
creating some small inefficiencies but not particularly harming the speaker, they 
may be considered infractions of the rules of conversation but not moral harms. 
But inasmuch as the violations are persistent, recurrent, patterned, and 
pervasive—to the extent that they lead to an accumulation of moral damage for 
speakers—we have reason to judge a listener as morally blameworthy. To discern 
which cases are which would be a judgement call, likely to be disagreed on and 
debated by aggrieved parties, and would depend on a variety of contextual factors. 
It is beyond the scope of my project to provide any sort of ‘forensic’ account of the 
morality of listening to substantiate particular judgement calls of this sort; the aim 
here is merely to clarify what the basis for such judgement calls would be. 
Don’t Have to Listen to This 
 The violations above are caused by an unvirtuous listener harming a 
speaker. We can use the same pattern to look at the virtuous listener’s obligations 
and entitlements surrounding harmful speech and harmful speakers. The premise 
is simple: just as the vicious listener shirks their conversational obligations in 
order to avoid normative entanglement and to keep a chokehold on the Common 
Ground, the vicious speaker also resists being obligated to the listener, in similar 
ways and for similar reasons. Forms of harmful speech—such as hate speech, 
objectifying speech, and genocidal speech—function to obstruct, disable, or 
remove the listener from the Enchronic Frame so that speaker can avoid 
honouring the entitlements of the listener. 
 These forms of language use are what I call discourse dysfunctional: they are 
verbal utterances and as such might appear to be discursive, but a look below the 
surface structure reveals that these kinds of utterances have a peculiar, self-
defeating structure. Speech which functions to disable or remove interlocutors 
from the Enchronic Frame forfeits the entitlements generated by the rules of the 
joint activity of conversation. Inasmuch as someone’s speech excludes you from 
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playing by the rules—excluding your moves from the Enchronic Frame, refusing 
to acknowledge meaningful connections between your claims and theirs, not 
incorporating your claims into the Common Ground and not acknowledging you 
as a perspectival centre—to that extent the speaker cannot justifiably treat you as 
being under obligation to listen to them. There is no acknowledged Enchronic 
Frame in force, and the Common Ground is collapsed out of commonality, thus, 
the obligations and entitlements are invalidated all around. 
 How then should we understand this sort of discourse dysfunctional 
speech? The harmful speaker issues utterances in a manner that claims to make 
unilateral changes to the Common Ground. The joint activity—the duet—is not 
undertaken. I argue that such speech functions in a performative way, a solo or 
soliloquy, meant not as discursive participation but as a wielding of power. Speech 
which performatively dominates the other is not protected by entitlement to be 
listened to, because without another player, without a subject to function as 
another perspectival centre and to jointly commit to the Enchronic Frame, the 
entitlement to be listened to does not obtain. 
 An advantage of conceiving of harmful speech in this way is that it lets us 
easily account for the complicating factor that harmful speech is very often third 
personal. Suppose that Jimmy Green and Gina Blue are in conversation and 
employ hate speech about a third group, depicted in purple. Although there is not 
a purple subject participating in this conversation, the use of hate speech has 
implications for the Common Ground as understood by both blue and green 
subjects. Since the harmful speech disqualifies the purple subjects from discursive 
participation, both Gina Blue and Jimmy Green would presumably then not enter 
into (legitimate, jointly-centred) conversation with purple subjects. 
Now, perhaps Gina is already, in the broader sense, in dialogue with Jack 
Purple. If Jimmy uses hate speech to depersonalise or objectify Jack, Gina has two 
options. She might incorporate this into the Common Ground, which would 
subsequently cause dysfunction in the blue-purple discourse, cutting off her 
discourse with Jack. This option describes (for example) the radicalisation aim of 
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some hate speech. Alternatively, Gina might push back against the claim, treating 
it as problematic and initiating repair moves to prompt Jimmy Green to revise his 
claim. If successful, Gina’s moves result in Jimmy being held accountable for 
honouring the discourse-capable subjectivity and personhood of purples—a good 
result, with potential benefits for the whole discourse ecosystem. 
 
  
If unsuccessful, then there is a disjuncture between Gina and Jimmy in the 
Common Ground—a disjuncture which has contradictory entailments for Gina. 
On the one hand, Gina’s own commitments entail that she preserves open 
discourse with Jack Purple, honouring his subjectivity. On the other hand, Jimmy 
in this case makes discourse with him—a person in a position of power over a 
domain (the school district) where Gina has concerns at stake—conditional on her 
either discontinuing discourse with Jack Purple, or at least going along with 
Jimmy as he propagates hateful claims about Jack Purple. This explanation of 
Gina’s position describes a common experience of allies, who often face the 
challenge of living with long term cognitive and social dissonance of the kind 
Figure 6: Harmful Speech and Third Personal Harms 
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Jimmy introduces by digging his heels in on this issue. Perhaps Jimmy is so 
opposed to the purple subjects that he is unwilling to preserve a disjunct in the 
Common Ground between himself and Gina on this subject. Jimmy insists that 
Gina must agree with him about purples… if Jimmy has the social capital to pull 
this off, then Gina will be forced to choose which discursive space will be 
maintained, that with Jack Purple or that with Jimmy Green. Jimmy has used his 
position to close off her option of maintaining both. 
What this shows us is that performative, third personal hate speech can 
harm in multiple ways: it can destroy the discourse between blues and purples, or 
it can even destroy discourse between greens and blues who are ‘purple 
sympathisers’. Therefore, much as first personal hate speech (i.e., Jimmy using 
slurs against Jack) removes the obligation for Jack to listen to Jimmy, so also third 
personal hate speech removes the obligation for Jack and Gina to listen to Jimmy. 
This does not solve Gina’s problem, if she still needs to negotiate with Jimmy on 
matters concerning the welfare of children in her community, but it does give us 
a way to think in clear terms about what is at stake and where she finds a clear 
entitlement to choose not to listen to someone whose harmful speech is discourse 
dysfunctional. Happily, as we have said in the previous chapters, Jimmy is on the 
path to positive change. We return now to add the last piece to the picture of how 
Jimmy should listen to Gina. 
4. What Jimmy Did Right 
 I have maintained throughout the thesis that when discourse and 
conversation are functioning well, when ordinary good listening is taking place, 
the results are often unremarkable. Things go smoothly, and people are not upset, 
and do not stop to negotiate over the obligations and entitlements of 
conversational activity. If a boss is reported to be a ‘good listener’, and one asks 
the employees what makes the boss such a good listener, they will often be hard-
pressed to identify specific features as evidence. We have already considered what 
Jimmy does on the inter-turn, intra-turn, and meta-turn structural levels to check 
that he is indeed doing his share of the conversational labour, participating 
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collaboratively with Gina in accomplishing her aims, and ensuring her fair access 
to the Common Ground, even when that means sitting with the uncomfortable ego 
risks and extenuating irresolution that comes of keeping reality disjunctures 
open, rather than solving them for the record. To complete the picture, we look at 
what Jimmy does with respect to the Enchronic Frame. 
Given the power dynamic between greens and blues, it would be easy for 
Jimmy to assume primacy over the Common Ground, to doubt or question Gina’s 
point of view and to elide disjunctures in his own favour. To resist this, Jimmy’s 
new policy of responsiveness involves giving Gina primacy over the whole 
Common Ground. This is not to say that Jimmy automatically agrees with 
everything she says, but rather that he brackets his own perspective in order to 
attend to hers. Instead of treating points of difference as disjunctures pressuring 
to be resolved, Jimmy accepts the cognitive and emotional burden of keeping 
Gina’s claims in at the risk of being himself found to be wrong. This handing over 
of primacy in the Common Ground entails assuming that Gina’s views are at least 
as likely as Jimmy’s to be sound, or even more so; that she has reasons for her 
views, and that there is parity between the kinds of reasons she has and the reasons 
Jimmy has for his own views. His main job right now is to take the learner’s 
posture, to learn the lay of the land, and to become at home in the World According 
to Gina. 
As for the Enchronic Frame, Jimmy takes responsibility for maintaining it 
by searching out the meaningful connection of co-relevance between every move 
of his and Gina’s. If what Jimmy thinks is important is not the same as what Gina 
thinks is important in their conversation, then Jimmy might ordinarily take her 
comments to be ‘off topic’ or to be mistaking which features are most pertinent to 
their subject matter. Instead, by committing to maintaining the Enchronic Frame 
(the special glue of co-relevance), Jimmy binds himself to the assumption that each 
move Gina makes is surely relevant and meaningfully respondent to whatever 
Jimmy has said. 
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Suppose Gina is commenting on a need amongst blue students living in 
food deserts that is going unaddressed. Jimmy mentions the school lunch 
provisions for students in the school district, pointing out the good programmes 
that he already has in place to meet student needs. If Gina’s next move is to say, 
‘That does not help, because…’ then Jimmy might be tempted to assume that Gina 
is just making trouble, or failing to see the impact of the existing lunch 
programme. Instead, being committed to assuming that every move of Gina’s is 
meaningfully connected, Jimmy is now required by his new policy of 
responsiveness—specifically, by his commitment to maintaining the Enchronic 
Frame—to assume that if Gina says the problem on her mind is not addressed by 
the existing lunch programme, then Jimmy must assume that her correction is 
purposeful and correctly conveys her meaning. He then follows her lead as she 
points out which issues, for her, are important for solving the problems at hand. 
When Jimmy takes up the responsibility for maintaining the Enchronic 
Frame in this way, he blocks himself from the option to close down his discourse 
with Gina. No longer does he have the option of deciding that they have covered 
all they need to and can draw their meeting to a close; nor does he have the option 
of deciding that he has heard all he needs in order to understand Gina’s point of 
view and no longer needs to hear from her. His policy of responsiveness now 
commits him to keeping their discourse open—and this moves him closer to 
fulfilling the deliberative democratic ideal of reasonableness described by Iris 
Marion Young: 
Being open thus also refers to a disposition to listen to others, treat them 
with respect, make an effort to understand them by asking questions, and 
not judge them too quickly. A reasonable respectful process of discussion 
exhibits deliberative uptake; when some speak, others acknowledge the 
expression in ways that continue the engagement.281 
At the end of a meeting Jimmy does not say, ‘Right, I have heard enough.’ Rather, 
he reasserts his intent to continue listening to Gina in their future conversations. 
 
281 Young, ‘The Deliberative Model’, 229. 
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He takes Gina’s points, which includes exhibiting illocutionary and, in Young’s 
term, deliberative uptake. He expresses his intent to continue trying to 
understand her point of view. 
This ongoing pursuit of understanding highlights the difference between 
listening to Gina and simply giving her what she wants with respect to the school 
district situation. Elise Springer emphasises that our motivations for 
communication run far beyond getting merely instrumental results, and reach 
toward the sometimes difficult task of achieving a shared attention. 
But the difficulty is no worse than for any other account on which 
communication happens—communication of thoughts, feelings, or even of 
diseases. Attention is precisely the kind of thing that can be passed from one 
social being to another; without sharing attention, we would share nothing 
else (except in the sense in which we can share by coincidence, as two cars 
share a garage). And if another’s attentive uptake never served as a cue to 
release our attention from an object, the burden upon each individual’s 
attention would be ever increasing and unmanageable.282 
Gina is coming to Jimmy with concerns about significant matters surrounding the 
wellbeing of her community. Even if she could secure some material gains—
perhaps if Jimmy wanted to ‘buy her off’ with a new school lunch programme so 
that she will stop challenging him—this would not have the effect of alleviating 
Gina’s concerns. If Jimmy has not shared and understood her concerns—if she had 
not succeeded in getting him to share her attention to areas of need—then Gina 
will not be inclined to release her attention from the matter. The real gift of a 
listener in Jimmy’s position is that by giving attentive uptake to Gina’s concerns, 
Gina can rest from attending to them. 
Gina has primacy over the Common Ground, and so he takes her view as 
granted, but he will continue working to understand how the various elements of 
their shared world give rise to the views that she asserts; why her priorities sit as 
they do, and why her views might warrant a change in his own. He goes with her 
 
282 Springer, Communicating Moral Concern, 112. 
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terminological choices, even when he does not understand why she takes some 
terminology to be demeaning. That is something he can make sense of in due 
course, as she continues filling in the Common Ground for him; meanwhile, he 
does not contest the choices. 
Often we (we the philosophers) are instinctively uncomfortable with any kind 
of suggestion that there might be a duty not to contest something, so we should 
remember here that the full ecological context is taken into account already in 
deriving these obligations and entitlements. It is because Jimmy is in a position of 
significant socio-political advantage over Gina, as well as in a position of direct 
institutional power over her concerns, and because we have established that she is 
indeed a responsible interlocutor, that this strong obligation arises. We would 
certainly not want to say that Gina has a reciprocal obligation to do the same, to 
not contest what Jimmy says, because she is in a very different socio-political and 
institutional position.  
Thus, in each aspect of this policy of responsiveness, Jimmy tasks himself 
with the ego work of treating his own views as contestable, of constantly 
confronting the possibility that he might actually be mistaken in his view of the 
world. He tasks himself with enduring the cognitive dissonance of taking on 
Gina’s views into the Common Ground no matter how sharply they contradict his 
own. He dedicates cognitive and emotional resources to connecting the dots as 
Gina speaks, grasping her illocutionary and perlocutionary aims, attending to her 
voice with elaborated central route processing and resisting the urge to silence 
Gina or to refuse giving uptake to utterances which challenge him and his views. 
The longer Jimmy maintains this policy of responsiveness toward Gina, the 
more he will grow to see and understand the perspectives she contributes to the 
Common Ground, and he will come to anticipate the robustness of her reasons. 
His perception of her voice becomes more rightly attuned, to Gina herself on the 
basis of their ongoing interactions, rather than to the ‘Blue-ness’ of her voice. It 
becomes Jimmy’s habituated response to take Gina seriously. There will of course 
be times when the two disagree; they will have a variety of reality disjunctures 
225 
 
preserved in their Common Ground, not least because they live in two very 
different experiences of reality. In future, as the parity between them increases, 
Jimmy will grow to have an apt sense of when a given conversation has been 
adequately played out and he has a handle on Gina’s point of view. This will enable 
the two to share more evenly the responsibility for maintaining the Enchronic 
Frame and for negotiating primacy over epistemic territories in the Common 
Ground. 
Consider the Samaritan 
 To close, I offer a case study which highlights the flexibility and 
explanatory value of the account I have put forward. In the course of developing 
this thesis, I ran my ideas past many thoughtful friends and fellow researchers. 
One evening, a friend asked me what my account would say about the Samaritans, 
a UK charity which maintains a helpline, available 24/7, for people in crisis to call 
and speak to someone.283 The volunteers who take the calls are not mental health 
experts; they have no particular expertise and in fact are trained to not give advice 
except, where appropriate, signposting callers to resources they might access for 
support. The stated aim of the Samaritans is to just listen to people in crisis, giving 
 
283 For further information see samaritans.org. 
Figure 7: Advertisement for the Samaritans charity at Edinburgh Waverly; photo by author 
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the callers space to work out their distress. Calls are anonymous; neither caller nor 
volunteer knows the other’s identity. If someone calls multiple times, they may 
never speak to the same volunteer twice. 
The question posed by my friend was: given these parameters, why is ‘being 
listened to’ by an anonymous stranger with no mental health expertise and no 
advice to give, something that would be valuable to people? Can my model explain 
what is beneficial about this kind of service? I would not presume to offer a fully 
fledged explanation of the function and benefits of this service; research exists to 
explore what the charity itself offers and why it is successful, and it would be the 
work of other disciplines to assess in detail how it functions.284 Nevertheless, I 
thought it was an interesting case study for my framework. What is a volunteer 
doing as a listener in this context? What does their listening offer to a caller? Here 
is what my framework would suggest: the listening offered by a Samaritans 
volunteer can be called Enchronic Minimalism. The volunteer holds open an 
Enchronic Frame for the caller in which the caller has completely free reign over 
the Common Ground. 
Because they do not know each other and the volunteer has no stakes in the 
game, the caller can explore their thoughts and feelings freely and without 
challenge. Neither party has enough connection to the other for reality 
disjunctures to arise; since the volunteer does not know the caller nor details of 
their life, they have no basis for disputing claims. Because the volunteer is not in a 
position to offer or prescribe intervention, the caller can articulate and reckon 
with their more upsetting thoughts, without fear of losing autonomy in the 
conversation. Part of the value here, it seems, is simply having the space in a 
conversation to explore difficult thoughts and feelings. Beyond this, there is 
further value in the fully asymmetric allocation of Common Ground primacy to the 
caller and Enchronic Frame maintenance to the volunteer. A caller who has been 
struggling with agency damage, fragmentation, depersonalisation, or any other 
 
284 Stephanie Stace and Clare Wyllie, ‘An Evaluation of Samaritans Emotional Support Services: Summary 
Report’ (Samaritans, 2011). 
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form of dis-integration has the opportunity to bring all of themselves into the 
Common Ground at once. The ‘reality disjunctures’ which exist within their 
experience of broken subjectivity can sit together in the Common Ground, with all 
the contradictions they entail, and yet the coherence of the conversational 
structure is maintained. The minimalist listener does not ask the caller to choose 
which claims are true, or to settle such fragmentation for the record. 
 
Instead, what the volunteer does offer through providing the minimally-
specified Enchronic Frame is the glue of co-relevance. At risk of overextending the 
metaphor, where the caller has struggled to re-integrate the fragmented elements 
of their subjectivity, the open enchronic support gives them a bit of ‘glue’ to hold 
things together, as they work out what it is that they need to do in the longer term 
to secure support for their mental health. The main listening task here is to trace 
and follow the meaningful connection between each of the moves in the 
conversation, and a listener who affirms that such meaningful connection is 
Figure 8: The Samaritan and Enchronic Minimalism - the Samaritan takes full responsibility for keeping up the Enchronic 
Frame (in green) and gives the caller full domain over the Common Ground for the duration of the call 
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possible creates space for the caller to rest and begin moving towards re-
integration.  
Because the volunteer’s moves are minimal, mostly back channel responses 
to underscore their continuing enchronic support, this serves to provide a chain 
of meaningful connections between the various thoughts and feelings of the 
distressed caller. The volunteer accepts each of these into the Common Ground 
without challenge, giving recognition to the caller, and a sense of coherence with 
the rest of human experience. Enchronic Minimalism offers the caller an 
experience of social connection, in which all epistemic, affective, and inferential 
commitments are stripped out of the Common Ground. No matter how sad or 
scary or shocking their thoughts are, the listening volunteer affirms that they can 
still find and experience connection and coherence with other people—that they 
can still be held by the special glue of co-relevance, that thing which provides the 
ground and grain for human interaction, and affirms their place in our wider 
discursive ecology. 
Conclusions 
 In this thesis, I have addressed the need for a robust account of listening. 
I have argued that there are reasons why this normatively significant concept has 
resisted theorisation in analytic philosophy, given that the frames we commonly 
use do not make the salience of this concept available to us. I supplied an alternate 
frame—the Discourse Ecology Model—and through extensive conceptual analysis 
and interpretation of empirical work in sociolinguistic sciences, I have supplied 
such an account. In sum, here are the things I established: 
1. Listening is a normatively loaded concept with which we express 
judgements about the normative value of a person’s mode of responsiveness—
to praise good listening, to blame people who fail or refuse to listen. 
2. An exemplar of virtuous listening has the full trifecta of excellences 
which characterise a virtue: right perceptions of what listening requires in a 
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given case; the intention to be rightly responsive to the speaker, and the skill 
required to produce the result that they do in fact listen to the speaker. 
3. Speech acts are performative, normative events; each one brings 
about normative changes, generating obligations and entitlements. 
4. To escape the Declarative Fallacy, we need a frame which is built to 
be responsive to the full context of utterances and to highlight the way that to 
speak is to do something in and to the normative context. To theorise the 
normativity of listening, we need an approach which centres what agents do, 
and do to each other, as listeners: that is, we need a pragmatic approach. 
5. We replace the Message in a Bottle frame and the Scoreboard frame 
with the Discourse Ecology Model, which predisposes us to a broad, pluralistic 
focus on the interactions between individual speakers, communities of 
speakers, social contexts, linguistic resources, and extenuating political and 
normative factors. 
6. Refusal to listen to someone is a kind of silencing based on bad faith 
withholding of reciprocity—refusing to give uptake to someone’s utterances. 
Repeated instances of this kind lead to dis-integration between the speaker’s 
communicative intentions and outcomes, which is the worry that animates 
the normativity of the concept of listening to someone. 
7. Cumulative silencing causes cumulative moral damage and can 
play a role in various kinds of harm, including gaslighting, fragmentation, 
and depersonalisation. 
8. Listening occurs not as a single action but as a course of action, 
brought about by a policy of responsiveness which coordinates various infra-
doings. The infra-doings of the listener include attentional habits, and 
willingness to give more-than-peripheral attention to someone’s voice. 
9. Speakers and listeners function as part of a wider discursive 
environment. The habits of individuals are shaped by and can also shape their 
environment; an individual’s habits can change, and such changes can spread 
through their discursive environment and become institutionalised, leading 
to social change. 
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10. A praiseworthy policy of responsiveness coordinates infra-doings 
at the intra-turn, inter-turn, meta-turn, and enchronic levels of structure. 
11. A blameworthy listener does not shoulder his rightful share of the 
labour and risk involved in the shared activity of conversation. 
12. A blameworthy listener does not allow his interlocutor her rightful 
share of access to modify the conversational Common Ground, but a 
praiseworthy listener acknowledges his interlocutor’s claims, even when this 
means sitting with the discomfort of leaving reality disjunctures open, rather 
than settling them for the record. 
13. A praiseworthy listener commits himself to upholding the 
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